July, 2013


30
Jul 13

Mail from the (Velvet) Cybercrime Underground

Over the past six months, “fans” of this Web site and its author have shown their affection in some curious ways. One called in a phony hostage situation that resulted in a dozen heavily armed police surrounding my home. Another opened a $20,000 new line of credit in my name. Others sent more than $1,000 in bogus PayPal donations from hacked accounts. Still more admirers paid my cable bill for the next three years using stolen credit cards. Malware authors have even used my name and likeness to peddle their wares.

“Flycracker,” the administrator of thecc.bz crime forum, hatches plan to send drugs to my home.

“Flycracker,” the administrator of thecc.bz crime forum, hatches plan to send drugs to my home.

But the most recent attempt to embarrass and fluster this author easily takes the cake as the most elaborate: Earlier this month, the administrator of an exclusive cybercrime forum hatched and executed a plan to purchase heroin, have it mailed to my home, and then spoof a phone call from one of my neighbors alerting the local police. Thankfully, I had already established a presence on his forum and was able to monitor the scam in real time and alert my local police well in advance of the delivery.

This would-be smear campaign was the brainchild of a fraudster known variously online as “Fly,” “Flycracker,” and MUXACC1 (muxa is transliterated Russian for “муха” which means “fly”). Fly is the administrator of the fraud forum “thecc[dot]bz,” an exclusive and closely guarded Russian language board dedicated to financial fraud and identity theft.

On July 14, Flycracker posted a new  forum discussion thread titled, “Krebs Fund,” in which he laid out his plan: He’d created a bitcoin wallet for the exclusive purpose of accepting donations from other members. The goal: purchase heroin in my name and address from a seller on the Silk Road, an online black market that is only reachable via the Tor network.  In the screenshot pictured above, Flycracker says to fellow members:

“Guys, it became known recently that Brian Krebs is a heroin addict and he desperately needs the smack, so we have started the “Helping Brian Fund”, and shortly we will create a bitcoin wallet called “Drugs for Krebs” which we will use to buy him the purest heroin on the Silk Road.  My friends, his withdrawal is very bad, let’s join forces to help the guy! We will save Brian from the acute heroin withdrawal and the world will get slightly better!”

Together, forum members raised more than 2 bitcoins – currently equivalent to about USD $200. At first, Fly tried to purchase a gram of heroin from a Silk Road vendor named 10toes, an anonymous seller who had excellent and plentiful feedback from previous buyers as a purveyor of reliably good heroin appropriate for snorting or burning and inhaling (see screnshot below).

Flycracker discussing the purchase of a gram of heroin from Silk Road seller "10toes."

Flycracker discussing the purchase of a gram of heroin from Silk Road seller “10toes.”

For some reason, that transaction with 10toes fell through, and Flycracker turned to another Silk Road vendor — Maestro — from whom he purchased a dozen baggies of heroin of “HIGH and consistent quality,” to be delivered to my home in Northern Virginia earlier today. The purchase was made using a new Silk Road account named “briankrebs7,” and cost 1.6532 bitcoins (~USD $165).

Flycracker ultimately bought 10 small bags of smack from Silk Road seller "Maestro."

Flycracker ultimately bought 10 small bags of smack from Silk Road seller “Maestro.” The seller threw in two extra bags for free (turns out he actually threw in three extra bags).

In the screen shot below, Fly details the rest of his plan:

“12 sacks of heroin [the seller gives 2 free sacks for a 10-sacks order] are on the road, can anyone make a call [to the police] from neighbors, with a record? Seller said the package will be delivered after 3 days, on Tuesday. If anyone calls then please say that drugs are hidden well.”

h3

Last week, I alerted the FBI about this scheme, and contacted a Fairfax County Police officer who came out and took an official report about it. The cop who took the report just shook his head incredulously, and kept saying he was trying to unplug himself from various accounts online with the ultimate goal of being “off the Internet and Google” by the time he retired. Before he left, the officer said he would make a notation on my report so that any officer dispatched to respond to complaints about drugs being delivered via mail to my home would prompted to review my report.

FOLLOWING THE MONEY

I never doubted Flycracker”s resolve for a minute, but I still wanted to verify his claims about having made the purchase. On that front I received assistance from Sara Meiklejohn, a graduate student at the University of California, San Diego who’s been analyzing the role of bitcoin and anonymity on the Silk Road. Meiklejohn confirmed that the bitcoin wallet linked to in Fly’s forum thread was indeed used to deposit two bitcoins into a purse controlled by anonymous individuals who help manage commerce on the Silk Road.

Meiklejohn and fellow researcher Damon McCoy, an assistant professor of computer science at George Mason University, have been mapping out a network of bitcoin wallets that are used exclusively by the curators of the Silk Road. If you wish to transact with merchants on the Silk Road, you need to fund your account with bitcoins. The act of adding credits appears to be handled by a small number of bitcoin purses.

“All Silk Road purchases are handled internally by Silk Road, which means money trades hands from the Silk Road account of the buyer to the Silk Road account of the seller,”  explained Meiklejohn, author of the paper, A Fistful of Bitcoins: Characterizing Payments Among Men with No Names, to be released in October 2013 at the ACM Internet Measurement Conference in Barcelona, Spain.

Continue reading →


29
Jul 13

Don’t Get Sucker Pumped

Gas pump skimmers are getting craftier. A new scam out of Oklahoma that netted thieves $400,000 before they were caught is a reminder of why it’s usually best to pay with credit versus debit cards when filling up the tank.

The U.S. Attorney’s office in Muskogee, Okla. says two men indicted this month for skimming would rent a vehicle, check into a local hotel and place skimming devices on gas pumps at Murphy’s filling stations located in the parking lots of Wal-Mart retail stores. The fraud devices included a card skimmer and a fake PIN pad overlay designed to capture PINs from customers who paid at the pump with a debit card.

A PIN pad overlay device for gas pumps. Photo; NewsOn6.com

A PIN pad overlay device for gas pumps. Photo; NewsOn6.com

According to their indictment (PDF), defedants Kevin Konstantinov and Elvin Alisuretove would leave the skimming devices in place for between one and two months. Then they’d collect the skimmers and use the stolen data to create counterfeit cards, visiting multiple ATMs throughout the region and withdrawing large amounts of cash. Investigators say some of the card data stolen in the scheme showed up in fraudulent transactions in Eastern Europe and Russia.

As the Oklahoma case shows, gas pump skimmers have moved from analog, clunky things to the level of workmanship and attention to detail that is normally only seen in ATM skimmers. Investigators in Oklahoma told a local news station that the skimmer technology used in this case was way more sophisticated than anything they’ve seen previously.

Continue reading →


26
Jul 13

Security Vendors: Do No Harm, Heal Thyself

Security companies would do well to build their products around the physician’s code: “First, do no harm.” The corollary to that oath borrows from another medical mantra: “Security vendor, heal thyself. And don’t take forever to do it! ”

crackedsymOn Thursday, Symantec quietly released security updates to fix serious vulnerabilities in its Symantec Web Gateway, a popular line of security appliances designed to help “protect organizations against multiple types of Web-borne malware.” Symantec issued the updates more than five months after receiving notice of the flaws from Vienna, Austria based SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab, which said attackers could chain together several of the flaws to completely compromise the appliances.

“An attacker can get unauthorized access to the appliance and plant backdoors or access configuration files containing credentials for other systems (eg. Active Directory/LDAP credentials) which can be used in further attacks,” SEC Consult warned in an advisory published in coordination with the patches from Symantec. “Since all web traffic passes through the appliance, interception of HTTP as well as the plain text form of HTTPS traffic (if SSL Deep Inspection feature in use), including sensitive information like passwords and session cookies is possible.”

Big Yellow almost certainly dodged a bullet with this coordinated disclosure, and it should be glad that the bugs weren’t found by a researcher at NATO, for example; Earlier this month, security vendor McAfee disclosed multiple vulnerabilities in its ePolicy Orchestrator, a centralized security management product. The researcher in that case said he would disclose his findings within 30 days of notifying the company, and McAfee turned around an advisory in less than a week.

Interestingly, Google’s security team is backing a new seven-day security deadline that would allow researchers to make serious vulnerabilities public a week after notifying a company. Google says a week-long disclosure timeline is appropriate for critical vulnerabilities that are under active exploitation, and that its standing recommendation is that companies should fix critical vulnerabilities in 60 days, or, if a  fix is not possible, they should notify the public about the risk and offer workarounds.

Continue reading →


25
Jul 13

Hacker Ring Stole 160 Million Credit Cards

U.S. federal authorities have indicted five men — four Russians and a Ukrainian – for allegedly perpetrating many of the biggest cybercrimes of the past decade, including the theft of more than 160 million credit card numbers from major U.S. retailers, banks and card processors.

The gang is thought to be responsible for the 2007 breach at credit card processor Heartland Payment Systems that exposed some 130 million card numbers, as well as the 2011 breach at Global Payments that involved nearly a million accounts and cost the company almost $100 million.

Federal prosecutors in New Jersey today called the case the largest hacking scheme ever prosecuted in the U.S. Justice Department officials said the men were part of a gang run by Albert “Soupnazi” Gonzalez, a hacker arrested in 2008 who is currently serving a 20-year-prison sentence for his role in many of the breaches, including the theft of some 90 million credit cards from retailer TJX.

One of the accused, 27-year-0ld Dmitriy Smilianets, is in U.S. custody. Vladimir Drinkman, 32 of Syktyvkar, Russia, is awaiting extradition to the United States. Three others named in the indictments remain at large, including Aleksandr Kalinin, 26 of St. Petersburg; 32-year-old Roman Kotov from Moscow; and Mikhail Rytikov, 26, of Odessa, Ukraine.

According to the government’s indictment, other high-profile heists tied to this gang include compromises at:

Hannaford Brothers Co: 2007, 4.2 million card numbers

Carrefour S.A.: 2007, 2 million card numbers

Commidea Ltd.: 2008, 30 million card numbers

Euronet: 2010, 2 million card numbers

Visa, Inc.: 2011, 800,000 card numbers

Discover Financial Services: 500,000 Diners card numbers

In addition, the group is being blamed for breaking into and planting malware on the networks of NASDAQ, 7-Eleven, JetBlue, JCPenny, Wet Seal, Dexia, Dow Jones, and Ingenicard.

The hackers broke into their targets using SQL injection attacks, which take advantage of weak server configurations to inject malicious code into the database behind the public-facing Web server. Once inside, the attackers can upload software and siphon data.

The government’s indictment alleges that the thieves were at times overwhelmed by the sheer amount of data yielded by their SQL attacks.  On Aug. 12, 2007, Kalinin allegedly sent Gonzalez  an instant message that he’d just gained access to 30 SQL servers on NASDAQ’s network, but hadn’t yet cracked the administrator passwords that secured the data inside. “These [databases] are hell big and I think most of info is trading histories.” On Jan. 9, 2008, after Gonzalez offered to help attack the trading floor’s computer systems, Kalinin allegedly messaged back, “NASDAQ is owned.”

Continue reading →


25
Jul 13

Haunted by the Ghosts of ZeuS & DNSChanger

One of the challenges in malware research is separating the truly novel innovations in malcoding from new nasties that merely include nominal or superficial tweaks. This dynamic holds true for both malware researchers and purveyors, albeit for different reasons. Researchers wish to avoid being labeled alarmist in calling special attention to what appears to be an emerging threat that turns out to be old news; the bad guys just want to avoid getting scammed into paying for an old malware kit dressed up as the new next big thing.

Source: RSA

Source: RSA

On Tuesday, RSA Security somewhat breathlessly announced that it had spotted KINS, a ZeuS Trojan variant that looked like “a new professional-grade banking Trojan” that was likely to emerge as the “next Trojan epiphany” in the cybercrime underground. RSA said the emergence of KINS was notable because the reigning ZeuS Trojan derivative – the Citadel Trojan — had long ago been taken off the market, and that crooks were anxiously awaiting the development and sale of a new botnet creation kit based on the leaked ZeuS source code.

Since December 2012, when the spokesperson of the Citadel team took the Trojan off the semi-open underground market, cyber criminals have been scrambling to find a replacement,” RSA’s Limor Kessem wrote. “In early February 2013, RSA fraud intelligence researchers began tracing hints about a new crimeware tool called ‘KINS’. At the time, the information about the Trojan just a rumor, but in sporadic comments, fraudsters were associating a Trojan named KINS with the Citadel source code, looking for its developer in order to reach out to him and purchase KINS. The rumors were soon hushed and ties to Citadel were denied, mostly in what appeared as a case of fearful fraudsters who did not want to be denied the possibility to buy the next Trojan.”

But according to Fox-IT, a security research and consulting group based in The Netherlands, KINS has been used in private since at least December 2011 to attack financial institutions in Europe, specifically Germany and The Netherlands. Fox-IT says KINS is short for “Kasper Internet Non-Security,” which is likely the malware author’s not-so-subtle dig at the security suite offered by Russian antivirus maker Kaspersky.

Source: Fox-IT

Source: Fox-IT

In its own analysis of the banking Trojan malware, Fox-IT said KINS is fully based on the leaked ZeuS source code, and includes only minor additions. What’s more, Fox-IT notes, many of the users of KINS have already migrated to yet another ZeuS variant, suggesting that perhaps they were unsatisfied with the product and that it didn’t deliver as advertised.

“While the technical additions are interesting, they are far from ground breaking,” wrote Michael Sandee, principal security expert at Fox-IT. “With an array of fairly standard features, and relatively simple additions to the standard ZeuS, such as reporting of installed security product information, the malware platform does not bring anything really new. There are however some features of this malware, not aimed at the functionality for the person using it, but aimed at complicating malware analysis.”

OLD MALWARE, NEW PAINTJOB?

From the bad-guy perspective, this infighting over malware innovation is on display in a new malware offering that surfaced today on a semi-private forum: The seller is pitching a resurrected and modified version of the DNSChanger Trojan, a global contagion that once infected millions of PCs. The DNSChanger botnet, which hooked into infected systems quite deeply and spread to both Windows and Mac computers, was eradicated only by a worldwide, concerted digital quarantine and vaccination effort — combined with the arrest of its creators.

Continue reading →


24
Jul 13

Toward A Greater Mobile Mal-Awareness

Several recent developments in mobile malware are conspiring to raise the threat level for Android users, making it easier for attackers to convert legitimate applications into malicious apps and to undermine the technology that security experts use to tell the difference.

Source: Symantec

Source: Symantec

Last week, Symantec warned about a new malware toolkit or “binder” designed to Trojanize legitimate Android apps with a backdoor that lets miscreants access infected mobile devices remotely. Binders have been around in a variety of flavors for many years, but they typically are used to backdoor Microsoft Windows applications.

Symantec notes that the point-and-click Androrat APK Binder is being used in conjunction with an open-source remote access Trojan for Android devices called called AndroRAT. “Like other RATs, it allows a remote attacker to control the infected device using a user friendly control panel,” Symantec’s Andrea Lelli wrote. “For example, when running on a device, AndroRAT can monitor and make phone calls and SMS messages, get the device’s GPS coordinates, activate and use the camera and microphone and access files stored on the device.”

The company said while it has detected only a few hundred AndroRAT infections worldwide, but that it expects that number increase as more tools for AndroRAT like the APK binder emerge.

Perhaps more worryingly, Symantec said this week that it had discovered two malicious Android apps in the wild that take advantage of a newly discovered and potentially quite serious security hole in Android applications. As first outlined roughly two weeks ago by researchers at BlueBox Security, the so-called “Master Key” vulnerability could let attackers convert almost any Android application into a Trojan, all without altering its cryptographic digital signature. Android uses these signatures to determine if an app is legitimate and to verify that an app hasn’t been tampered with or modified.

Continue reading →


23
Jul 13

One-Stop Bot Chop-Shops

New fraudster-friendly content management systems are making it more likely than ever that crooks who manage botnets and other large groupings of hacked PCs will extract and sell all credentials of value that can be harvested from the compromised machines.

Templates like this are helping to spread one-stop-fraud shops.

Templates like this are helping to spread one-stop-fraud shops.

I’ve often observed that botmasters routinely fail to fully eat what they kill. That is, they tend to chronically undervalue the computers at their disposal, and instead focus on extracting specific resources from hacked PCs, such as using them as spam relays or harvesting online banking credentials. Meanwhile, other assets on the hacked PC that have street value go unused and “wasted” from the fraudster’s perspective.

More often, when miscreants do seek to extract and monetize all of the account credentials from their hacked PCs, they do so by selling access to their raw botnet “logs” — huge text files that document the notable daily activities of the botted systems. To borrow from another food metaphor, this is the digital equivalent of small farms selling their fruits and vegetables as “pick-your-own;” such commerce produces some added revenue without requiring much more work on the seller’s part.

Recently, I’ve been spotting more online fraud shops set up using what appear to be pre-set templates that can be used to sell all manner of credentials from hacked PCs. These shops all sell credit and debit card information, of course, but also lists of emails culled from victim computers, hacked VPN and RDP credentials, Cpanel installations, PHP mailers, FTP access, SSH logins, and online gambling accounts. Some of the panels are even reselling hacked credentials at popular porn sites. Goods can be purchased via virtual currencies such as Perfect Money and bitcoin.

The shop shown below — blackhatstore[dot]ru — borrows the trademarked image of the Black Hat security conference franchise. It’s sometimes said that there’s no such thing as bad press, but I’m pretty sure the folks at Black Hat don’t want their brand advertised or associated in this way (by the way, I’ll be speaking at this year’s Black Hat in Las Vegas next week). I alerted the Black Hat organizers to this fraudulent site, so I wouldn’t expect it to remain live much longer.

This bot chop shop trades on the good name and trademarks of the Black Hat security conference franchise owned by UBM Tech.

This bot chop shop trades on the good name and trademarks of the Black Hat security conference franchise owned by UBM Tech.

Continue reading →


19
Jul 13

Styx Crypt Makers Push DDoS, Anti-Antivirus Services

I recently published a piece that examined the role of several Ukrainian men likely responsible for making and marketing the Styx Pack malware exploit kit. Today’s post will show how this same enterprise is linked to a DDoS protection scheme and a sprawling cybercrook-friendly malware scanning service that is bundled with Styx-Crypt.

Anonymous antivirus scanning service -- captain-checker[dot]com -- bundled with the Styx exploit pack.

Anonymous antivirus scanning service — captain-checker.com — bundled with Styx.

As I noted in a graphic accompanying a July 8 analysis of Styx, the $3,000 exploit pack includes a built-in antivirus scanning service that employs at least 17 antivirus products. The scanning service is “anonymous,” in that it alerts Styx customers whenever one of the antivirus tool detects their malware  as such, but the service also prevents the antivirus products from reporting home about the new malware detections.

When Styx customers click on one of these malware scanning reports from within the Styx pack panel itself, the full scanning results are displayed in a new browser window at the domain captain-checker[dot]com (see screenshot above). The Styx panel that I examined earlier this month was based at the Internet address 5.199.167.196, and was reachable only by appending the port number 10665 to the numeric address. At first, I thought this might be a standard port used by Styx installations but that turns out not to be the case, according to interviews with other researchers. I didn’t realize it at the time, but now I’m thinking it’s likely that the panel I examined was actually one run by the Styx Pack curators themselves.

I discovered that although captain-checker[dot]com is hosted at another address (46.21.146.130), it also had this 10665 port open. I noticed then that captain-checker shares that server with 12 other Web sites. All of those sites also respond on port 10665, each revealing a captain-checker login page. Among the 12 is uptimer[dot]biz, one of two sites that led to the identity of Alexander “Nazar” Nazarenko — one of the main marketers and sellers of Styx pack.

styx-reality7-mapNot only are all of these sites on the same server, an Nmap scan of these systems shows that they all are on the same Windows workgroup — “Reality7.” This dovetails nicely with the other domain that I noted in that July 10 story as tied to Nazarenko — reality7solutions[dot]com.

Many of the other domains on the server (see graphic to the left) use some variation of the word “wizard,” and share a Google Analytics code, UA-19307857. According to SameID.net, this code is embedded in the homepage for at least 38 different Web sites.

In my previous story on Nazarenko and his Styx Pack business partner — Max “Ikar” Gavryuk —  I noted that both men were advertising “Reality Guard,” a service to help protect clients from distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks designed to knock sites offline. I had a closer look at their site — reality-guard[dot]com — and learned several interesting things: For starters, the site also responds with a captain-checker[dot]com login page when you append “:10665″ to the domain name. It also is on a Microsoft Windows workgroup called “Reality7″. Finally, the reality-guard[dot]com home page includes an icon for virtual currency Webmoney that when hovered over pops up Nazar’s Webmoney account (someone changed the name on this account from “Nazar” to “Lives” within hours after my July 10 story on the Styx Pack purveyors).

Continue reading →


18
Jul 13

Botcoin: Bitcoin Mining by Botnet

An increasing number of malware samples in the wild are using host systems to secretly mine bitcoins. In this post, I’ll look at an affiliate program that pays people for the mass installation of programs that turns host machines into bitcoin mining bots.

The FeodalCash bitcoin mining affiliate program.

The FeodalCash bitcoin mining affiliate program.

Bitcoin is a decentralized, virtual currency, and bitcoins are created by large numbers of CPU-intensive cryptographic calculations. As Wikipedia explains, the processing of Bitcoin transactions is secured by servers called bitcoin miners. These servers communicate over an internet-based network and confirm transactions by adding them to a ledger which is updated and archived periodically using peer-to-peerfilesharing technology. In addition to archiving transactions, each new ledger update creates some newly minted bitcoins.

Earlier this week, I learned of a Russian-language affiliate program called FeodalCash which pays its members to distribute a bitcoin mining bot that forces host PCs to process bitcoin transactions (hat tip to security researcher Xylitol). FeodalCash opened its doors in May 2013, and has been recruiting new members who can demonstrate that they have control over enough Internet traffic to guarantee at least several hundred installs of the bitcoin mining malware each day.

The FeodalCash administrator claims his mining program isn’t malware, although he cautions all affiliates against submitting the installer program to multi-antivirus scanners such as Virustotal; sending the program that installs bitcoin mining bot to Virustotal “greatly complicates the work with antivirus” on host PCs. Translation: Because services like Virustotal share information about new malware samples with all participating antivirus vendors, scanning the installer will make it more likely that antivirus products on host PCs will flag the program as malicious. Rather, the administrator urged users who want to check the files for antivirus detection to use a criminal friendly service like scan4u[dot]net or chk4me[dot]com, which likewise scan submitted files with dozens of different antivirus tools but block those tools from reporting home about new and unidentified malware variants.

This Google-translated version of the site shows the builder for the installer.

This Google-translated version of the site shows the builder for the installer.

I gained access to an affiliate account and was able to grab a copy of the mining program. I promptly submitted the file to Virustotal and found it was flagged as a trojan horse program by at least two antivirus products. This analysis at automated malware scanning site malwr.com shows that the mining program installer ads a Windows registry key so that the miner starts each time Windows boots up. It also indicates that the program beacons out to pastebin.com (perhaps to deposit a note about each new installation).

The FeodalCash administrator also claims that his affiliates are not permitted to distribute the installer file in any way that violates the law, but of course it’s unclear which national laws he might be talking about. At the same time, the affiliate program’s Web site includes a graphical tool that helps affiliates create a custom installer program that can install silently and be disguised with a variety of program icons that are similar to familiar Windows icons.

Also, the administrator demands that new users demonstrate the ability to garner hundreds to thousands of installs per day. This is a rather high install rate, and it appears many if not all affiliates are installing the mining program by bundling it with other executable programs distributed by so-called pay-per-install (PPI) programs. This was apparent because a source managed to gain administrative-level access to the back-end database for the FeodalCash program, which includes hundreds of messages between affiliates and the administrator; most of those messages are from new registrants sending the administrator screenshots  of their traffic and installs statistics at various PPI affiliate programs.

Continue reading →


16
Jul 13

Getting Skimpy With ATM Skimmers

Cybercrooks can be notoriously cheap, considering how much they typically get for nothing. I’m reminded of this when I occasionally stumble upon underground forum members trying to  sell a used ATM skimmer: Very often, the sales thread devolves into a flame war over whether the fully-assembled ATM skimmer is really worth more than the sum of its parts.

Card skimmer device made for Wincor/Nixdorf ATMs

Card skimmer device made for Wincor/Nixdorf ATMs

Such was the fate of an audio-based ATM skimmer put up for sale recently on a private crime forum. The seller, a Ukrainian, was trying to offload a relatively pro-grade skimmer powered by parts cannibalized from an MP3 player and a small spy camera. The seller set the price at $2,450, but made the mistake of describing the device’s various parts, all of which can be purchased inexpensively from a variety of online retailers.

For example, he told forum members that the main component in the card skimmer as an MSR-605, which is a handheld magnetic stripe reader of the sort that you might find attached to a cash register/point-of-sale machine at a retail clothing store, for example.

This ubiquitous device can be had for approximately $200 at a number of places online, including Newegg.com and Amazon.com. The seller went on to describe the inexpensive flash storage drive that was incorporated in his device, and the modified tiny video camera that was hidden on the underside of a fake fascia designed to be affixed to the top of the ATM and record victims entering their PINs.

This tiny spy camera powers the fake ATM fascia that records victims entering their PINs.

This tiny spy camera powers the fake ATM fascia that records victims entering their PINs.

The image below shows the fake fascia as it appears from the side meant to be pointed toward the PIN pad. IMG_1871

Continue reading →