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  • Pharma Wars


    3
    Apr 12

    Gateline.net Was Key Rogue Pharma Processor

    It was mid November 2011. I was shivering on the upper deck of an aging cruise ship docked at the harbor in downtown Rotterdam. Inside, a big-band was jamming at a reception for attendees of the GovCert cybersecurity conference, where I had delivered a presentation earlier that day on a long-running turf war between two of the largest sponsors of spam.

    Promenade of SS Rotterdam. Copyright: Peter Jaspers

    The evening was bracingly frigid and blustery, and I was waiting there to be introduced to investigators from the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB). Several FSB agents who attended the conference told our Dutch hosts that they wanted to meet me, but in a private setting. Stepping out the night air, a woman from the conference approached, formally presented the three men behind her, and then hurried back inside to the warmth of the reception.

    A middle-aged stocky fellow introduced as the senior FSB officer spoke in Russian, while a younger gentleman translated into English. They asked did I know anything about a company in Moscow called “Onelia“? I said no, asked them to spell it for me, and inquired as to why they were interested in this firm. The top FSB official said they believed the company was heavily involved in processing payments for a variety of organized cyber criminal enterprises.

    Later that evening, back at my hotel room, I searched online for details about the company, but came up dry. I considered asking some of my best sources in Russia what they knew about Onelia. But a voice inside my head warned that the FSB agents may have been hoping I’d do just that, and that they would then be able to divine who my sources were when those individuals began making inquiries about a mysterious (and probably fictitious) firm called Onelia.

    My paranoia got the best of me, and I shelved the information. That is, until just the other day, when I discovered that Onelia (turns out it is more commonly spelled Oneliya) was the name of the limited liability company behind Gateline.net, the credit card processor that processed tens of thousands of customer transactions for SpamIt and Rx-Promotion. These two programs, the subject of my Pharma Wars series, paid millions of dollars to the most notorious spammers on the planet, hiring them to blast junk email advertising thousands of rogue Internet pharmacies over a four-year period.

    WHO IS ‘SHAMAN’?

    Gateline.net states that the company’s services are used by firms across a variety of industries, including those in tourism, airline tickets, mobile phones, and virtual currencies. But according to payment and affiliate records leaked from both SpamIt and Rx-Promotion, Gateline also was used to process a majority of the rogue pharmacy site purchases that were promoted by spammers working for the two programs. Continue reading →


    21
    Mar 12

    Bredolab Botmaster ‘Birdie’ Still at Large

    Employee and financial records leaked from some of the world’s largest sponsors of spam provide new clues about the identity of a previously unknown Russian man believed to have been closely tied to the development and maintenance of “Bredolab,” a massive collection of hacked machines that was disassembled in an international law enforcement sweep in late 2010.

    Bredolab grew swiftly after Birdie introduced his load system.

    In October 2010, Armenian authorities arrested and imprisoned 27-year-old Georg Avanesov on suspicion of running Bredolab, a botnet that infected an estimated 3 million PCs per month through virus-laden e-mails and booby-trapped Web sites. The arrest resulted from a joint investigation between Armenian police and cyber sleuths in the Netherlands, whose ISPs were home to at least 143 servers that were used to direct the botnet’s activities.

    Dutch and Armenian investigators have long suspected that Avanesov worked closely with an infamous Russian botmaster who used the nickname “Birdie,” but so far they have been unable to learn the Russian’s real identity or whereabouts.

    “He was a close associate of Gregory A.,” Pim Takkenberg, team leader of the National High Tech Crime Unit in the Netherlands, said of the hacker known as Birdie. “Actually, we were never able to fully identify him.”

    According to records leaked from SpamIt — a pharmacy affiliate program that was the victim of a data breach in 2010 — Birdie was an affiliate with SpamIt along with Avanesov. Neither affiliates earned much from SpamIt directly; they both made far more money selling other spammers access to Bredolab.

    Birdie was also the nickname of a top member of Spamdot.biz, a now-defunct forum that once counted among its members nearly all of the big names in Spamit, as well as a dozen competing spam affiliate programs. Birdie’s core offering on Spamdot was the “Birdie Load System,” which allowed other members to buy “installs” of their own malware by loading it onto machines already infected with Bredolab.

    So successful and popular was the Birdie Load System among Spamdot members that Birdie eventually had to create a customer queuing system, scheduling new loads days or weeks in advance for high volume customers. According to his own postings on Spamdot, Birdie routinely processed at least 50,000 new loads or installs for customers each day.

    “Due to the fact that many of my clients very much hate waiting in line, we’ve begun selling access to weekly slots,” Birdie wrote. “If a ‘slot’ is purchased, independently from other customers, the person who purchased the slot is guaranteed service.”

    Using Birdie’s Bredolab load system, spammers could easily re-seed their own spam botnets, and could rely upon load systems like this one to rebuild botnets that had been badly damaged from targeted takedowns by anti-spam activists and/or law enforcement. Bredolab also was commonly used to deploy new installations of the ZeuS Trojan, which has been used in countless online banking heists against consumers and businesses.

    Below is a translated version of Birdie’s Dec. 2008 post to Spamdot describing the rules, prices and capabilities of his malware loading machine (click the image below twice for an enlarged version of the Spamdot discussion thread from which this translation was taken). Continue reading →


    12
    Mar 12

    Half of All ‘Rogue’ Pharmacies at Two Registrars

    Half of all “rogue” online pharmacies — sites that sell prescription drugs without requiring a prescription — got their Web site names from just two domain name registrars, a study released today found. The findings illustrate the challenges facing Internet policymakers in an industry that is largely self-regulated and rewards companies who market their services as safe havens for shadowy businesses.

    Source: LegitScript

    There are about 450 accredited domain name registrars worldwide, but at least one-third of all active rogue pharmacy sites are registered at Internet.bs, a relatively small registrar that purports to operate out of the Bahamas and aggressively markets itself as an “offshore” registrar. That’s according to LegitScript, a verification and monitoring service for online pharmacies.

    LegitScript President John Horton said the company began to suspect that Internet.bs was courting the rogue pharmacy business when it became clear that the registrar has only two-tenths of one percent of the market share for new Web site name registrations. In a report (PDF) being released today, LegitScript said that a separate analysis of more than 9,000 “not recommended” pharmacies compiled by the National Association of Boards of Pharmacy suggested that Internet.bs is sponsoring nearly 44 percent of the Internet’s dodgy pill shops.

    Asked whether he was concerned about allegations that his firm was targeting an industry that seeks out registrars who turn a blind eye to questionable businesses, Internet.bs President Marco Rinaudo replied that, on the contrary, LegitScript’s report was bound to be “excellent advertising for our company.”

    Reached via phone at his home in Panama, Rinaudo said he was under no obligation to police whether his customers’ business may be in violation of some other nation’s laws, absent clear and convincing evidence that his registrants were operating illegally from their own country.

    “Even though I understand they could bother some pharmacy lobby, if an industry likes us, what’s the problem with an online pharmacy, as long as they are operating legally from their own country?” Rinaudo asked. “We cannot accept pressure to shut down a legitimate business just because it is not pleasing to some political lobbying group. We and I personally make sure that all the domains that are in breach of an applicable law and for which we receive a complete report, will be acted on the same day.”

    Continue reading →


    17
    Feb 12

    Zeus Trojan Author Ran With Spam Kingpins

    The cybercrime underground is expanding each day, yet the longer I study it the more convinced I am that much of it is run by a fairly small and loose-knit group of hackers. That suspicion was reinforced this week when I discovered that the author of the infamous ZeuS Trojan was a core member of Spamdot, until recently the most exclusive online forum for spammers and the shady businessmen who support the big spam botnets.

    Thanks to a deep-seated enmity between the owners of two of the largest spam affiliate programs, the database for Spamdot was leaked to a handful of investigators and researchers, including KrebsOnSecurity. The forum includes all members’ public posts and private messages — even those that members thought had been deleted. I’ve been poring over those private messages in an effort to map alliances and to learn more about the individuals behind the top spam botnets.

    The Zeus author's identity on Spamdot, selling an overstock of "installs."

    As I was reviewing the private messages of a Spamdot member nicknamed “Umbro,” I noticed that he gave a few key members his private instant message address, the jabber account bashorg@talking.cc. In 2010, I learned from multiple reliable sources that for several months, this account was used exclusively by the ZeuS author to communicate with new and existing customers. When I dug deeper into Umbro’s private messages, I found several from other Spamdot members who were seeking updates to their ZeuS botnets. In messages from 2009 to a Spamdot member named “Russso,” Umbro declares flatly, “hi, I’m the author of Zeus.”

    Umbro’s public and private Spamdot postings offer a fascinating vantage point for peering into an intensely competitive and jealously guarded environment in which members feed off of each others’ successes and failures. The messages also provide a virtual black book of customers who purchased the ZeuS bot code.

    In the screen shot above, the ZeuS author can be seen selling surplus “installs,” offering to rent hacked machines that fellow forum members can seed with their own spam bots (I have added a translation beneath each line). His price is $60 per 1,000 compromised systems. This is a very reasonable fee and is in line with rates charged by more organized pay-per-install businesses that also tend to stuff host PCs with so much other malware that customers who have paid to load their bots on those machines soon find them unstable or unusable. Other members apparently recognized it as a bargain as well, and he quickly received messages from a number of interested takers.

    The image below shows the Zeus author parceling out a small but potentially valuable spam resource that was no doubt harvested from systems compromised by his Trojan. In this solicitation, dated Jan. 2008, Umbro is selling a mailing list that would be especially useful for targeted email malware campaigns.

    Continue reading →


    1
    Feb 12

    Who’s Behind the World’s Largest Spam Botnet?

    A Wikileaks-style war of attrition between two competing rogue Internet pharmacy gangs has exposed some of the biggest spammers on the planet. The latest casualties? Several individuals likely responsible for running Grum, currently the world’s most active spam botnet.

    Grum is the top spam botnet, according to M86Security

    In the summer of 2010, hackers stole and leaked the database for SpamIt and Glavmed, sister programs that paid people to promote fly-by-night online pharmacies. According to that data, the second-most successful affiliate in SpamIt was a member nicknamed “GeRa.” Over a 3-year period, GeRa’s advertisements and those of his referrals resulted in at least 80,000 sales of knockoff pharmaceuticals, brought SpamIt revenues of in excess of $6 million, and earned him and his pals more than $2.7 million.

    A variety of data indicate that GeRa is the lead hacker behind Grum, a spam botnet that can send more than 18 billion emails a day and is the primary vehicle for more than a third of all junk email.

    Hackers bent on undermining SpamIt leaked thousands of chats between SpamIt members and Dmitry Stupin, the co-administrator of the program. The chats show daily communication between GeRa and Stupin; the conversations were usually about setting up new spamming operations or fixing problems with existing infrastructure. In fact, Stupin would remark that GeRa was by far the most bothersome of all the program’s top spammers, telling a fellow SpamIt administrator that, “Neither Docent [Mega-D botmaster] nor Cosma [Rustock botmaster] can compare with him in terms of trouble with hosting providers.”

    Several of those chats show GeRa pointing out issues with specific Internet addresses that would later be flagged as control servers for the Grum botnet. For example, in a chat with Stupin on June 11, 2008, GeRa posts a link to the address 206.51.234.136. Then after checking the server, he proceeds to tell Stupin how many infected PCs were phoning home to that address at the time. That same server has long been identified as a Grum controller.

    By this time, Grum had grown to such an established threat that it was named in the Top Spam Botnets Exposed paper released by Dell SecureWorks researcher Joe Stewart. On  April 13, 2008 – just five days after Stewart’s analysis was released -  GeRa would post a link to it into a chat with Stupin, saying “Haha, I am also on the list!” Continue reading →


    26
    Jan 12

    Mr. Waledac: The Peter North of Spamming

    Microsoft on Monday named a Russian man as allegedly responsible for running the Kelihos botnet, a spam engine that infected an estimated 40,000 PCs. But closely held data seized from a huge spam affiliate program suggests that the driving force behind Kelihos is a different individual who commanded a much larger spam empire, and who is still coordinating spam campaigns for hire.

    Kelihos shares a great deal of code with the infamous Waledac botnet, a far more pervasive threat that infected hundreds of thousands of computers and pumped out tens of billions of junk emails promoting shady online pharmacies. Despite the broad base of shared code between the two malware families, Microsoft classifies them as fundamentally different threats. The company used novel legal techniques to seize control over and shutter both botnets, sucker punching Waledac in early 2010 and taking out Kelihos last fall.

    On Monday, Microsoft filed papers with a Virginia court stating that Kelihos was operated by Andrey N. Sabelnikov, a St. Petersburg man who once worked at Russian antivirus and security firm Agnitum. But according to the researcher who shared that intelligence with Microsoft — and confidentially with Krebs On Security weeks prior to Microsoft’s announcement — Sabelnikov is likely only a developer of Kelihos.

    “It’s the same code with modifications,” said Brett Stone-Gross, a security analyst who came into possession of the Kelihos source code last year and has studied the two malware families extensively.

    Rather, Stone-Gross said, the true coordinator of both Kelihos and Waledac is likely another Russian who is well known to anti-spam activists.

    WHO IS SEVERA?

    A variety of indicators suggest that the person behind Waledac and later Kelihos is a man named “Peter Severa” — known simply as “Severa” on underground forums. For several years running, Severa has featured in the Top 10 worst spammers list published by anti-spam activists at Spamhaus.org (he currently ranks at #5). Spamhaus alleged that Severa was the Russian partner of convicted U.S. pump-and-dump stock spammer Alan Ralsky, and indeed Peter Severa was indicted by the U.S. Justice Department in a related and ongoing spam investigation.

    It turns out that the connection between Waledac and Severa is supported by data leaked in 2010 after hackers broke into the servers of pharmacy spam affiliate program SpamIt. The data also include tantalizing clues about Severa’s real identity.

    In multiple instances, Severa gives his full name as “Peter North;” Peter Severa translates literally from Russian as “Peter of the North.” (The nickname may be a nod to the porn star Peter North, which would be fitting given that Peter North the spammer promoted shady pharmacies whose main seller was male enhancement drugs).

    Spamdot.biz moderator Severa listing prices to rent his Waledac spam botnet.

    According to SpamIt records, Severa brought in revenues of $438,000 and earned commissions of $145,000 spamming rogue online pharmacy sites over a 3-year period. He also was a moderator of Spamdot.biz (pictured at right), a vetted-members-only forum that included many of SpamIt’s top earners, as well as successful spammers/malware writers from other affiliate programs such as EvaPharmacy and Mailien.

    Severa seems to have made more money renting his botnet to other spammers. For $200, vetted users could hire his botnet to send 1 million pieces of spam; junk email campaigns touting employment/money mule scams cost $300 per million, and phishing emails could be blasted out through Severa’s botnet for the bargain price of $500 per million.

    Spamhaus says Severa’s real name may be Peter Levashov. The information Severa himself provided to SpamIt suggests that Spamhaus’s intelligence is not far off the mark.

    Severa had his SpamIt earnings deposited into an account at WebMoney, a virtual currency popular in Russia and Eastern Europe. According to a source that has the ability to look up identity information tied to WebMoney accounts, the account was established in 2001 by someone who entered a WebMoney office and presented the Russian passport #454345544. The passport bore the name of a then 26-year-old from Moscow — Viktor Sergeevich Ivashov.

    Continue reading →


    24
    Jan 12

    Microsoft: Worm Operator Worked at Antivirus Firm

    In a surprise filing made late Monday, Microsoft said a former technical expert at a Russian antivirus firm was the person responsible for operating the Kelihos botnet, a global spam machine that Microsoft dismantled in a coordinated takedown last year.

    Andrey Sabelnikov

    In a post to the Official Microsoft Blog, the company identified 31-year-old Andrey N. Sabelnikov of St. Petersburg, Russia as responsible for the operations of the botnet. Microsoft’s amended complaint (PDF) filed with the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia states that Sabelnikov worked as a software engineer and project manager at a company that provided firewall, antivirus and security software.

    Microsoft doesn’t specify where Sabelnikov worked, but according to Sabelnikov’s LinkedIn page, from 2005 to 2007 he was a senior system developer and project manager for Agnitum, a Russian antivirus firm based in St. Petersburg. One of the company’s most popular products is Outpost, a free firewall program. Sabelnikov’s profile says he most recently worked for a firm called Teknavo, which makes software for companies in the financial services sector.

    A source close to the investigation told Krebs On Security that Sabelnikov’s alleged role was discovered after a security researcher obtained a copy of the source code to Kelihos. The researcher noticed that the source contained debug code that downloaded a Kelihos malware installer from the domain sabelnikov.net, a photography site registered to Sabelnikov’s name. That site currently links to Sabelnikov’s profile page at Russian social networking site Vkontakte.ru, which includes the same pictures found in the LinkedIn profile mentioned above.

    Microsoft doesn’t mention the source code discovery in its amended complaint, but it does reference the availability of new evidence in naming Sabelnikov. The company said it also had cooperation from the original defendants in the case — Dominique Alexander Piatti and the dotFREE Group, which owned the domains allegedly used to control the botnet.

    Update, Jan. 27 9:38 a.m. ET: Sabelnikov on Thursday posted a response on his blog denying Microsoft’s allegations, saying he had never participated in the management of botnets and any other similar programs. Sabelnikov also stated that he has just returned from a business trip to the United States earlier this month. Interestingly, he says he arrived in the U.S. on Jan. 21, and stayed for two days — meaning he left either the same day or a day after Microsoft filed its brief with the court.

    Also on Thursday, I published a follow-up investigation which suggests that Kelihos and its predecessor Waledac were almost certainly the work of a well-known spammer named Peter Severa.


    5
    Jan 12

    Pharma Wars: Mr. Srizbi vs. Mr. Cutwail

    The previous post in this series introduced the world to “Google,” an alias chosen by the hacker in charge of the Cutwail spam botnet. Google rented his crime machine to members of SpamIt, an organization that paid spammers to promote rogue Internet pharmacy sites. This made Google a top dog, but also a primary target of rival botmasters selling software to SpamIt, particularly the hacker known as “SPM,” the brains behind the infamous Srizbi botnet.

    Today’s Pharma Wars entry highlights that turf battle, and features newly discovered clues about the possible identity of the Srizbi botmaster, including his whereabouts and current occupation.

    Reactor Mailer Terms of Service, 2005

    Srizbi burst onto the malware scene in early 2007, infecting hundreds of thousands of Microsoft Windows computers via exploit kits stitched into hacked and malicious Web sites. SpamIt members could rent access to the collection of hacked machines via a piece of spamware that had been around since 2004, known as “Reactor Mailer.”

    This page from archive.org (pictured at right) is a Feb. 2005 snapshot of the terms of service for the Reactor Mailer service, explaining how it worked and its pricing structure. The document is signed by  “SPM,” who claims to be the CEO of a company called Elphisoft. He asks customers and would-be clients to contact him via ICQ instant message ID 360000 (the importance of this number will be apparent later in the story).

    That same ICQ number features prominently in dozens of chat logs that apparently belonged to SpamIt co-administrator Dmitry “Saintd” Stupin. The logs were leaked online last year after Russian investigators questioned Stupin as part of an investigation into Igor Gusev, the alleged other co-founder of SpamIt. Facing criminal charges for his alleged part in SpamIt, Gusev chose to shutter the program October 2010, but not before its affiliate database was stolen and also leaked online.

    BOTMASTER BATTLE

    SPM is introduced to SpamIt in May 2007, when he joins the program with the hopes of becoming the default spam software provider for the pharmacy affiliate program. The chats translated and recorded at this link show SPM’s early communications with SpamIt, in which he brings on board several other affiliates who will help develop and maintain his Reactor/Srizbi botnet.

    Very soon after joining SpamIt, SPM identifies Google — the Cutwail botmaster — as his main competitor, and sets off to undermine Google and to become the default spam software provider to SpamIt.

    The following is from a chat between SPM and Stupin, recorded Oct. 9, 2007, in which SPM argues that he should be the primary spam software seller for SpamIt, and that his software’s logo should be embedded in the SpamIt banner at the organization’s closely-guarded online user forum.

    Continue reading →


    1
    Jan 12

    Pharma Wars: ‘Google,’ the Cutwail Botmaster

    Previous stories in my Pharma Wars series have identified top kingpins behind the some of the biggest spam botnets. Today’s post does that and more, including never-before-published information on “Google,” the lead hacker behind the world’s busiest spam botnet — Cutwail.

    December 2011 spam stats from M86Security

    For many years, Cutwail has been among the top three most prolific spam botnets. With the recent takedown of the Rustock botnet, Cutwail now is the top spam bot; according to M86 Security, versions of Cutwail are responsible for about 22 percent of the daily spam volumes worldwide.

    Security researchers have extensively dissected the technical machinery that powers Cutwail (a.k.a. “Pushdo” and “Pandex”), but until now little has been published about the brains behind it. Krebs On Security has learned that the individual principally responsible for developing and renting this crime machine to other miscreants was a top moneymaker for SpamIt, until recently the world’s largest rogue Internet pharmacy affiliate program.

    By the time he joined SpamIt in early 2007, the hacker named Google had already spent several years fine-tuning his spam botnet. Just months prior to its closure in Oct. 2010, SpamIt was hacked, and its customer and affiliate data leaked online. The data shows that Google used close to a dozen affiliate accounts at SpamIt, and made nearly $175,000 in commissions advertising SpamIt’s rogue online pharmacies with the help of Cutwail.

    But Google would make far more money renting his botnet to other spammers, and SpamIt affiliates quickly became his biggest client base. Interestingly, the proprietors of SpamIt initially asked for Google’s help not to spam rogue pharmacies, but to jump-start a new affiliate program called Warezcash to sell “OEM” software — mostly pirated copies of Microsoft Windows and other high-priced software titles.

    That relationship is evident from hundreds of chat logs between Google and SpamIt co-founder Dmitry “Saintd” Stupin. The conversations were part of thousands of hours of logs obtained by Russian cybercrime investigators who examined Stupin’s computer. The chats were later leaked online, and provide a rare glimpse into the day-to-day operations of Cutwail from the botmaster’s perspective. They also provide tantalizing clues as to the real-life identity of Google and his co-workers. Snippets of those conversations appear below, translated from their original Russian into English by native Russian speakers.

    THE CUTWAIL MACHINE

    Some of the best techical analysis of Cutwail came earlier this year in a paper from researchers at the University of California, Santa Barbara and Ruhr-University Bochum, which described in detail how the Cutwail botnet was operated, rented and promoted on the exclusive SpamIt forums. From their paper (PDF):

    “The Cutwail spam engine is known in spam forums by the name 0bulk Psyche Evolution, where it is rented to a community of spam affiliates. These affiliates pay a fee to Cutwail botmasters in order to use their botnet infrastructure. In return, the clients are provided with access to a Web interface (available in Russian or English language) that simplifies the process of creating and managing spam campaigns…”

    SpamIt affiliate records show that Google registered with the program using the email address psyche.evolution@gmail.com (according to historical WHOIS records, the domain name psyche-evolution.com was registered in 2005 by that same email address, to an organizations called “0bulk corp.” in Moscow).

    In several chats with Stupin, Google describes how he and his pals switched to pharmacy spamming when promoting stocks via spam became less lucrative. In a discussion on Feb. 25, 2007, Google said he was “renting software for spam,” to competing spam affiliate programs “Mailien,” “Bulker,” and “Aff Connection,” and that all of his clients had great success converting traffic into sales. “We have been spamming stocks, however now stocks started converting badly, so we decided to spam in parallel with some affiliate programs. We organized people, gave them tasks to do. We’ve been spamming them for a week only, but I think we’ll do good.”

    Continue reading →


    5
    Dec 11

    Chats With Accused ‘Mega-D’ Botnet Owner?

    Recently leaked online chat records may provide the closest look yet at a Russian man awaiting trial in Wisconsin on charges of running a cybercrime machine once responsible for sending between 30 to 40 percent of the world’s junk email.

    Oleg Nikolaenko

    Oleg Y. Nikolaenko, a 24-year-old who’s been dubbed “The King of Spam,” was arrested by authorities in November 2010 as he visited a car show in Las Vegas. The U.S. Justice Department alleges that Nikolaenko, using the online nickname “Docent” earned hundreds of thousands of dollars using his “Mega-D” botnet, which authorities say infected more than half a million PCs and could send over 10 billion spam messages a day. Nikoalenko has pleaded not guilty to the charges, and is slated to appear in court this week for a status conference (PDF) on his case.

    The Justice Department alleges that Nikolaenko spammed on behalf of Lance Atkinson and other members of Affking, an affiliate program that marketed fly-by-night online pharmacies and knockoff designer goods. Atkinson told prosecutors that one of his two largest Russian spamming affiliates used the online moniker Docent. He also said that Docent received payment via an ePassporte account under the name “Genbucks_dcent.” FBI agents later learned that the account was registered in Nikolaenko’s name and address in Russia, and that the email address attached to the account was 4docent@gmail.com.

    According to my research, Docent also spammed for other rogue pharmacy programs. In fact, it’s hard to find one that didn’t pay him to send spam. In my Pharma Wars series, I’ve detailed how Russian cybercrime investigators probing the operations of the massive GlavMed/SpamIt rogue pharmacy operation seized thousands of chat logs from one of its principal organizers. The chats were later leaked online and to select journalists. Within those records are hundreds of hours of chats between the owners of the pharmacy program and many of the world’s biggest spammers, including dozens with one of its top earners — Docent.

    According to the SpamIt records, Docent earned commissions totaling more than $325,000 promoting SpamIt pharmacy sites through spam between 2007 and 2010. The Docent in the SpamIt database also had his earnings sent to the same ePassporte account identified by the FBI. The Docent in the leaked chats never references himself as Nikolaenko, but in several cases he asks SpamIt coordinators to send documents to him at the 4docent@gmail.com address.

    The chats between Docent and Stupin show a young man who is ultra-confident in the value and sheer spam-blasting power of his botnet. Below are the first in a series of conversation snippets between Docent and SpamIt co-administrator Dmitry Stupin. Before each is a brief note providing some context.

    In the transcript that follows, Stupin tries to woo Docent to join SpamIt. Docent negotiates a much higher commission rate than is usually given to new spamming partners. The typical rate is 30 percent of each sale, but Docent is a known figure in the spamming underground, and argues that his botnet will bring such massive traffic to the SpamIt pharmacies that he deserves a higher 45 or 50 percent cut of the sales. This conversation was recorded on Feb. 1, 2007.

    Stupin:  Hello! You have communicated with ICQ 397061228, I am writing regarding your case, Docent.

    Docent: Which case?

    Stupin:  Do you want to send spam regarding our partnerka ["partnerka" is Russian slang for a mix of private and semi-public affiliate groups that form to facilitate cybercrime activities].

    Docent: Which exactly do you mean? I have not yet communicated with this 397061228.

    Stupin: Here is the letter which recently came from  you: “It is usual spam,  GI bases, not opt-in. Big volume of emails. I mail a lot of [competing pharmacy] programs, Bulker, Mailien, SRX. I’m a member of most bulk forums. So if you need references, i can provide them. Usual traffic is 2k+ uniques. Also i need bulk-host.”

    Docent: Yes, I got it. It’s just nobody IM’d me.

    Stupin: ок) What kind of volumes of spam can you deliver? We are soon deploying our own “partnerka” for spam, we just do not have it right now.

    Docent: Volumes are huge, 500 million + / day.

    Stupin: Wow! Are you not accidentally on [Spamhaus] ROKSO List ?

    Docent: Yes, it’s a list of idiots :) , with the exception of a couple of people.

    Stupin:  We do contract people for our spam campaigns, but only verified people. We are not publicly opened yet.

    Continue reading →