Posts Tagged: Bitcoin


4
Jun 14

Peek Inside a Professional Carding Shop

Over the past year, I’ve spent a great deal of time trolling a variety of underground stores that sell “dumps” — street slang for stolen credit card data that buyers can use to counterfeit new cards and go shopping in big-box stores for high-dollar merchandise that can be resold quickly for cash. By way of explaining this bizarro world, this post takes the reader on a tour of a rather exclusive and professional dumps shop that caters to professional thieves, high-volume buyers and organized crime gangs.

mcdumpalsjoinedThe subject of this post is “McDumpals,” a leading dumps shop that first went online in late April 2013.  Featuring the familiar golden arches and the bastardized logo, “i’m swipin’ it,”  the site’s mascot is a gangstered-up Ronald McDonald pointing a handgun at the viewer.

Nevermind that this shop is violating a ridiculous number of McDonald’s trademarks in one fell swoop: It’s currently selling cards stolen from data breaches at main street stores in nearly every U.S. state.

Like many other dumps shops, McDumpals recently began requiring potential new customers to pay a deposit (~$100) via Bitcoin before being allowed to view the goods for sale. Also typical of most card shops, this store’s home page features the latest news about new batches of stolen cards that have just been added, as well as price reductions on older batches of cards that are less reliable as instruments of fraud.

I’ve put together a slideshow (below) that steps through many of the updates that have been added to this shop since its inception. One big takeaway from this slideshow is that many shops are now categorizing their goods for sale by the state or region of the victim company.

This was a major innovation that we saw prominently on display in the card shop that was principally responsible for selling cards stolen in the Target and Sally Beauty retail breaches: In those cases, buyers were offered the ability to search for cards by the city, state and ZIP of the Target and Sally Beauty stores from which those cards were stolen. Experienced carders (as buyers are called) know that banks will often flag transactions as suspicious if they take place outside of the legitimate cardholder’s regular geographic purchasing patterns, and so carders tend to favor cards stolen from consumers who live nearby.

The slideshow may make more sense if readers familiarize themselves with a few terms and phrases that show up in the text:

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20
Dec 13

Cards Stolen in Target Breach Flood Underground Markets

Credit and debit card accounts stolen in a recent data breach at retail giant Target have been flooding underground black markets in recent weeks, selling in batches of one million cards and going for anywhere from $20 to more than $100 per card, KrebsOnSecurity has learned.

targetgoboom

Prior to breaking the story of the Target breach on Wednesday, Dec. 18, I spoke with a fraud analyst at a major bank who said his team had independently confirmed that Target had been breached after buying a huge chunk of the bank’s card accounts from a well-known “card shop” — an online store advertised in cybercrime forums as a place where thieves can reliably buy stolen credit and debit cards.

There are literally hundreds of these shady stores selling stolen credit and debit cards from virtually every bank and country. But this store has earned a special reputation for selling quality “dumps,” data stolen from the magnetic stripe on the backs of credit and debit cards. Armed with that information, thieves can effectively clone the cards and use them in stores. If the dumps are from debit cards and the thieves also have access to the PINs for those cards, they can use the cloned cards at ATMs to pull cash out of the victim’s bank account.

At least two sources at major banks said they’d heard from the credit card companies: More than a million of their cards were thought to have been compromised in the Target breach. One of those institutions noticed that one card shop in particular had recently alerted its loyal customers about a huge new batch of more than a million quality dumps that had been added to the online store. Suspecting that the advertised cache of new dumps were actually stolen in the Target breach, fraud investigators with the bank browsed this card shop’s wares and effectively bought back hundreds of the bank’s own cards.

When the bank examined the common point of purchase among all the dumps it had bought from the shady card shop, it found that all of them had been used in Target stores nationwide between Nov. 27 and Dec. 15. Subsequent buys of new cards added to that same shop returned the same result.

On Dec. 19, Target would confirm that crooks had stolen 40 million debit and credit cards from stores nationwide in a breach that extended from Nov. 27 to Dec. 15. Not long after that announcement, I pinged a source at a small community bank in New England to see whether his institution had been notified by Visa or MasterCard about specific cards that were potentially compromised in the Target breach.

This institution has issued a grand total of more than 120,000 debit and credit cards to its customers, but my source told me the tiny bank had not yet heard anything from the card associations about specific cards that might have been compromised as a result of the Target breach. My source was anxious to determine how many of the bank’s cards were most at risk of being used for fraud, and how many should be proactively canceled and re-issued to customers. The bank wasn’t exactly chomping at the bit to re-issue the cards; that process costs around $3 to $5 per card, but more importantly it didn’t want to unnecessarily re-issue cards at a time when many of its customers would be racing around to buy last-minute Christmas gifts and traveling for the holidays.

On the other hand, this bank had identified nearly 6,000 customer cards — almost 5 percent of all cards issued to customers — that had been used at Target stores nationwide during the breach window described by the retailer.

“Nobody has notified us,” my source said. “Law enforcement hasn’t said anything, our statewide banking associations haven’t sent anything out…nothing. Our senior legal counsel today was asking me if we have positive confirmation from the card associations about affected cards, but so far we haven’t gotten anything.”

When I mentioned that a big bank I’d spoken with had found a 100 percent overlap with the Target breach window after purchasing its available cards off a particular black market card shop called rescator[dot]la, my source at the small bank asked would I be willing to advise his fraud team on how to do the same?

CARD SHOPPING

Ultimately, I agreed to help in exchange for permission to write about the bank’s experience without actually naming the institution. The first step in finding any of the bank’s cards for sale was to browse the card shop’s remarkably efficient and customer-friendly Web site and search for the bank’s “BINs”; the Bank Identification Number is merely the first six digits of a debit or credit card, and each bank has its own unique BIN or multiple BINs.

According to the "base" name, this "Dumps" shop sells only cards stolen in the Target breach.

According to the “base” name for all stolen cards sold at this card shop, the proprietor sells only cards stolen in the Target breach.

A quick search on the card shop for the bank’s BINs revealed nearly 100 of its customers’s cards for sale, a mix of MasterCard dumps ranging in price from $26.60 to $44.80 apiece. As one can imagine, this store doesn’t let customers pay for purchases with credit cards; rather, customers can “add money” to their accounts using a variety of irreversible payment mechanisms, including virtual currencies like Bitcoin, Litecoin, WebMoney and PerfectMoney, as well as the more traditional wire transfers via Western Union and MoneyGram.

With my source’s newly registered account funded via wire transfer to the tune of USD $450, it was time to go shopping. My source wasn’t prepared to buy up all of the available cards that match his institution’s BINs, so he opted to start with a batch of 20 or so of the more recently-issued cards for sale.

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18
Nov 13

vBulletin Breach Prompts Password Reset

Forum software maker vBulletin is urging users to change their passwords following a recent breach of its networks. The attackers who claimed responsibility for the intrusion say they broke in using a zero-day flaw that is now being sold in several places online, but vBulletin maintains it is not aware of any zero-day attacks against current versions of its product.

vbulletinOn Thursday, Nov. 14, this publication received an email with several screen shots and a short note indicating that vBulletin had been hacked. The attackers claimed they had knowledge of a zero-day bug in versions 4.x and 5.x of vBulletin, and that they had used the same vulnerability to break into vbulletin.com and macrumors.com.

That same day, I reached out to both vBulletin and MacRumors. I heard immediately from MacRumors owner Arnold Kim, who pointed my attention to a story the publication put up last Monday acknowledging a breach.  Kim said MacRumors actually runs version 3.x of vBulletin, and that the hackers appear to have broken in using a clever cross-site-scripting attack.

“In VB3, moderators can post ‘announcements’  in the forum, and by default announcements allow HTML,” Kim explained. “The hacker or hackers were able to somehow get a moderator’s login password, and used that to embed Javascript in an announcement and waited for an administrator to load that page. Once that happened, the Javascript installed a plugin in the background that allowed [the attackers] to execute PHP scripts.”

Kim said the attackers in that case even came on the MacRumors forum and posted a blow-by-blow of the attack, confirming that the cause of the breach was a compromised moderator account. Kim said the person who left the comment was using the same Internet address as the attacker who hacked his forum, and that the moderator account that got compromised on MacRumors also had an account with the same name and password on vBulletin.com.

“Stop [blaming] this on the ‘outdated vBulletin software’,” the apparent culprit wrote. ” The fault lied within a single moderator. All of you kids that are saying upgrade from 3.x to 4.x or 5.x have no idea what you’re talking about. 3.x is far more secure than the latter. Just because it’s older, it doesn’t mean it’s any worse.”

On Saturday, Nov. 16, I heard back from vBulletin, which said it had just posted a note urging users to change their passwords, and that the company was not aware of any zero day bugs in its software. vBulletin didn’t say which version of its software was attacked, only that “our staging server was running a wide variety of versions of the software.” The vBulletin homepage says the site is powered by version 5.0.5.

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6
Nov 13

CryptoLocker Crew Ratchets Up the Ransom

Last week’s article about how to prevent CryptoLocker ransomware attacks generated quite a bit of feedback and lots of questions from readers. For some answers — and since the malware itself has morphed significantly in just a few day’s time — I turned to Lawrence Abrams and his online help forum BleepingComputer.com, which have been following and warning about this scourge for several months.

This message is left by CryptoLocker for victims whose antivirus software removed the file needed to pay the ransom.

This message is left by CryptoLocker for victims whose antivirus software removes the file needed to pay the ransom.

To recap, CryptoLocker is a diabolical new twist on an old scam. The malware encrypts all of the most important files on a victim PC — pictures, movie and music files, documents, etc. — as well as any files on attached or networked storage media. CryptoLocker then demands payment via Bitcoin or MoneyPak and installs a countdown clock on the victim’s desktop that ticks backwards from 72 hours. Victims who pay the ransom receive a key that unlocks their encrypted files; those who let the timer expire before paying risk losing access to their files forever.

Or, at least, that’s how it worked up until a few days ago, when the crooks behind this scam began easing their own rules a bit to accommodate victims who were apparently willing to pay up but simply couldn’t jump through all the hoops necessary in the time allotted.

“They realized they’ve been leaving money on the table,” Abrams said. “They decided there’s little sense in not accepting the ransom money a week later if the victim is still willing to pay to get their files back.”

Part of the problem, according to Abrams, is that few victims even know about Bitcoins or MoneyPak, let alone how to obtain or use these payment mechanisms.

“We put up survey and asked how many [victims] had paid the ransom with Bitcoins, and almost no one said they did, Abrams said. “Most paid with MoneyPak. The people who did pay with Bitcoins said they found the process for getting them was so cumbersome that it took them a week to figure it out.”

Another major stumbling block that prevents many otherwise willing victims from paying the ransom is, ironically, antivirus software that detects CryptoLocker — but only after the malware has locked the victim’s most prized files with virtually uncrackable encryption.

“Originally, when antivirus software would clean a computer, it would remove the CryptoLocker infection, which made it so the user could not pay the ransom,” Abrams said. “Newer versions change the desktop background to include a URL where the user can download the infection again and pay the ransom.”

The idea of purposefully re-infecting a machine by downloading and executing highly destructive malware may be antithetical and even heresy to some security pros. But victims who are facing the annihilation of their most precious files probably have a different view of the situation. Abrams that said his testing has shown that as long as the registry key “HKCU\Software\Cryptolocker_0388″ remains in the Windows registry, re-downloading the malware would not try to re-encrypt the already encrypted data — although it would encrypt any new files added since the initial infection.

“Some antivirus companies have been telling victims not to pay the ransom,” Abrams said. “On the one hand, I get it, because you don’t want to encourage these malware writers. But on the other hand, there are some companies that are facing going out of business if they don’t, and can’t afford to take the holier-that-thou route.”

CRYPTOLOCKER DECRYPTION SERVICE

On Friday, Nov. 1, the crooks behind this malware campaign launched a “customer service” feature that they have been promising to debut for weeks: a CryptoLocker Decryption Service. “This service allow [sic] you to purchase private key and decrypter for files encrypted by CryptoLocker,” the site reads. “Customers” of the service can search for their “order number” simply by uploading any of the encrypted files.

“They’re calling it an ‘order,’ as if victims posted an order at Amazon.com,” Abrams said.

The "Cryptolocker Decryption Service."

The “Cryptolocker Decryption Service.”

“If you already purchased private key using CryptoLocker, then you can download private key and decrypter for free,” explains the service, which is currently hosted at one of several addresses on the Tor anonymity network. The decryption service site is not reachable from the regular Internet; rather, victims must first download and install special software to access the site – yet another potential hurdle for victims to jump through.

According to Abrams, victims who are still within the initial 72-hour countdown clock can pay the ransom by coughing up two Bitcoins — or roughly $200 using a MoneyPak order. Victims who cannot pay within 72 hours can still get their files back, but for that unfortunate lot the ransom rises fivefold to 10 bitcoins — or roughly USD $2,232 at current exchange rates. And those victims will no longer have the option to pay the ransom via MoneyPak.

Abrams said the service exposes two lies that the attackers have been perpetuating about their scheme. For starters, the bad guys have tried to dissuade victims from rolling back their system clocks to buy themselves more time to get the money together and pay the ransom. According to Abrams, this actually works in many cases to delay the countdown timer. Secondly, the launch of the Cryptolocker Decryption Service belies the claim that private keys needed to unlock files encrypted by CryptoLocker are deleted forever from the attacker’s servers after 72 hours.

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7
Oct 13

Feds Arrest Alleged Top Silk Road Drug Seller

Federal authorities last week arrested a Washington state man accused of being one of the most active and sought-after drug dealers on the online black market known as the “Silk Road.” Meanwhile, new details about the recent coordinated takedown of the Silk Road became public, as other former buyers and sellers on the fraud bazaar pondered who might be next and whether competing online drug markets will move in to fill the void.

NOD's feedback from Silk Road buyers, according to the government.

NOD’s feedback from Silk Road buyers, according to the government.

A complaint unsealed Oct. 2 by the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Washington at Seattle alleges that Steven Lloyd Sadler, 40, of Bellevue, Wash., used the nickname “NOD” on the Silk Road, and was among the “top one percent of sellers” on the Silk Road, selling high-quality cocaine, heroin and methamphetamine in small, individual-use amounts to hundreds of buyers around the world.

Investigators with the FBI and U.S. Post Office inspectors say they tracked dozens of packages containing drugs allegedly shipped by Sadler and a woman who was living with him at the time of his arrest. Authorities tied Sadler to the Silk Road after intercepting a package of cocaine and heroin destined for an Alaskan resident. That resident agreed to cooperate with authorities in the hopes of reducing his own sentence, and said he’d purchased the drugs from NOD via the Silk Road.

Agents in Seattle sought and were granted permission to place GPS tracking devices on Sadler’s car and that of his roommate, Jenna White, also charged in this case. Investigators allege that the tracking showed the two traveled to at least 38 post offices in the Seattle area during the surveillance period.

Interestingly, the investigators used the feedback on NOD’s Silk Road seller profile to get a sense of the volume of drugs he sold. Much like eBay sellers, merchants on the Silk Road are evaluated by previous buyers, who are encouraged to leave feedback about the quality of the seller’s goods and services. According to the government, NOD had 1,400 reviews for individual sales/purchases of small amounts of drugs, including: 2,269.5 grams of cocaine, 593 grams of heroin and 105 grams of meth. The complaint notes that these amounts don’t count sales going back more than five months prior to the investigation, when NOD first created his Silk Road vendor account.

Cryptome has published a copy of the complaint (PDF) against Sadler. A copy of Sadler’s case docket is here. NOD’s reputation on the Silk Road also was discussed for several months on this Reddit thread.

Many readers of last week’s story on the Silk Road takedown have been asking what is known about the locations of the Silk Road servers that were copied by the FBI. It’s still unclear how agents gained access to those servers, but a civil forfeiture complaint released by the Justice Department shows that they were aware of five, geographically dispersed servers that were supporting the Silk Road, either by directly hosting the site and/or hosting the Bitcoin wallets that the Silk Road maintains for buyers and sellers.

geomap2
Two of those servers were located in Iceland, one in Latvia, another in Romania, and apparently one in the United States. See the map above.

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30
Jul 13

Mail from the (Velvet) Cybercrime Underground

Over the past six months, “fans” of this Web site and its author have shown their affection in some curious ways. One called in a phony hostage situation that resulted in a dozen heavily armed police surrounding my home. Another opened a $20,000 new line of credit in my name. Others sent more than $1,000 in bogus PayPal donations from hacked accounts. Still more admirers paid my cable bill for the next three years using stolen credit cards. Malware authors have even used my name and likeness to peddle their wares.

“Flycracker,” the administrator of thecc.bz crime forum, hatches plan to send drugs to my home.

“Flycracker,” the administrator of thecc.bz crime forum, hatches plan to send drugs to my home.

But the most recent attempt to embarrass and fluster this author easily takes the cake as the most elaborate: Earlier this month, the administrator of an exclusive cybercrime forum hatched and executed a plan to purchase heroin, have it mailed to my home, and then spoof a phone call from one of my neighbors alerting the local police. Thankfully, I had already established a presence on his forum and was able to monitor the scam in real time and alert my local police well in advance of the delivery.

This would-be smear campaign was the brainchild of a fraudster known variously online as “Fly,” “Flycracker,” and MUXACC1 (muxa is transliterated Russian for “муха” which means “fly”). Fly is the administrator of the fraud forum “thecc[dot]bz,” an exclusive and closely guarded Russian language board dedicated to financial fraud and identity theft.

On July 14, Flycracker posted a new  forum discussion thread titled, “Krebs Fund,” in which he laid out his plan: He’d created a bitcoin wallet for the exclusive purpose of accepting donations from other members. The goal: purchase heroin in my name and address from a seller on the Silk Road, an online black market that is only reachable via the Tor network.  In the screenshot pictured above, Flycracker says to fellow members:

“Guys, it became known recently that Brian Krebs is a heroin addict and he desperately needs the smack, so we have started the “Helping Brian Fund”, and shortly we will create a bitcoin wallet called “Drugs for Krebs” which we will use to buy him the purest heroin on the Silk Road.  My friends, his withdrawal is very bad, let’s join forces to help the guy! We will save Brian from the acute heroin withdrawal and the world will get slightly better!”

Together, forum members raised more than 2 bitcoins – currently equivalent to about USD $200. At first, Fly tried to purchase a gram of heroin from a Silk Road vendor named 10toes, an anonymous seller who had excellent and plentiful feedback from previous buyers as a purveyor of reliably good heroin appropriate for snorting or burning and inhaling (see screnshot below).

Flycracker discussing the purchase of a gram of heroin from Silk Road seller "10toes."

Flycracker discussing the purchase of a gram of heroin from Silk Road seller “10toes.”

For some reason, that transaction with 10toes fell through, and Flycracker turned to another Silk Road vendor — Maestro — from whom he purchased a dozen baggies of heroin of “HIGH and consistent quality,” to be delivered to my home in Northern Virginia earlier today. The purchase was made using a new Silk Road account named “briankrebs7,” and cost 1.6532 bitcoins (~USD $165).

Flycracker ultimately bought 10 small bags of smack from Silk Road seller "Maestro."

Flycracker ultimately bought 10 small bags of smack from Silk Road seller “Maestro.” The seller threw in two extra bags for free (turns out he actually threw in three extra bags).

In the screen shot below, Fly details the rest of his plan:

“12 sacks of heroin [the seller gives 2 free sacks for a 10-sacks order] are on the road, can anyone make a call [to the police] from neighbors, with a record? Seller said the package will be delivered after 3 days, on Tuesday. If anyone calls then please say that drugs are hidden well.”

h3

Last week, I alerted the FBI about this scheme, and contacted a Fairfax County Police officer who came out and took an official report about it. The cop who took the report just shook his head incredulously, and kept saying he was trying to unplug himself from various accounts online with the ultimate goal of being “off the Internet and Google” by the time he retired. Before he left, the officer said he would make a notation on my report so that any officer dispatched to respond to complaints about drugs being delivered via mail to my home would prompted to review my report.

FOLLOWING THE MONEY

I never doubted Flycracker”s resolve for a minute, but I still wanted to verify his claims about having made the purchase. On that front I received assistance from Sara Meiklejohn, a graduate student at the University of California, San Diego who’s been analyzing the role of bitcoin and anonymity on the Silk Road. Meiklejohn confirmed that the bitcoin wallet linked to in Fly’s forum thread was indeed used to deposit two bitcoins into a purse controlled by anonymous individuals who help manage commerce on the Silk Road.

Meiklejohn and fellow researcher Damon McCoy, an assistant professor of computer science at George Mason University, have been mapping out a network of bitcoin wallets that are used exclusively by the curators of the Silk Road. If you wish to transact with merchants on the Silk Road, you need to fund your account with bitcoins. The act of adding credits appears to be handled by a small number of bitcoin purses.

“All Silk Road purchases are handled internally by Silk Road, which means money trades hands from the Silk Road account of the buyer to the Silk Road account of the seller,”  explained Meiklejohn, author of the paper, A Fistful of Bitcoins: Characterizing Payments Among Men with No Names, to be released in October 2013 at the ACM Internet Measurement Conference in Barcelona, Spain.

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23
Jul 13

One-Stop Bot Chop-Shops

New fraudster-friendly content management systems are making it more likely than ever that crooks who manage botnets and other large groupings of hacked PCs will extract and sell all credentials of value that can be harvested from the compromised machines.

Templates like this are helping to spread one-stop-fraud shops.

Templates like this are helping to spread one-stop-fraud shops.

I’ve often observed that botmasters routinely fail to fully eat what they kill. That is, they tend to chronically undervalue the computers at their disposal, and instead focus on extracting specific resources from hacked PCs, such as using them as spam relays or harvesting online banking credentials. Meanwhile, other assets on the hacked PC that have street value go unused and “wasted” from the fraudster’s perspective.

More often, when miscreants do seek to extract and monetize all of the account credentials from their hacked PCs, they do so by selling access to their raw botnet “logs” — huge text files that document the notable daily activities of the botted systems. To borrow from another food metaphor, this is the digital equivalent of small farms selling their fruits and vegetables as “pick-your-own;” such commerce produces some added revenue without requiring much more work on the seller’s part.

Recently, I’ve been spotting more online fraud shops set up using what appear to be pre-set templates that can be used to sell all manner of credentials from hacked PCs. These shops all sell credit and debit card information, of course, but also lists of emails culled from victim computers, hacked VPN and RDP credentials, Cpanel installations, PHP mailers, FTP access, SSH logins, and online gambling accounts. Some of the panels are even reselling hacked credentials at popular porn sites. Goods can be purchased via virtual currencies such as Perfect Money and bitcoin.

The shop shown below — blackhatstore[dot]ru — borrows the trademarked image of the Black Hat security conference franchise. It’s sometimes said that there’s no such thing as bad press, but I’m pretty sure the folks at Black Hat don’t want their brand advertised or associated in this way (by the way, I’ll be speaking at this year’s Black Hat in Las Vegas next week). I alerted the Black Hat organizers to this fraudulent site, so I wouldn’t expect it to remain live much longer.

This bot chop shop trades on the good name and trademarks of the Black Hat security conference franchise owned by UBM Tech.

This bot chop shop trades on the good name and trademarks of the Black Hat security conference franchise owned by UBM Tech.

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18
Jul 13

Botcoin: Bitcoin Mining by Botnet

An increasing number of malware samples in the wild are using host systems to secretly mine bitcoins. In this post, I’ll look at an affiliate program that pays people for the mass installation of programs that turns host machines into bitcoin mining bots.

The FeodalCash bitcoin mining affiliate program.

The FeodalCash bitcoin mining affiliate program.

Bitcoin is a decentralized, virtual currency, and bitcoins are created by large numbers of CPU-intensive cryptographic calculations. As Wikipedia explains, the processing of Bitcoin transactions is secured by servers called bitcoin miners. These servers communicate over an internet-based network and confirm transactions by adding them to a ledger which is updated and archived periodically using peer-to-peerfilesharing technology. In addition to archiving transactions, each new ledger update creates some newly minted bitcoins.

Earlier this week, I learned of a Russian-language affiliate program called FeodalCash which pays its members to distribute a bitcoin mining bot that forces host PCs to process bitcoin transactions (hat tip to security researcher Xylitol). FeodalCash opened its doors in May 2013, and has been recruiting new members who can demonstrate that they have control over enough Internet traffic to guarantee at least several hundred installs of the bitcoin mining malware each day.

The FeodalCash administrator claims his mining program isn’t malware, although he cautions all affiliates against submitting the installer program to multi-antivirus scanners such as Virustotal; sending the program that installs bitcoin mining bot to Virustotal “greatly complicates the work with antivirus” on host PCs. Translation: Because services like Virustotal share information about new malware samples with all participating antivirus vendors, scanning the installer will make it more likely that antivirus products on host PCs will flag the program as malicious. Rather, the administrator urged users who want to check the files for antivirus detection to use a criminal friendly service like scan4u[dot]net or chk4me[dot]com, which likewise scan submitted files with dozens of different antivirus tools but block those tools from reporting home about new and unidentified malware variants.

This Google-translated version of the site shows the builder for the installer.

This Google-translated version of the site shows the builder for the installer.

I gained access to an affiliate account and was able to grab a copy of the mining program. I promptly submitted the file to Virustotal and found it was flagged as a trojan horse program by at least two antivirus products. This analysis at automated malware scanning site malwr.com shows that the mining program installer ads a Windows registry key so that the miner starts each time Windows boots up. It also indicates that the program beacons out to pastebin.com (perhaps to deposit a note about each new installation).

The FeodalCash administrator also claims that his affiliates are not permitted to distribute the installer file in any way that violates the law, but of course it’s unclear which national laws he might be talking about. At the same time, the affiliate program’s Web site includes a graphical tool that helps affiliates create a custom installer program that can install silently and be disguised with a variety of program icons that are similar to familiar Windows icons.

Also, the administrator demands that new users demonstrate the ability to garner hundreds to thousands of installs per day. This is a rather high install rate, and it appears many if not all affiliates are installing the mining program by bundling it with other executable programs distributed by so-called pay-per-install (PPI) programs. This was apparent because a source managed to gain administrative-level access to the back-end database for the FeodalCash program, which includes hundreds of messages between affiliates and the administrator; most of those messages are from new registrants sending the administrator screenshots  of their traffic and installs statistics at various PPI affiliate programs.

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30
May 13

Underweb Payments, Post-Liberty Reserve

Following the U.S. government’s seizure this week of virtual currency Liberty Reserve, denizens of the cybercrime underground collectively have been progressing through the classic stages of grief, from denial to anger and bargaining, and now grudging acceptance that any funds they had stashed in the e-currency system are likely gone forever. Over the past few days, the top discussion on many cybercrime forums has been which virtual currency will be the safest bet going forward?

As I mentioned in an appearance today on NPR’s show On Point, the predictable refrain from many in the underground community has been that the demise of Costa Rica-based Liberty Reserve — and of eGold, eBullion, StormPay and a host of other virtual currencies before it — is the death knell of centrally-managed e-currencies. Just as the entertainment industry’s crackdown on music file-sharing network Napster in the late 1990s spawned a plethora of decentralized peer-to-peer (P2P) file-sharing networks, the argument goes, so too does the U.S. government’s action against centrally-managed digital currencies herald the ascendancy of P2P currencies — particularly Bitcoin.

Fluctuation in BTC values. Source: Bitcoincharts.com

Fluctuation in BTC values. Source: Bitcoincharts.com

This knee-jerk reaction is understandable, given that private crime forums are now replete with postings from members who reported losing tens of thousands of LR dollars this week. But as some of the more seasoned and reasoned members of these communities point out, there are several aspects of Bitcoin that make it especially unsuited for everyday criminal commerce.

For one thing, Bitcoin’s conversion rate fluctuates far too wildly for communities accustomed to virtual currencies that are tied to the US Dollar: In both Liberty Reserve and WebMoney — a digital currency founded in Russia — one LR or WMZ (the “Z” designation is added to all purses kept in US currency) has always equaled $1 USD.

The following hypothetical scenario, outlined by one member of an exclusive crime forum, illustrates how Bitcoin’s price volatility could turn an otherwise simple transaction into an ugly mess for both parties.

“Say I pay you $1k today for a project, and its late, and you decide to withdraw tomorrow. You wake up and the $1k I just sent you in Bitcoins is now worth just $600. It’s not yet stable to be used in such a way.”

Another forum member agreed: “BTC on large scale or saving big amounts is a mess because the price changes. Maybe it’s only good cashing out,” noting WebMoney now allows users to convert Bitcoins into a new unit called WMX.

Others compared Bitcoin to a fashionable high-yield investment program (HYIP), a Ponzi-scheme investment scam that promises unsustainably high return on investment by paying previous investors with the money invested by new investors.  As the U.S. government’s complaint alleges, dozens of HYIP schemes had a significant amount of funds wrapped up in Liberty Reserve.

“Bitcoin is a trendy HYIP. There are far more stable and attractive currencies to invest in, if you are willing to take the risk,” wrote “Off-Sho.re,” a bulletproof hosting provider I profiled in an interview earlier this month. “In the legit ‘real products’ area, which I represent, a very small niche of businesses are willing to accept this form of payment. I understand the drug dealers on Tor sites, since this is pretty much the only thing they can receive without concerns about their identities, but if you sell anything illegal, WMZ should be the choice.”

What’s more, MtGox — Bitcoin’s biggest exchanger and the primary method that users get money into and out of the P2P currency — today posted a note saying that it will now be requiring ID verification from anyone who wants to deposit money with it in order to buy Bitcoins.

A logo from perfectmoney.com

A logo from perfectmoney.com

Perhaps the closest competitor to Liberty Reserve and WebMoney — a Panamanian e-currency known as Perfect Money (or just “PM” to many) — appears to have been busy over the past few days seizing and closing accounts of some of its more active users, according to the dozens of complaints I saw on several different crime forums. Perfect Money also announced on Saturday, May 25 that it would no longer accept new account registrations from U.S. citizens or companies.

For now, it seems the primary beneficiary of the Liberty Reserve takedown will be WebMoney. This virtual currency also has barred U.S. citizens from creating new accounts (it did so in March 2013, in apparent response to the U.S. Treasury Department’s new regulations on virtual currencies.) Still, WebMoney has been around for so long — and its logo is about as ubiquitous on Underweb stores as the Visa and MasterCard logos are at legitimate Web storefronts — that most miscreants and n’er-do-wells in the underground already have accounts there.

But not everyone in the underground who got burned by Liberty Reserve is ready to place his trust in yet another virtual currency. The curmudgeon-in-chief on this point is a hacker nicknamed “Ninja,” the administrator of Carder.pro – a crime forum with thousands of active members from around the world. Ninja was among the most vocal and prominent doubters that Liberty Reserve had been seized, even after the company’s homepage featured seizure warnings from a trio of U.S. federal law enforcement agencies. Ninja so adamantly believed this that, prior to the official press announcements from the U.S. Justice Department on Tuesday, he offered a standing bet of $1,000 to any takers on the forum that Liberty Reserve would return. Only two forum members took him up on the wager.

Now, Ninja says, he’s ready to pay up, but he’s not interested in buying into yet another virtual currency. Instead, he says he’s planning to create a new “carding payment system,” one that will serve forum members and be housed at Internet servers in North Korea, or perhaps Iran (really, any country that has declared the United States a sworn enemy would do).

ninjapost

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6
Sep 11

Rent-a-Bot Networks Tied to TDSS Botnet

Criminals who operate large groupings of hacked PCs tend to be a secretive lot, and jealously guard their assets against hijacking by other crooks. But one of the world’s largest and most sophisticated botnets is openly renting its infected PCs to any and all comers, and has even created a Firefox add-on to assist customers.

The TDSS botnet is the most sophisticated threat today, according to experts at Russian security firm Kaspersky Lab. First launched in 2008, TDSS is now in its fourth major version (also known as TDL-4). The malware uses a “rootkit” to install itself deep within infected PCs, ensuring that it loads before the Microsoft Windows operating system starts. TDSS also removes approximately 20 malicious programs from host PCs, preventing systems from communicating with other bot families.

In an exhaustive analysis of TDSS published in June, Kaspersky researchers Sergey Golovanov and Igor Soumenkov wrote that among the many components installed by TDSS is a file called “socks.dll,” which allows infected PCs to be used by others to surf the Web anonymously.

Researchers say this Firefox add-on helps customers use Internet connections of TDSS-infected PCs.

“Having control over such a large number of computers with this function, the cybercriminals have started offering anonymous Internet access as a service, at a cost of roughly $100 per month,” the researchers wrote. “For the sake of convenience, the cybercriminals have also developed a Firefox add-on that makes it easy to toggle between proxy servers within the browser.”

The storefront for this massive botnet is awmproxy.net, which advertises “the fastest anonymous proxies.” According to Golovanov, when socks.dll is installed on a TDSS-infected computer, it notifies awmproxy.net that a new proxy is available for rent. Soon after that notification is completed, the infected PC starts to accept approximately 10 proxy requests each minute, he said.

“For us it was enough to see that this additional proxy module for tdl4 was installed directly on encrypted partition and runs thru rootkit functionality,” Golovanov told KrebsOnSecurity. “So we believe that awmproxy has direct connection to tdl4 developer but how they are working together we don’t know.” The curators of AWMproxy did not respond to requests for comment.

AWMproxy.net, the storefront for renting access to TDSS-infected PCs

The service’s proxies are priced according to exclusivity and length of use. Regular browser proxies range from $3 per day to $25 monthly. Proxies that can be used to anonymize all of the Internet traffic on a customer’s PC cost between $65 and $500 a month. For $160 a week, customers can rent exclusive access to 100 TDSS-infected systems at once. Interestingly, AWMproxy says it accepts payment via PayPal, MasterCard, and Visa.

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