Posts Tagged: Verified by Visa


2
Dec 11

Loopholes in Verified by Visa & SecureCode

Trend Micro’s Rik Ferguson posted a good piece on Thursday about a major shortcoming in credit card security programs maintained by MasterCard and Visa. Although the loophole that Ferguson highlighted may be unsettling to some, fraudsters who specialize in stealing and using stolen credit cards online have been exploiting it for years.

At issue is a security protocol called “3 Domain Secure,” (3DS), a program designed to reduce card fraud and shift liability for fraud from online merchants to the card issuing banks. Visa introduced the program in 2001, branding it “Verified by Visa,” and MasterCard has a similar program in place called “SecureCode.”

Cardholders who chose to participate in the programs can register their card by entering the card number, filling in their ZIP code and birth date, and picking a passcode. When a cardholder makes a purchase at a site that uses 3DS, he enters the code, which is verified by the issuing bank and is never shared with the merchant site.

But as Ferguson notes, people are human and tend to forget things, especially passcodes and passwords, and it is the password reset function that eliminates any security provided by Verified by Visa or SecureCode. From his blog:

What would a criminal do if they access to your card details but not your password? Of course, there’s that handy “I forgot my password” link. Let’s see how well protected that is.”

The first step in the password reset procedure is to enter your card number, obviously to ensure you are resetting the password for the correct account. Once that number is entered the system now requires some corroborating data to be sure that you are the legitimate account holder, let’s have a look at that “Identification” phase.”

“Oh noes, this doesn’t look good at all! Three out of four of the items of information used to verify my identity are all contained in the credit card data itself, embossed or printed on the card and contained in the magnetic stripe data. Wouldn’t the criminal already have access to this? So what remains? One piece of information that is not included on the card. Trouble is, it’s information that is not only widely shared on social networks, surveys, sign-up forms and a myriad of other places, but also freely available in public records. We cannot and should not consider our date of birth to be a secret.”

“Having entered the required information all that remains is to enter a new password of your choosing and your transaction is authorised. Worse still, no email notification is sent to alert the cardholder that their account has been accessed or modified. The cardholder need never know until they check their statements.”

This would all be very shocking if it wasn’t already painfully obvious to today’s cyber crooks. When I read the Trend blog post, I began searching for several screen shots I had taken of a discussion on an underground carding forum more than two years ago, which explained very clearly how to get around this added level of card security. The tutorial in the screen shot below was posted by an administrator from the carding forum carder.pro on Halloween, 2009:

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23
Mar 11

Big Scores and Hi-Scores

Business gurus have long maintained that time = $$, but that doesn’t mean that playtime necessarily decreases the bottom line. Many corporations have discovered that their employees tend to be more productive when they have time to give their brains a break, and gameplay is the perfect escape. So it’s not surprising that some cyber criminals have taken this lesson to heart, and are crafting crime machines to include games that allow their evildoing customers to steal money and set their hi-scores at the same time.

I had a laugh when I stumbled upon the administrative panel shown in the video below. It’s a back-end Web database designed to interact with a collection of Windows PCs infected by the ZeuS Trojan. This panel receives financial data stolen from victim machines, including PayPal and Bank of America account credentials. This video shows the Bank of America tab of the tool, which also allows the criminal to inject specific “challenge/response” questions into BofA’s Web page as displayed in the victim’s browser, as a way to steal the answers to these questions should the criminal later be asked for them when later logging in to victim accounts.

Directly to the right of an option to export all stolen credentials to an easy-to-read .csv file is a button labeled “Pacman”. Clicking launches a playable, exact replica of the 1980s arcade game (enlarge the video by clicking the icon in the bottom right corner of the video panel):

I can’t help but wonder whether we will witness some perverse kind of Moore’s law with future criminal Web administration panels. I can just see it now: In 18 months, crooks writing these panels will be bundling Halo 3 and Counter-Strike with their creations!

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16
Nov 10

Captchabot: Blurring Human and Machine

Last week, I wrote about a “bulletproof hosting” provider that offers dodgy Web hosting that is insulated from takedown by abuse complaints or requests from Western law enforcement agencies. Today, I’ll look at one of that bulletproof provider’s biggest clients: Captchabot.com, a service that automates the solving of “CAPTCHAs,” those annoying agglomerations of squiggly numbers and letters that many online services require users to solve to help ensure that new accounts are not being auto-created by a computer.

These so-called reverse Turing Tests can be exasperating for legitimate users, but these days they are little more than a speed bump for those who specialize in mass-creating bogus new accounts at popular online destinations like Facebook, MySpace, YouTube for use in spreading spyware and pimping spammy Web sites.

That’s thanks largely to services like Captchabot, which automate the solving of CAPTCHAs with the help of low-paid workers in China, India and Eastern Europe who earn pennies per hour deciphering the puzzles.

Captchabot charges clients based on how many thousand CAPTCHAs they ask the service solve: $1 buys about 1,000 solved CAPTCHAs. The service claims at least an 80 percent success rate, and customers only pay for CAPTCHAs that are solved correctly.

In their seminal paper (PDF) on CAPTCHA-solving services, researchers at UC San Diego earlier this year tried to estimate how many employees it would take to solve the daily workload of CAPTCHAs fed to the various services. The researchers guessed that Captchabot.com would need to have between 130 and 200 workers available more or less around the clock (for a look at how these services performed against CAPTCHAs required by MySpace, Google, Wikipedia and others, see this graphic.)

The researchers also sought to learn where most of the puzzle-solving workers resided, so they fed Captchabot and other services a variety of CAPTCHAs from different languages. The results, shown in the screen shot here, indicated that most of the workers were Chinese, English and Russian speakers.

I contacted the owner of Captchabot.com, a hacker named Mirko Res, via online chat to see if I could fine-tune the UCSD estimates on the number of workers employed by the service, but he was unwilling to give an exact figure (“under NDA,” he explained). He did say, however, that the majority of the workers employed by his service live in Belarus, and that workers are only passed puzzles that can’t be solved by the service’s automated CAPTCHA-guessing algorithm.

“They using it for legal Webspam, like blog comments,” Res said of his operation’s customers. In fact, a widely-used forum- and blog-spamming tool known as XRumer relies exclusively on Captchabot to deliver its CAPTCHA-cracking capability.

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