A recent ATM skimming attack in which thieves used a specialized device to physically insert malicious software into a cash machine may be a harbinger of more sophisticated scams to come.
Authorities in Macau — a Chinese territory approximately 40 miles west of Hong Kong — this week announced the arrest of two Ukrainian men accused of participating in a skimming ring that stole approximately $100,000 from at least seven ATMs. Local police said the men used a device that was connected to a small laptop, and inserted the device into the card acceptance slot on the ATMs.
Armed with this toolset, the authorities said, the men were able to install malware capable of siphoning the customer’s card data and PINs. The device appears to be a rigid green circuit board that is approximately four or five times the length of an ATM card.
According to local press reports (and supplemented by an interview with an employee at one of the local banks who asked not to be named), the insertion of the circuit board caused the software running on the ATMs to crash, temporarily leaving the cash machine with a black, empty screen. The thieves would then remove the device. Soon after, the machine would restart, and begin recording the card and PINs entered by customers who used the compromised machines.
The Macau government alleges that the accused would return a few days after infecting the ATMs to collect the stolen card numbers and PINs. To do this, the thieves would reinsert the specialized chip card to retrieve the purloined data, and then a separate chip card to destroy evidence of the malware. Here’s a look at the devices that Macau authorities say the accused used to insert the malware into ATMs (I’m working on getting clearer photos of this hardware):
Here is a side-view look at the circuit board device:
And finally, a close-up of one end of the skimming board itself:
ATM attacks that leverage external, physical access to install malware aren’t exactly new, but they’re far less common than skimming devices that are made to be affixed to the cash machine for the duration of the theft. It’s not clear how the malware is being delivered in this case, but in previous attacks of this sort the thieves have been able to connect directly to a USB port somewhere inside the ATMs.
Late last year, a pair of researchers at the Chaos Communication Congress (CCC) conference in Germany detailed a malware attack that drained ATMs at unnamed banks in Europe. In that attack, the crooks cut a chunk out of the ATM’s chassis to expose its USB port, and then inserted a USB stick loaded with malware. The thieves would then replace the cut-out piece of chassis and come back a few days later, and enter a 12-digit code that launched a special interface that displayed the amount of money available in each denomination — along with options for dispensing each kind.
In December 2012, I wrote about an attack in Brazil in which thieves swapped an ATM’s USB-based security camera with a portable keyboard that let them hack the cash machine. In that attack, the crook caused a reboot of the ATM software by punching in a special combination of keys. The thieves then were able to reboot into a custom version of Debian Linux designed to troubleshoot locked or corrupted ATM equipment.