The Internal Revenue Service has re-enabled a service on its Web site that allows taxpayers to get a copy of their previous year’s tax transcript. The renewed effort to beef up taxpayer authentication methods at irs.gov comes more than a year after the agency disabled the transcript service because tax refund fraudsters were using it to steal sensitive data on consumers.
During the height of tax-filing season in 2015, KrebsOnSecurity warned that identity thieves involved in tax refund fraud with the IRS were using irs.gov’s “Get Transcript” feature to glean salary and personal information they didn’t already have on targeted taxpayers. In May 2015, the IRS suspended the Get Transcript feature, citing its abuse by fraudsters and noting that some 100,000 taxpayers may have been victimized as a result.
So exactly how does the new-and-improved Get Transcript feature validate that taxpayers who are requesting information aren’t cybercriminal imposters? According to the IRS’s Get Transcript FAQ, the visitor needs to supply a Social Security number (SSN) and have the following:
immediate access to your email account to receive a confirmation code;
name, birthdate, mailing address, and filing status from your most recent tax return;
an account number from either a credit card, auto loan, mortgage, home equity loan or home equity line of credit;
a mobile phone number with your name on the account.
“If you previously registered to use IRS Get Transcript Online, Identity Protection PIN, Online Payment Agreement, or ePostcard online services, log in with the same username and password you chose before,” the IRS said. “You’ll need to provide a financial account number and mobile phone number if you haven’t already done so.”
The agency said it will then verify your financial account number and mobile phone number with big-three credit bureau Equifax. Readers who have taken my advice and placed a security freeze on their credit files will need to request a temporary thaw in that freeze with Equifax before attempting to verify their identity with the IRS. Continue reading →
When news broke last month that the credit card breach at fast food chain Wendy’s impacted fewer than 300 out of the company’s 5,800 locations, the response from many readers was, “Where’s the Breach?” Today, Wendy’s said the number of stores impacted by the breach is “significantly higher” and that the intrusion may not yet be contained.
On January 27, 2016, this publication was the first to report that Wendy’s was investigating a card breach. In mid-May, the company announced in its first quarter financial statement that the fraud impacted just five percent of stores.
But since that announcement last month, a number of sources in the fraud and banking community have complained to this author that there was no way the Wendy’s breach only affected five percent of stores — given the volume of fraud that the banks have traced back to Wendy’s customers.
What’s more, some of those same sources said they were certain the breach was still ongoing well after Wendy’s made the five percent claim in May. In my March 02 piece Credit Unions Feeling Pinch in Wendy’s Breach, I quoted B. Dan Berger, CEO of the National Association of Federal Credit Unions, saying the he’d heard from three credit union CEOs who said the fraud they’ve experienced so far from the Wendy’s breach has eclipsed what they were hit with in the wake of the Home Depot and Target breaches.
Today, Wendy’s acknowledged in a statement that the breach is now expected to be “considerably higher than the 300 restaurants already implicated.” Company spokesman Bob Bertini declined to be more specific about the number of stores involved, citing an ongoing investigation. Bertini also declined to say whether the company is confident that the breach has been contained.
“Wherever we are finding it we’ve taken action,” he said. “But we can’t rule out that there aren’t others.”
Bertini said part of the problem was that the breach happened in two waves. He said the outside forensics investigators that were assigned to the case by the credit card associations initially found 300 locations that had malware on the point-of-sale devices, but that the company’s own investigators later discovered a different strain of the malware at some locations. Bertini declined to provide additional details about either of the malware strains found in the intrusions.
“In recent days, our investigator has identified this additional strain or mutation of the original malware,” he said. “It just so happens that this new strain targets a different point of sale system than the original one, and we just within the last few days discovered this.” Continue reading →
Last week, KrebsOnSecurity broke the news of an ongoing credit card breach involving CiCi’s Pizza, a restaurant chain in the United States with more than 500 locations. What follows is an exclusive look at a point-of-sale botnet that appears to have enslaved dozens of hacked payment terminals inside of CiCi’s locations that are being relieved of customer credit card data in real time.
Over the weekend, I heard from a source who said that since November 2015 he’s been tracking a collection of hacked cash registers. This point-of-sale botnet currently includes more than 100 infected systems, and according to the administrative panel for this crime machine at least half of the compromised systems are running a malicious Microsoft Windows process called cicipos.exe.
This admin panel shows the Internet address of a number of infected point-of-sale devices as of June 4, 2016. Many of these appear to be at Cici’s Pizza locations.
KrebsOnSecurity has not been able to conclusively tie the botnet to CiCi’s. Neither CiCi’s nor its outside public relations firm have responded to multiple requests for comment. However, the control panel for this botnet includes the full credit card number and name attached to the card, and several individuals whose names appeared in the botnet control panel confirmed having eaten at CiCi’s Pizza locations on the same date that their credit card data was siphoned by this botnet.
Among those was Richard Higgins of Prattville, Ala., whose card data was recorded in the botnet logs on June 4, 2016. Reached via phone, Higgins confirmed that he used his debit card to pay for a meal he and his family enjoyed at a CiCi’s location in Prattville on that same date.
An analysis of the botnet data reveals more than 100 distinct infected systems scattered across the country. However, the panel only displayed hacked systems that were presently reachable online, so the actual number of infected systems may be larger.
Most of the hacked cash registers map back to dynamic Internet addresses assigned by broadband Internet service providers, and those addresses provide little useful information about the owners of the infected systems — other than offering a general idea of the city and state tied to each address.
For example, the Internet address of the compromised point-of-sale system that stole Mr. Higgins’ card data is 72.242.109.130, which maps back to an Earthlink system in a pool of IP addresses managed out of Montgomery, Ala.
Many of the botnet logs include brief notes or messages apparently left by CiCi’s employees for other employees. Most of these messages concern banal details about an employee’s shift, or issues that need to be addressed when the next employee shift comes in to work. Continue reading →
In the wake of megabreaches at some of the Internet’s most-recognized destinations, don’t be surprised if you receive password reset requests from numerous companies that didn’t experience a breach: Some big name companies — including Facebook and Netflix — are in the habit of combing through huge data leak troves for credentials that match those of their customers and then forcing a password reset for those users.
Netflix sent out notices to customers who re-used their Netflix password at other sites that were hacked. This notice was shared by a reader who had re-used his Netflix password at one of the breached companies.
Netflix.com, for example, sent out a notification late last week to users who made the mistake of re-using their Netflix password at Linkedin, Tumblr or MySpace. All of three of those breaches are years old, but the scope of the intrusions (more than a half billion usernames and passwords leaked in total) only became apparent recently when the credentials were posted online at various sites and services.
“We believe your Netflix account credentials may have been included in a recent release of email addresses and passwords from an older breach at another company,” the message from Neflix reads. “Just to be safe, we’ve reset your password as a precautionary measure.”
The missive goes on to urge recipients to visit Netflix.com and click the “forgot your email or password” link to reset their passwords.
Netflix is taking this step because it knows from experience that cybercriminals will be using the credentials leaked from Tumblr, MySpace and LinkedIn to see if they work on a variety of third-party sites (including Netflix).
“Some Netflix members have received emails encouraging them to change their account passwords as a precautionary measure due to the recent disclosure of additional credentials from an older breach at another internet company,” Netflix said in a statement released to KrebsOnSecurity. “Note that we are always engaged in these types of proactive security measures (leveraging Scumblr in addition to other mechanisms and data sources), not just in the case of major security breaches such as this one.”
CiCi’s Pizza, an American fast food business based in Coppell, Texas with more than 500 stores in 35 states, appears to be the latest restaurant chain to struggle with a credit card breach. The data available so far suggests that hackers obtained access to card data at affected restaurants by posing as technical support specialists for the company’s point-of-sale provider, and that multiple other retailers have been targeted by this same cybercrime gang.
Over the past two months, KrebsOnSecurity has received inquiries from fraud fighters at more than a half-dozen financial institutions in the United States — all asking if I had any information about a possible credit card breach at CiCi’s. Every one of these banking industry sources said the same thing: They’d detected a pattern of fraud on cards that all had all been used in the last few months at various CiCi’s Pizza locations.
Earlier today, I finally got around to reaching out to the CiCi’s headquarters in Texas and was referred to a third-party restaurant management firm called Champion Management. When I called Champion and told them why I was inquiring, they said “the issue” was being handled by an outside public relations firm called SPM Communications.
I never did get a substantive response from SPM, which according to their email and phone messages closes at 1 pm on Fridays during the summer. So I decided to follow up on a tip I’d received from a fraud fighter at one affected bank who said they’d heard from the U.S. Secret Service that the fraud was related to a breach or security weakness at Datapoint (CiCi’s point-of-sale provider).
Incredibly, I went to look up the contact information for datapoint[dot]com, and found that Google was trying to prevent me from visiting this site: According to the search engine giant, Datapoint’s Web site appears to be compromised! It appears Google has listed the site as hacked and that it was once abused by spammers to promote knockoff male enhancement pills. Continue reading →
Last week, LifeLock and several other identity theft protection firms erroneously alerted their customers to a breach at cloud storage giant Dropbox.com — an incident that reportedly exposed some 73 million usernames and passwords. The only problem with that notification was that Dropbox didn’t have a breach; the data appears instead to have come from another breach revealed this week at social network Tumblr.
Today’s post examines some of the missteps that preceded this embarrassing and potentially brand-damaging “oops.” We’ll also explore the limits of automated threat intelligence gathering in an era of megabreaches like the ones revealed over the past week that exposed more than a half billion usernames and passwords stolen from Tumblr, MySpace and LinkedIn.
The credentials leaked in connection with breaches at those social networking sites were stolen years ago, but the full extent of the intrusions only became clear recently — when several huge archives of email addresses and hashed passwords from each service were posted to the dark web and to file-sharing sites.
Last week, a reader referred me to a post by a guy named Andrew on the dropbox.com help forum. Andrew said he’d just received alerts blasted out by two different credit monitoring firms that his dropbox credentials had been compromised and were found online (see screenshot below).
A user on the dropbox forum complains of receiving alerts from separate companies warning of a huge password breach at dropbox.com.
Here’s what LifeLock sent out on May 23, 2016 to many customers who pay for the company’s credential recovery services:
Alert Date: 05-23-2016
Alert Type: Monitoring
Alert Category: Internet-Black Market Website
**Member has received a File Sharing Network alert Email: *****
Password: ****************************************
Where your data was found: social media
Type of Compromise: breach
Breached Sector: business
Breached Site: www.dropbox.com
Breached Record Count: 73361477
Password Status: hashed
Severity: red|email,password
Site: www.dropbox.com
LifeLock said it got the alert data via an information sharing agreement with a third party threat intelligence service, but it declined to name the service that sent the false positive alert.
“We can confirm that we recently notified a small segment of LifeLock members that a version of their dropbox.com credentials were detected on the internet,” LifeLock said in a written statement provided to KrebsOnSecurity. “When we are notified about this type of information from a partner, it is usually a “list” that is being given away, traded or sold on the dark web. The safety and security of our members’ data is our highest priority. We are continuing to monitor for any activity within our source network. At this time, we recommend that these LifeLock members change their Dropbox password(s) as a precautionary measure.”
Dropbox says it didn’t have a breach, and if it had the company would be seeing huge amounts of account checking activity and other oddities going on right now. And that’s just not happening, they say.
“We have learned that LifeLock and MyIdCare.com are reporting that Dropbox account details of some of their customers are potentially compromised,” said Patrick Heim, head of trust and security at Dropbox. “An initial investigation into these reports has found no evidence of Dropbox accounts being impacted. We’re continuing to look into this issue and will update our users if we find evidence that Dropbox accounts have been impacted.” Continue reading →
On March 14, 2013 our humble home in Annandale, Va. was “swatted” — that is to say, surrounded by a heavily-armed police force that was responding to fraudulent reports of a hostage situation at our residence. Later this month the government will sentence 21-year-old hacker named Mir Islam for that stunt and for leading a criminal conspiracy allegedly engaged in a pattern of swatting, identity theft and wire fraud.
Mir Islam
Mir Islam briefly rose to Internet infamy as one of the core members of UGNazi, an online mischief-making group that claimed credit for hacking and attacking a number of high-profile Web sites.
On June 25, 2012, Islam and nearly two-dozen others were caught up in an FBI dragnet dubbed Operation Card Shop. The government accused Islam of being a founding member of carders[dot]org — a credit card fraud forum — trafficking in stolen credit card information, and possessing information for more than 50,000 credit cards.
Most importantly for the government, however, Islam was active on CarderProfit, a carding forum created and run by FBI agents.
Islam ultimately pleaded guilty to aggravated identity theft and conspiracy to commit computer hacking, among other offenses tied to his activities on CarderProfit. In March 2016 a judge for the Southern District of New York sentenced (PDF) Islam to just one day in jail, a $500 fine, and three years of probation.
Not long after Islam’s plea in New York, I heard from the U.S. Justice Department. The DOJ told me that I was one of several swatting victims of Mir Islam, who was awaiting sentencing after pleading guilty of leading a cybercrime conspiracy. Although that case remains sealed — i.e. there are no documents available to the press or the public about the case — the government granted a waiver that allows the Justice Department to contact victims of the accused and to provide them with an opportunity to attend Islam’s sentencing hearing — and even to address the court.
Corbin Weiss, an assistant US attorney and a cybercrime coordinator with the Department of Justice, said Islam pleaded guilty to one count of conspiracy, and that the objects of that conspiracy were seven:
-identity theft;
-misuse of access devices;
-misuse of Social Security numbers;
-computer fraud;
-wire fraud;
-attempts to interfere with federal officials;
-interstate transmission of threats.
Weiss said my 2013 blog post about my swatting incident — The World Has No Room for Cowards — was part of the government’s “statement of offense” or argument before the court as to why a given suspect should be arrested and charged with a violation of law.
“Your swatting is definitely one of the incidents specifically brought to the attention of the court in this case,” Weiss said. “In part because we didn’t have that many swat victims who were able to describe to us the entire process of their victimization. Your particular swat doesn’t fit neatly within any of those charges, but it was part of the conspiracy to engage in swats and some of the swats are covered by those charges.” Continue reading →
How much would a cybercriminal, nation state or organized crime group pay for blueprints on how to exploit a serious, currently undocumented, unpatched vulnerability in all versions of Microsoft Windows? That price probably depends on the power of the exploit and what the market will bear at the time, but here’s a look at one convincing recent exploit sales thread from the cybercrime underworld where the current asking price for a Windows-wide bug that allegedly defeats all of Microsoft’s current security defenses is USD $90,000.
So-called “zero-day” vulnerabilities are flaws in software and hardware that even the makers of the product in question do not know about. Zero-days can be used by attackers to remotely and completely compromise a target — such as with a zero-day vulnerability in a browser plugin component like Adobe Flash or Oracle’s Java. These flaws are coveted, prized, and in some cases stockpiled by cybercriminals and nation states alike because they enable very stealthy and targeted attacks.
The $90,000 Windows bug that went on sale at the semi-exclusive Russian language cybercrime forum exploit[dot]in earlier this month is in a slightly less serious class of software vulnerability called a “local privilege escalation” (LPE) bug. This type of flaw is always going to be used in tandem with another vulnerability to successfully deliver and run the attacker’s malicious code.
LPE bugs can help amplify the impact of other exploits. One core tenet of security is limiting the rights or privileges of certain programs so that they run with the rights of a normal user — and not under the all-powerful administrator or “system” user accounts that can delete, modify or read any file on the computer. That way, if a security hole is found in one of these programs, that hole can’t be exploited to worm into files and folders that belong only to the administrator of the system.
This is where a privilege escalation bug can come in handy. An attacker may already have a reliable exploit that works remotely — but the trouble is his exploit only succeeds if the current user is running Windows as an administrator. No problem: Chain that remote exploit with a local privilege escalation bug that can bump up the target’s account privileges to that of an admin, and your remote exploit can work its magic without hindrance.
The seller of this supposed zero-day — someone using the nickname “BuggiCorp” — claims his exploit works on every version of Windows from Windows 2000 on up to Microsoft’s flagship Windows 10 operating system. To support his claims, the seller includes two videos of the exploit in action on what appears to be a system that was patched all the way up through this month’s (May 2016) batch of patches from Microsoft (it’s probably no accident that the video was created on May 10, the same day as Patch Tuesday this month).
A second video (above) appears to show the exploit working even though the test machine in the video is running Microsoft’s Enhanced Mitigation Experience Toolkit (EMET), a free software framework designed to help block or blunt exploits against known and unknown Windows vulnerabilities and flaws in third-party applications that run on top of Windows.
The sales thread on exploit[dot]in.
Jeff Jones, a cybersecurity strategist with Microsoft, said the company was aware of the exploit sales thread, but stressed that the claims were still unverified. Asked whether Microsoft would ever consider paying for information about the zero-day vulnerability, Jones pointed to the company’s bug bounty program that rewards security researchers for reporting vulnerabilities. According to Microsoft, the program to date has paid out more than $500,000 in bounties.
Microsoft heavily restricts the types of vulnerabilities that qualify for bounty rewards, but a bug like the one on sale for $90,000 would in fact qualify for a substantial bounty reward. Last summer, Microsoft raised its reward for information about a vulnerability that can fully bypass EMET from $50,000 to $100,000. Incidentally, Microsoft said any researcher with a vulnerability or who has questions can reach out to the Microsoft Security Response Center to learn more about the program and process.
ANALYSIS
It’s interesting that this exploit’s seller could potentially make more money by peddling his find to Microsoft than to the cybercriminal community. Of course, the videos and the whole thing could be a sham, but that’s probably unlikely in this case. For one thing, a scammer seeking to scam other thieves would not insist on using the cybercrime forum’s escrow service to consummate the transaction, as this vendor has. Continue reading →
The Associated Press today points to a remarkable footnote in a recent State Department inspector general report on the Hillary Clinton email scandal: The mail was managed from the vanity domain “clintonemail.com.” But here’s a potentially more explosive finding: A review of the historic domain registration records for that domain indicates that whoever built the private email server for the Clintons also had the not-so-bright idea of connecting it to an Internet-based printer.
According to historic Internet address maps stored by San Mateo, Calif. based Farsight Security, among the handful of Internet addresses historically assigned to the domain “clintonemail.com” was the numeric address 24.187.234.188. The subdomain attached to that Internet address was….wait for it…. “printer.clintonemail.com“.
Interestingly, that domain was first noticed by Farsight in March 2015, the same month the scandal broke that during her tenure as United States Secretary of State Mrs. Clinton exclusively used her family’s private email server for official communications.
Farsight’s record for 24.187.234.188, the Internet address which once mapped to “printer.clintonemail.com”.
I should emphasize here that it’s unclear whether an Internet-capable printer was ever connected to printer.clintonemail.com. Nevertheless, it appears someone set it up to work that way.
Ronald Guilmette, a private security researcher in California who prompted me to look up this information, said printing things to an Internet-based printer set up this way might have made the printer data vulnerable to eavesdropping.
“Whoever set up their home network like that was a security idiot, and it’s a dumb thing to do,” Guilmette said. “Not just because any idiot on the Internet can just waste all your toner. Some of these printers have simple vulnerabilities that leave them easy to be hacked into.”
More importantly, any emails or other documents that the Clintons decided to print would be sent out over the Internet — however briefly — before going back to the printer. And that data may have been sniffable by other customers of the same ISP, Guilmette said. Continue reading →
Recent local news stories about credit card skimmers found in self-checkout lanes at some Walmart locations reminds me of a criminal sales pitch I saw recently for overlay skimmers made specifically for the very same card terminals.
Much like the skimmers found at some Safeway locations earlier this year, the skimming device pictured below was designed to be installed in the blink of an eye at self-checkout lanes — as in recent incidents at Walmart stores in Fredericksburg, Va. and Fort Wright, Ky. In these attacks, the skimmers were made to piggyback on card readers sold by payment solutions company Ingenico.
A skimmer made to be fitted to an Ingenico credit card terminal of the kind used at Walmart stores across the country. Image: Hold Security.
This Ingenico “overlay” skimmer has a PIN pad overlay to capture the user’s PIN, and a mechanism for recording the data stored on a card’s magnetic stripe when customers swipe their cards at self-checkout aisles. The wire pictured at the bottom is for offloading the data from the card skimmers once thieves have retrieved the devices from compromised checkout lanes.
This particular skimmer retails for between $200 to $300, but that price doesn’t include the electronics that power the device and store the stolen card data.
Here’s how this skimmer looks when it’s attached. Think you’d be able to spot it?
Image credit: Hold Security.
Walmart last year began asking customers with more secure chip-enabled cards to dip the chip instead of swipe the stripe. Chip-based cards are more expensive and difficult for thieves to counterfeit, and they can help mitigate the threat from most modern card-skimming methods that read the cardholder data in plain text from the card’s magnetic stripe. Those include malicious software at the point-of-sale terminal, as well as physical skimmers placed over card readers at self-checkout lanes. Continue reading →