The data breach disclosed in March by security firm RSA received worldwide attention because it highlighted the challenges that organizations face in detecting and blocking intrusions from targeted cyber attacks. The subtext of the story was that if this could happen to one of the largest and most integral security firms, what hope was there for organizations that aren’t focused on security?
Security experts have said that RSA wasn’t the only corporation victimized in the attack, and that dozens of other multinational companies were infiltrated using many of the same tools and Internet infrastructure. But so far, no one has been willing to talk publicly about which other companies may have been hit. Today’s post features a never-before-published list of those victim organizations. The information suggests that more than 760 other organizations had networks that were compromised with some of the same resources used to hit RSA. Almost 20 percent of the current Fortune 100 companies are on this list.
Since the RSA incident was disclosed, lawmakers in the U.S. Congress have taken a renewed interest in so-called “advanced persistent threat” or APT attacks. Some of the industry’s top security experts have been summoned to Capitol Hill to brief lawmakers and staff about the extent of the damage. The information below was shared with congressional staff.
Below is a list of companies whose networks were shown to have been phoning home to some of the same control infrastructure that was used in the attack on RSA. The first victims appear to have begun communicating with the attacker’s control networks as early as November 2010.
A few caveats are in order here. First, many of the network owners listed are Internet service providers, and are likely included because some of their subscribers were hit. Second, it is not clear how many systems in each of these companies or networks were compromised, for how long those intrusions persisted, or whether the attackers successfully stole sensitive information from all of the victims. Finally, some of these organizations (there are several antivirus firms mentioned below) may be represented because they intentionally compromised internal systems in an effort to reverse engineer malware used in these attacks.
Among the more interesting names on the list are Abbott Labs, the Alabama Supercomputer Network, Charles Schwabb & Co., Cisco Systems, eBay, the European Space Agency, Facebook, Freddie Mac, Google, the General Services Administration, the Inter-American Development Bank, IBM, Intel Corp., the Internal Revenue Service (IRS), the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Motorola Inc., Northrop Grumman, Novell, Perot Systems, PriceWaterhouseCoopers LLP, Research in Motion (RIM) Ltd., Seagate Technology, Thomson Financial, Unisys Corp., USAA, Verisign, VMWare, Wachovia Corp., and Wells Fargo & Co.
At the end of the victim list is a pie chart that shows the geographic distribution of the command and control networks used to coordinate the attacks. The chart indicates that the overwhelming majority of the C&Cs are located in or around Beijing, China.
8e6 Technologies, Inc.
AAPT AAPT Limited
ABBOTT Abbot Labs
ABOVENET-CUSTOMER – Abovenet Communications, Inc
ACCNETWORKS – Advanced Computer Connections
ACEDATACENTERS-AS-1 – Ace Data Centers, Inc.
ACSEAST – ACS Inc.
ACS-INTERNET – Affiliated Computer Services
ACS-INTERNET – Armstrong Cable Services
ADELPHIA-AS – Road Runner HoldCo LLC
Administracion Nacional de Telecomunicaciones
AERO-NET – The Aerospace Corporation
AHP – WYETH-AYERST/AMERICAN HOME PRODUCTS
AIRLOGIC – Digital Magicians, Inc.
AIRTELBROADBAND-AS-AP Bharti Airtel Ltd., Telemedia Services
AIS-WEST – American Internet Services, LLC.
AKADO-STOLITSA-AS _AKADO-Stolitsa_ JSC
ALCANET Corporate ALCANET Access
ALCANET-DE-AS Alcanet International Deutschland GmbH
ALCATEL-NA – Alcanet International NA
ALCHEMYNET – Alchemy Communications, Inc.
Alestra, S. de R.L. de C.V.
ALLIANCE-GATEWAY-AS-AP Alliance Broadband Services Pvt. Ltd.,Alliance Gateway AS,Broadband Services Provider,Kolkata,India
ALMAZAYA Almazaya gateway L.L.C
AMAZON-AES – Amazon.com, Inc.
AMERITECH-AS – AT&T Services, Inc.
AMNET-AU-AP Amnet IT Services Pty Ltd
ANITEX-AS Anitex Autonomus System
AOL-ATDN – AOL Transit Data Network
API-DIGITAL – API Digital Communications Group, LLC
APOLLO-GROUP-INC – University of Phoenix
ARLINGTONVA – Arlington County Government
ARMENTEL Armenia Telephone Company
AS3215 France Telecom – Orange
AS3602-RTI – Rogers Cable Communications Inc.
AS4196 – Wells Fargo & Company
AS702 Verizon Business EMEA – Commercial IP service provider in Europe
ASATTCA AT&T Global Network Services – AP
ASC-NET – Alabama Supercomputer Network
ASDANIS DANIS SRL
ASGARR GARR Italian academic and research network
ASIAINFO-AS-AP ASIA INFONET Co.,Ltd./ TRUE INTERNET Co.,Ltd.
ASIANDEVBANK – Asian Development Bank
ASN852 – Telus Advanced Communications
AS-NLAYER – nLayer Communications, Inc.
ASTOUND-CABLE – Wave Broadband, LLC
AT&T Global Network Services – EMEA
ATMAN ATMAN Autonomous System
ATOMNET ATOM SA
ATOS-AS ATOS Origin Infogerance Autonomous System
ATT-INTERNET4 – AT&T Services, Inc.
AUGERE-AS-AP Augere Wireless Broadband Bangladesh Limited
AVENUE-AS Physical person-businessman Kuprienko Victor Victorovich
AXAUTSYS ARAX I.S.P.
BACOM – Bell Canada
BAHNHOF Bahnhof AB
BALTKOM-AS SIA _Baltkom TV SIA_
BANGLALINK-AS an Orascom Telecom Company, providing GSM service in Bangladesh
BANGLALION-WIMAX-BD Silver Tower (16 & 18th Floor)
BASEFARM-ASN Basefarm AS. Oslo – Norway
BBIL-AP BHARTI Airtel Ltd.
BBN Bredbaand Nord I/S
BEAMTELE-AS-AP Beam Telecom Pvt Ltd
BEE-AS JSC _VimpelCom_
BELINFONET Belinfonet Autonomus System, Minsk, Belarus
BELLSOUTH-NET-BLK – BellSouth.net Inc.
BELWUE Landeshochschulnetz Baden-Wuerttemberg (BelWue)
BENCHMARK-ELECTRONICS – Benchmark Electronics Inc.
BEND-BROADBAND – Bend Cable Communications, LLC
BEZEQ-INTERNATIONAL-AS Bezeqint Internet Backbone
BIGNET-AS-ID Elka Prakarsa Utama, PT
BLUEWIN-AS Swisscom (Schweiz) AG
BM-AS-ID PT. Broadband Multimedia, Tbk
BN-AS Business network j.v.
BNSF-AS – Burlington Northern Sante Fe Railway Corp
BNT-NETWORK-ACCESS – Biz Net Technologies
BORNET Boras Energi Nat AB
BREEZE-NETWORK TOV TRK _Briz_
BSC-CORP – Boston Scientific Corporation
BSKYB-BROADBAND-AS BSkyB Broadband
BSNL-NIB National Internet Backbone
BT BT European Backbone
BT-ITALIA BT Italia S.p.A.
BTN-ASN – Beyond The Network America, Inc.
BTTB-AS-AP Telecom Operator & Internet Service Provider as well
BT-UK-AS BTnet UK Regional network
CABLECOM Cablecom GmbH
CABLE-NET-1 – Cablevision Systems Corp.
CABLEONE – CABLE ONE, INC.
CACHEFLOW-AS – Bluecoat Systems, Inc.
CANET-ASN-4 – Bell Aliant Regional Communications, Inc.
CANTV Servicios, Venezuela
CAPEQUILOG – CapEquiLog
CARAVAN CJSC Caravan-Telecom
CARRIER-NET – Carrier Net
CCCH-3 – Comcast Cable Communications Holdings, Inc
CDAGOVN – Government Telecommunications and Informatics Services
CDS-AS Cifrovye Dispetcherskie Sistemy
CDT-AS CD-Telematika a.s.
CE-BGPAC – Covenant Eyes, Inc.
CELLCO-PART – Cellco Partnership DBA Verizon Wireless
CENSUSBUREAU – U. S. Bureau of the Census
CERNET-ASN-BLOCK – California Education and Research Federation Network
CERT – Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT) – Coordination Center
CGINET-01 – CGI Inc
CHARLES-SCHWAB – Charles Schwab & Co., Inc.
CHARTER-NET-HKY-NC – Charter Communications
CHINA169-BACKBONE CNCGROUP China169 Backbone
CHINA169-BJ CNCGROUP IP network China169 Beijing Province Network
CHINA169-GZ China Unicom IP network China169 Guangdong province
CHINANET-BACKBONE No.31,Jin-rong Street
CHINANET-IDC-BJ-AP IDC, China Telecommunications Corporation
CHINANET-SH-AP China Telecom (Group)
CIPHERKEY – Cipherkey Exchange Corp.
CISCO-EU-109 Cisco Systems Global ASN – ARIN Assigned
CITEC-AU-AP QLD Government Business (IT)
CITYNET – CityNet
CLIX-NZ TelstraClear Ltd
CMCS – Comcast Cable Communications, Inc.
CMNET-BEIJING-AP China Mobile Communicaitons Corporation
CMNET-GD Guangdong Mobile Communication Co.Ltd.
CMNET-V4SHANDONG-AS-AP Shandong Mobile Communication Company Limited
CNCGROUP-GZ CNCGROUP IP network of GuangZhou region MAN network
CNCGROUP-SH China Unicom Shanghai network
CNIX-AP China Networks Inter-Exchange
CNNIC-DSNET-AP Shanghai Data Solution Co., Ltd.
CNNIC-WASU-AP WASU TV & Communication Holding Co.,Ltd.
CO-2COM-AS 2COM Co ltd.
COGECOWAVE – Cogeco Cable
COLO4 – Colo4Dallas LP
COLOMBIA TELECOMUNICACIONES S.A. ESP
COLT COLT Technology Services Group Limited
COLUMBUS-NETWORKS – Columbus Networks USA, Inc.
COMCAST-33490 – Comcast Cable Communications, Inc.
COMCAST-33491 – Comcast Cable Communications, Inc.
COMCAST-36732 – Comcast Cable Communications, Inc.
COMCAST-7015 – Comcast Cable Communications Holdings, Inc
COMCAST-7725 – Comcast Cable Communications Holdings, Inc
COMCAST-HOUSTON – Comcast – Houston
COMHEM-SWEDEN Com Hem Sweden
COMNET-TH KSC Commercial Internet Co. Ltd.
Completel Autonomous System in France
COMSTAR COMSTAR-Direct global network
CORBINA-AS Corbina Telecom
COVAD – Covad Communications Co.
CPMBLUE-AS-BD CPM BLUE ONLINE LTD.Transit AS Internet Service Provider, Dhaka
CRRSTV – CRRS-TV
CSC Computer Management and CSC Denmark
CSC-IGN-AUNZ-AP Computer Sciences Corporation
CSC-IGN-EMEA – Computer Sciences Corporation
CSC-IGN-FTW – Computer Sciences Corporation
CSLOXINFO-AS-AP CS LOXINFO PUBLIC COMPANY LIMITED
CSUNET-NW – California State University Network
CSXT-AS-1 – CSX Technology
CTIHK-AS-AP City Telecom (H.K.) Ltd.
CTS-MD I.S. Centrul de Telecomunicatii Speciale
CXA-ALL-CCI-22773-RDC – Cox Communications Inc.
CYBERVERSE – Cyberverse, Inc.
CYPRESS-SEMICONDUCTOR – Cypress Semiconductor
CYTA-NETWORK Cyprus Telecommunications Authority
DARLICS-AS Darlics ltd. provides IP transport and Internet
DATAGRUPA SIA _Datagrupa.lv_ Marijas 7 – 412a Riga, LV-1050, LATVIA
DCI-AS DCI Autonomous System
DECHO – Decho Corporation
DFINET DFi Service SA
DHL-AS DHL Systems Inc.
DHSINETNOC – DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
DIGCOMM Digital communications, LTD
DIGITAL-TELEPORT – Digital Teleport Inc.
DIL-AP DIRECT INTERNET LTD.
DIN-AS TOMSKTELECOM AS
DINAS-AS PE Kuznetsova Viktoria Viktorovna
DINET-AS Digital Network JSC
Diveo do Brasil Telecomunicacoes Ltda
DK-ESS-AS Syd Energi Bredbaand A/S
DMSLABNET – DoD Network Information Center
DNC-AS IM Data Network Communication SRL
DNEO-OSP7 – Comcast Cable Communications, Inc.
DNIC-ASBLK-00721-00726 – DoD Network Information Center
DNIC-ASBLK-27032-27159 – DoD Network Information Center
DOGAN-ONLINE Dogan Iletisim Elektronik Servis Hizmetleri
DOMAINFACTORY domainfactory GmbH
DOMAINTOOLS – DomainTools, LLC
DONTELE-AS Telenet LLC
DREAMHOST-AS – New Dream Network, LLC
DREAMX-AS DREAMLINE CO.
DRWEB-AS Doctor Web Ltd
DSE-VIC-GOV-AS Department of Sustainability & Environment,
DSIJSC-AS DSI Autonomous system
DSLEXTREME – DSL Extreme
DTAG Deutsche Telekom AG
DWL-AS-IN Dishnet Wireless Limited. Broadband Wireless
DYNDNS – Dynamic Network Services, Inc.
EASYDNS EasyDNS Technologies, Inc.
EASYNET Easynet Global Services
EBAY – eBay, Inc
ECI-TELECOM-LTD ECI Telecom-Ltd.
EDGECAST – EdgeCast Networks, Inc.
ELISA-AS Elisa Oyj
EMBARQ-WNPK – Embarq Corporation
EMBIT-AS BURTILA & Co. ELECTRON M.BIT SRL
EMC-AS12257 – EMC Corporation
EMIRATES-INTERNET Emirates Internet
EMOBILE eMobile Ltd.
ENTEL CHILE S.A.
EPM Telecomunicaciones S.A. E.S.P.
EQUANT-ASIA Equant AS for Asian Region covering Japan
EQUINIX-EDMA-ASH-ASN – Equinix, Inc.
ERICSSON-APAC-MY-AS Ericsson Global Services. BUGS N&V APAC
ESRI – Environmental Systems Research Institute
ESS-PR-WEBMASTERS – ESS/PR WebMasters
ETPI-IDS-AS-AP Eastern Telecoms Phils., Inc.
ETSI Autonomous System
EURONET Online Breedband B.V. Global AS
European Space Agency
EUSKALTEL Euskaltel S.A.
EXIM – Export Import Bank of the U.S
FACEBOOK – Facebook, Inc.
FANNIEMAE – Fannie Mae
FASTMETRICS – Fastmetrics, LLC
FAST-TELCO Fast Telecommunications Company W.L.L.
FASTWEB Fastweb SpA
FDA – Parklawn Computer Center / DIMES HQ
FIBREONE-AS fibre one networks GmbH, Duesseldorf
FITC-AS – FITC – FedEx International Transmission Corporation
FMAC-I-BILLING – Freddie Mac
FMI-NET-AS – Freeport-McMoran Inc.
FORATEC-AS Foratec Communication AS at Sverdlovsk, Tyumen, Perm regions
FORTINET-CANADA – Fortinet Inc.
FPT-AS-AP The Corporation for Financing & Promoting Technology
FRONTIER-AND-CITIZENS – Frontier Communications of America, Inc.
FRONTIER-FRTR – Frontier Communications of America, Inc.
FR-RENATER Reseau National de telecommunications pour la Technologie
FULLRATE Fullrate A/S
FX-PRIMARY-AS FX Networks Limited
GBLX Global Crossing Ltd.
GET-NO GET Norway
GIGAINFRA Softbank BB Corp.
GLOBAL-SPLK – Sprint International
GLOBE-TELECOM-AS Globe Telecoms
GOLDENLINES-ASN 012 Smile Communications Main Autonomous System
GOLDENTELECOM-UKRAINE Golden Telecom
GOOGLE – Google Inc.
GRAMEENPHONE-AS-AP GrameenPhone Ltd.
GSA-GOV – General Services Administration
GT-BELL – Bell Canada
Gtd Internet S.A.
H3G-AS H3G S.p.A.
H3GUKNIE Hutchison 3G UK and Ireland Core AS
HANARO-AS Hanaro Telecom Inc.
HATHWAY-NET-AP Hathway IP Over Cable Internet
HETZNER-AS Hetzner Online AG RZ
HHES – HAMILTON HYDRO ELECTRIC SYSTEM
HINET Data Communication Business Group
HKNET-AP HKNet Co. Ltd
HKTIMS-AP PCCW Limited
HNS-DIRECPC – Hughes Network Systems
HOPONE-GLOBAL – HopOne Internet Corporation
HOSTEUROPE-AS AS of Hosteurope Germany / Cologne
HP-INTERNET-AS Hewlett-Packard Company
HTCL-IAS-HK-AP Hutchison Telephone Company Limited
HTIL-TTML-IN-AP Tata Teleservices Maharashtra Ltd
HURRICANE – Hurricane Electric, Inc.
HUTCHISON-AS-AP Hutchison Global Communications
HUTCHVAS-AS Vodafone Essar Ltd., Telecommunication – Value Added Services,
IADB-NETWORKS – The Inter-American Development Bank
IBM E-business Hosting Delivery
IBMCCH-RTP – IBM
IBMCCH-SBY – IBM
IBMDES-AS – IBM Dallas Engineering & Scientific
IBSNAZ Telecom Italia S.p.a.
ICONNECT-BD Planners Tower
IDK-NETWORK CJSC Interdnestrcom AS
IEUNET BT Ireland Backbone
IFX-NW – IFX Communication Ventures, Inc.
IHNET – IHNetworks, LLC
IINET iiNet Limited
IJ-NET – Internet Junction Corp.
ILX-ASN – THOMSON FINANCIAL
IN2CABLE-AP AS Number of In2cable.com (India) Ltd.
INDONET-AS-AP INDO Internet, PT
INDOSATM2-ID INDOSATM2 ASN
INEA-AS INEA S.A.
INET-AS-ID PT. Inet Global Indo
INETCOMM-AS INET LTD
I-NETPARTNER-AS I-NetPartner GmbH ASN
INETTEHNO Inet Tehno
INFINEON-AS Infineon AG
INFINEON-SG 8 Kallang Sector
INFLOW19294 – Inflow Inc.
INFOSPHERE NTT PC Communications, Inc.
INFOSTRADA Infostrada S.p.A.
INIT7 Init7 Global Backbone
INS-AS – AT&T Data Communications Services
Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad y Telecom.
Instituto Tecnol??gico y de Estudios Superiores de Monterrey
INTEGRATELECOM – Integra Telecom, Inc.
INTELSAT Intelsat Global BGP Routing Policy
INTEL-SC-AS – Intel Corporation
INTERNAP-2BLK – Internap Network Services Corporation
INTERNAP-BLK – Internap Network Services Corporation
INTERNAP-BLK – Internap Network Services Corporation
INTERNAP-BLK3 – Internap Network Services Corporation
INTERNAP-BLOCK-4 – Internap Network Services Corporation
INTERNETIA-AS Netia SA
INTERNET-PATH – Internet Path, Inc.
INTERNET-PRO-AS Internet-Pro Ltd
INTEROUTE Interoute Communications Ltd
INTERPHONE-AS Interphone Ltd.
IPASAULE-AS _Interneta Pasaule_ SIA
IPG-AS-AP Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company
IPGOMA – THE INTERPUBLIC GROUP OF COMPANIES, INC.
IPO-EU IP-Only Telecommunication Networks AB
IQUEST-AS – IQuest Internet
IRONPORT-SYSTEMS-INC – Cisco Systems Ironport Division
IRS – Internal Revenue Service
ISC-AS1280 Internet Systems Consortium, Inc.
ISKON ISKON INTERNET d.d. za informatiku i telekomunikacije
ISKRATELECOM-AS ISKRATELECOM ZAO
ISP-KIM-NET Kalush Information Network LTD
ISSC-AS – ISSC
ISW – Internet Specialties West Inc.
ITNS ITNS. NET SRL
ITSCOM its communications Inc.
JAWWAL Jawwal will be multihoming with us AS15975 and AS12975
JAZZNET Jazz Telecom S.A.
Jordan Data Communications Company LLC
JUNIPER-NETWORKS – Juniper Networks, Inc.
KABELBW-ASN Kabel Baden-Wuerttemberg GmbH & Co. KG
KAISER-NCAL – Kaiser Foundation Health Plan
KAMOPOWER – KAMO Electric Cooperative, Inc.
KAZTELECOM-AS JSC Kazakhtelecom
KHERSON-TS Kherson Telecommunication Systems Ltd.
KIXS-AS-KR Korea Telecom
K-OPTICOM K-Opticom Corporation
KSNET-AS Kyivstar GSM
KVH KVH Co.,Ltd
LANTELECOM-AS Lan-Telecom AS Number
LATISYS-ASHBURN – Latisys-Ashburn, LLC
LATNETSERVISS-AS LATNET ISP
LDCOMNET NEUF CEGETEL (formerly LDCOM NETWORKS)
LEASEWEB LEASEWEB AS
LEVEL3 Level 3 Communications
LGCNS-AS – LG CNS America Inc.
LGDACOM LG DACOM Corporation
LGNET-AS-KR LG CNS
LINKLINE – LinkLINE Communications, Inc.
LINKNET-ID-AP Linknet ASN
LOQAL-AS Loqal AS
LUCENT-CIO – Lucent Technologies Inc.
LUGANET-AS ARTA Ltd
LVBALTICOM-AS _Balticom_ JSC
LVLT594-598 – Level 3 Communications, Inc.
LYSE-AS Altibox AS
MAGNUS-AS TOV _Magnus Limited_
MANGOTELESERVICE-AS-BD Only private Owned IIG in Bangladesh
MAP Moscow Network Access Point
MASERGY-US Masergy US Autonomous System
MASSCOM – Massillon Cable Communications
MAXIS-AS1-AP Binariang Berhad
MBL-AS-AP Micronet Broadband (Pvt) Ltd.
MCAFEE – McAfee, Inc.
MCAFEE-COM – McAfee, Inc.
MCC OJSC _Moscow Cellular Communications_,
MCI-ASN – MCI
MCT-SYDNEY Macquarie Telecom
MDITNET-AS ITNET (ITPAY SRL)
Mega Cable, S.A. de C.V.
MEGAPATH2-US – MegaPath Networks Inc.
METROTEL REDES S.A.
MF-KAVKAZ-AS Caucasus Branch of OJSC MegaFon AS
MF-NWGSM-AS North-West Branch of OJSC MegaFon Network
MFNX MFN – Metromedia Fiber Network
MICRON21-AS-AU-AP Micron21 Melbourne Australia Datacentre. Co-Location Dedicated Servers Web Hosting
MICROSOFT-CORP-AS – Microsoft Corp
MICROSOFT-CORP—MSN-AS-BLOCK – Microsoft Corp
MISD-NET – Macomb Intermediate School District
MIT-GATEWAYS – Massachusetts Institute of Technology
MOLDCELL_AS Moldcell SA Autonomous System
MOLDDATA-AS Administrator of the top level domain .MD,
MOLDTELECOM-AS Moldtelecom Autonomous System
MORENET – University of Missouri – dba the Missouri Research and Education Network (MOREnet)
MOTOROLA – Motorola, Inc.
MOTOROLA-PHX – Motorola, Inc.
MP-ELEKTRONIKA-AS MP ELEKTRONIKA Autonomous System
MPX-AS Microplex PTY LTD
MTNL-AP Mahanagar Telephone Nigam Ltd.
MTS-INDIA-IN 334,Udyog Vihar
MTSNET OJSC _Mobile TeleSystems_ Autonomous System
N9E7X5E3N1I2N4C – Nexen Inc.
NAWALA-AS-ID Asosiasi Warung Internet Indonesia (AWARI)
NAWRAS-AS Omani Qatari Telecommunications Company SAOC
NBLNETWORKS-AS Nebula Oy Autonomous System
NC-FUNB-AS – WACHOVIA CORP
NCNET-AS National Cable Networks
NEOLINK CJSC _ER-Telecom Holding_ Izhevsk branch
NERIM Nerim SAS
NET-ACCESS-CORP – Net Access Corporation
NET-AIG – American International Group (AIG) Data Center, Inc.
NETCOM-AS NetCom as Autonomous system
NETELLIGENT – Netelligent Hosting Services Inc.
NEWCOM-AS NEWCOM mirror object from ARIN
NEWCOM-ASN New Com Telecomunicatii SA
NEWEDGENETS – New Edge Networks
NEWSKIES-NETWORKS SES WORLD SKIES ARIN AS, for routing RIPE space.
NEWTT-IP-AP Wharf T&T Ltd.
NEXTGENTEL NEXTGENTEL Autonomous System
NEXTTELL-VRN-AS LLC NextTell-Voronezh AS Number
NG-AS NextGen Communications SRL
NIANET-AS nianet is a Danish carrier and Internet Service Provider
NOC – Network Operations Center Inc.
NOKIA Nokia Internet
NOKIA-AS NOKIANET APAC Data Centre network
NOKIANET_DALLAS NOKIANET Dallas office
Nominum Global NameServer network
NOMINUM-SKYE1 – SKYE
NORDLINKS-AS S.C. _NordLinks_ S.R.L.
NORMA-PLUS-AS TOV Norma Plus
NORTHROP-GRUMMAN – Northrop Grumman
NOVELL – Novell, Inc.
NTL Virgin Media Limited
NTT do Brasil Telecomunicaoes Ltda
NTT-COMMUNICATIONS-2914 – NTT America, Inc.
NUMERICABLE NUMERICABLE is a cable network operator in France, offering TV,VOICE and Internet services
NUVOX – NuVox Communications, Inc.
NV-ASN 013 NetVision Ltd.
NYFX-RTR – NYFIX, INC
O1COMM – O1 COMMUNICATIONS
OCN NTT Communications Corporation
OFIDEN – OppenheimerFunds, Inc.
OMD-FNO Orange Moldova Fix Network Autonomous System
OPENDNS – OpenDNS, LLC
ORANGE-BUSINESS-SERVICES-SOUTHEUR Equant Inc.
ORANGE-BUSINESS-SERVICES-UK Orange Business Services (formerly Equant) AS for UK
OSIS-PACOM – Joint Intelligence Center Pacific
P4NET P4 Sp. z o.o.
PACIFIC-INTERNET-INDIA-ASN Pacific Internet India Pvt. Ltd.
PACIFIC-INTERNET-IX Pacific Internet Ltd
PACNET Pacnet Global Ltd
PAH-INC – GoDaddy.com, Inc.
PAIR-NETWORKS – pair Networks
PALTEL-AS PALTEL Autonomous System
PARTNER-AS Partner Communications Ltd.
PBTL-BD-AS-AP Pacific Bangladesh Telecom Limited.
PDX – PORTLAND INTERNETWORKS
PEER1 – Peer 1 Network Inc.
Pegaso PCS, S.A. de C.V.
PERSNET Korea Telecom Freetel
PI-AU Pacific Internet (Australia) Pty Ltd
PI-HK Pacnet Internet (Hong Kong) Limited
PIXNET-AS – Providers Internet Exchange
PKTELECOM-AS-PK Pakistan Telecom Company Limited
PLUSSERVER-AS PlusServer AG, Germany
POLYCOM – Polycom, Inc.
POWEREDCOM KDDI CORPORATION
PRIMORYE-AS Open Joint Stock Company _Far East Telecommunications Company_
PRINCETON-AS – Princeton University
PROBENETWORKS-AS Probe Networks
PRONET_LV SIA _PRONETS_
PROXAD Free SAS
PS-NETPLEX-AS – Perot Systems
PT KPN Internet Solutions
PTK-CENTERTEL-DSL-AS PTK Centertel Sp. z o.o.
PTLP-CORE – People_s Tel Limited Partnership
PTPRIMENET PT PRIME – Solucoes Empresariais de Telecomunicacoes e Sistemas S.A.
PUSAN-AS-KR Pusan National University
PWC-AS – PriceWaterhouseCoopers, LLP
Q9-AS – Q9 Networks Inc.
Q9-AS-BRAM – Q9 Networks Inc.
QNETCZ QNET CZ s.r.o.
QSC-1 QSC AG
QUALCOMM – Qualcomm, Inc.
QUALCOMM-BLR-AS-AP Qualcomm Inc. Bangalore AS, Developer of CDMA Technology India
QWEST – Qwest Communications Company, LLC
RACKSPACE – Rackspace Hosting
RAPID-LINK-AS RAPID LINK SRL
RCN-AS – RCN Corporation
RDSNET RCS & RDS S.A.
Rede Nacional de Ensino e Pesquisa
REEDLAN-AS ISP REEDLAN
RELIANCE-COMMUNICATIONS-IN Reliance Communications Ltd.DAKC MUMBAI
RELIANCEGLOBALCOM – Reliance Globalcom Services, Inc
RENAM RENAM Association
RIML-CORP-AS-3 – Research In Motion Limited
RIPE-NCC-AS RIPE Network Coordination Centre
RISC-SYSTEM – Rockwell Scientific Company
RMH-14 – Rackspace Hosting
RMIFL RM Education PLC – Internet for Learning
ROGERS-CABLE – Rogers Cable Communications Inc.
ROSTELECOM-AS JSC Rostelecom
ROSTOV-TELEGRAF-AS Rostovelectrosviaz_ of Public Joint Stock Company
RTCOMM-AS OJSC RTComm.RU
RTD ROMTELECOM S.A
RUSTAVI2ONLINEAS Caucasus Online LLC
RU-SURNET Uralsvyazinform, Chelyabinsk branch
RWT – RagingWire Telecommunications
SAFELINES The network of ISP Safelines,includes POPs in various cities
SAFENZ-TRANSIT-AS-NZ SafeNZ Networks LTD
SAITIS-NETWORK Saitis Network, N.Desir
SAMSUNGNETWORKS-AS-KR Samsung Networks Inc.
SAN-JUAN-CABLE – San Juan Cable, LLC
SASUSA SunGard Availability Services USA
SAVVIS – Savvis
SBIS-AS – AT&T Internet Services
SCARTEL-AS Scartel Ltd.
SCOTTS-AS – CITY OF SCOTTSBURG
SCRR-10796 – Road Runner HoldCo LLC
SCRR-11426 – Road Runner HoldCo LLC
SCRR-12271 – Road Runner HoldCo LLC
SCV-AS-AP SCV Broadband Access Provider
SDL-20-AS – Smithville Digital, LLC
SEAGATE-USA-MN-1 – Seagate Technology
SEEDNET Digital United Inc.
SELECTNET-AS – SelectNet Internet Services
SERBIA-BROADBAND-AS Serbia BroadBand-Srpske Kablovske mreze d.o.o.
SERVICENET-AP Internet service provision to Western
SGNET-AS-AP Singapore Government Network AS
SHAW – Shaw Communications Inc.
SIBNETWORKS-AS Siberian Networks
SIFY-AS-IN Sify Limited
SIGMANET-NIC LU MII AS
SIKA-AS Sika Informationssysteme AG
SKTELECOM-NET-AS SK Telecom., Ltd.
SKYNET-SPB-AS SkyNet Ltd.
SKYVISION SkyVision Network Services
SLTINT-AS-AP Sri Lanka Telecom Internet
SOFTLAYER – SoftLayer Technologies Inc.
SOFTNET-AS-AP Software Technology Parks of India – Bangalore
SOLNET BSE Software GmbH
SONICDUO-AS AS for MegaFon-Moscow
SONOMA – Sonoma Interconnect
SONY-APAC-AP Sony – ASN for Asia Pacific
SOVAM-AS OJSC _Vimpelcom_
SPBMTS-AS Mobile TeleSystems, OJSC, MR North-West
SPCS – Sprint Personal Communications Systems
SPEAKEASY – Speakeasy, Inc.
SPECTRANET FIRST FIBRE BROADBAND NETWORK IN NEW DELHI, INDIA
SPRINTLINK – Sprint
SPRINTLINK-HOSTING – SPRINT, Business Serices Group
SS-NOC-AS – Straitshot Communications, Inc.
STARHUBINTERNET-AS StarHub Internet Exchange
STARNET-AS StarNet Moldova
STATEL-AS Stavropol branch of Southern Telecommunications Company
STEADFAST – Steadfast Networks
STOMI – State of Michigan, DMB-CNOC
STSN-SLC-UT-US – STSN GENERAL HOLDINGS, INC.
SUDDENLINK-COMMUNICATIONS – Suddenlink Communications
SUMTEL-AS-RIPE Summa Telecom
SUNCOMMUNICATIONS-AS JV _Sun Communications_ Autonomous System
SUNRISE Sunrise Communications AG
SUPERNET-PAKISTAN-AS-AP Supernet Limited Transit Autonomous System Number
SURFCONTROL-US-ASN Websense Hosted Security Network
SURFNET-NL SURFnet, The Netherlands
SWEETNET-AS Private entrepreneur Bliznichenko Vitalij Volodumirovich
SWISSCOM Swisscom (Switzerland) Ltd
SWITCH SWITCH, Swiss Education and Research Network
SWKO – SOUTHWEST KANSAS ONLINE
TACHYON-AS-ID PT Remala Abadi
TATA-AS TATA ISP
TATACOMM-AS TATA Communications formerly VSNL is Leading ISP
TATTELECOM-AS Tattelecom.ru/Tattelecom Autonomous System
TC Radio Systems Autonomous System
TCH – TCH Network Services
TDC TDC Data Networks
TDDE-ASN1 Telefonica o2 Germany Autonomous System
TDN Tikona Digital Networks Pvt Ltd.
TEAM-CYMRU – Team Cymru Inc.
TELCOMNET TelCom Ltd.
TELCOM-UA-AS _Telecomunikatsiina Companiya_ Ltd
Telecom Argentina S.A.
TELECOMMD-AS ICS Networks Solutions SRL
Telecomunicacoes da Bahia S.A.
TELEFONICA CHILE S.A.
Telefonica de Argentina
Telefonica Empresas SA
TELEFONICA-DATA-ESPANA Internet Access Network of TDE
TELEKOM-AS TELEKOM SRBIJA a.d.
TELENERGO EXATEL S.A. Autonomous System
TELENET-AS Autonomous System of Teleset-Servis Ltd.
TELENET-AS Telenet N.V.
TELENOR-NEXTEL Telenor Norge AS
TELESC – Telecomunicacoes de Santa Catarina SA
TELESWEET-AS Telesweet ISP Autonomous System
TELETECH – TeleTech Holdings, Inc
Television Internacional, S.A. de C.V.
TELEZUG WWZ Telekom AG
TELIANET-DENMARK TeliaNet Denmark
TELIANET-SWEDEN TeliaNet Sweden
TELKOMNET-AS2-AP PT Telekomunikasi Indonesia
TELKOMSEL-ASN-ID PT. Telekomunikasi Selular
TELLCOM-AS Tellcom Iletisim Hizmetleri
Telmex Chile Internet S.A.
Telmex Colombia S.A.
TELSTRA Telstra Pty Ltd
TEOLTAB TEO LT AB Autonomous System
TFN-TW Taiwan Fixed Network, Telco and Network Service Provider.
TFO-BOSTON – THOMSON FINANCIAL
THEPLANET-AS – ThePlanet.com Internet Services, Inc.
T-HT T-Com Croatia Internet network
TINET-BACKBONE Tinet SpA
TISCALI-UK Tiscali UK
TISNL-BACKBONE Telfort B.V.
TKPSA-AS TKP S.A. is 3S.pl network operator.
TKT-AS JSC TKT
TMIB-BD-AS-AP TM International Bangladesh Ltd. ISP, Gulshan-1,Dhaka-1212
TMN-AS TMN Autonomous System
TMNET-AS-AP TM Net, Internet Service Provider
TM-NETSYS-ASH – TicketMaster
TOMLINE Tomsk telecommunication company Ltd
TOTNET-TH-AS-AP TOT Public Company Limited
TPG-INTERNET-AP TPG Internet Pty Ltd
TPNET Telekomunikacja Polska S.A.
TRAVELERS – Travelers Property Casualty Corp.
TRENDMICRO Global IDC and Backbone of Trend Micro Inc.
TRENDMICRO Trend Micro Inc.
TRUENORTHCOMM – True North Communications
TSF-IP-CORE TeliaSonera Finland IP Network
TSU-SM – Texas State University – San Marcos
TTNET Turk Telekomunikasyon Anonim Sirketi
TTSL-MEISISP Tata Teleservices ISP AS
TULIP Tulip Telecom Ltd.
TURKCELL-AS TURKCELL ILETISIM HIZMETLERI A.S.
TVCABO-AS TVCABO Autonomous System
TWTC – tw telecom holdings, inc.
UAEXPRESS EXPRESS Radio Network
UARNET-AS Ukrainian Academic and Research Network
UA-SEECH Seech-Infocom NCC
UA-SMART-AS Broadcasting company _Smart_ Ltd
UCOM UCOM Corp.
UCSB-NET-AS – University of California, Santa Barbara
UCSC – University of California, Santa Cruz
UDMVT-AS OJSC VolgaTelecom branch in Udmurtia Republic AS Number
UECOMM-AU Uecomm Ltd
UKRBIT-NET-AS SPD Bilopol Roman Leonidovich
UKRTELNET JSC UKRTELECOM,
ULTRADNS – Centergate Research, LLC.
UMANITOBA – University of Manitoba
UMC-AS UMC Autonomous System
UMICH-AS-5 – University of Michigan
UMN Ural-TransTeleCom Autonomous System
UNI2-AS France Telecom Espana SA
Uninet S.A. de C.V.
UNINETT UNINETT, The Norwegian University & Research Network
UNISYS-6072 For routing issues, email firstname.lastname@example.org
UNISYS-AP-UI-AS-AP Unisys AsiaPac Intranet Access to Internet
UNISYS-AS-E – Unisys Corporation
Universidad Nacional de Colombia
University de Los Andes
UNL-AS – University of Nebraska-Lincoln
UPC UPC Broadband
UPITT-AS – University of Pittsburgh
URAN URAN Autonomous system
USAA – USAA
UUNET – MCI Communications Services, Inc. d/b/a Verizon Business
UUNET-INT – MCI Communications Services, Inc. d/b/a Verizon Business
VEGA-OD-UA DCS Ltd.
VERISIGN-CORP – VeriSign Infrastructure & Operations
VERSATEL AS for the Trans-European Tele2 IP Transport backbone
VIA-NET-WORKS-AS PSINet Europe / VIA NET.WORKS international AS
VIAPASS-FR VIAPASS SAS
VIDEOTRON – Videotron Telecom Ltee
VIETEL-AS-AP Vietel Corporation
VINAKOM – VINAKOM COMMUNICATIONS
VINS – ViaWest
VIRGINIA-AS – University of Virginia
VITSSEN-SUWON-AS-KR Tbroad Suwon Broadcating Corporati
VMWARENET-1 – VMWare, Inc.
VNET-AS VNET ISP Bratislava, Slovakia, SK
VNPT-AS-VN Vietnam Posts and Telecommunications (VNPT)
VODAFONE_ICELAND Backbone Autonomous System
VODAFONE-IT-ASN Vodafone N.V.
VODANET International IP-Backbone of Vodafone
VOLIA-AS Kyivski Telekomunikatsiyni Merezhi LLC
VOLKSWAGEN Volkswagen AG, Wolfsburg 1
VRIS-AS-BLOCK – Verizon Online LLC
VSI-AS VSI AS
VTX-NETWORK VTX Services SA
VZB-AU-AS Verizon Australia PTY Limited
VZGNI-TRANSIT – Verizon Online LLC
WATEEN-IMS-PK-AS-AP National WiMAX/IMS environment
WAYPORT – AT&T Wi-Fi Services
Webex Communications, Inc.
WEBSENSE Websense, Inc.
WELLSFARGO – Wells Fargo & Company
WESTHOST – WestHost, Inc.
WESTNET-AS-AP Westnet Internet Services
WESTPUB-A – West Publishing Corporation
WICAM-AS WiCAM ISP Cambodia Peering AS
WIDEXS ion-ip B.V.
WINDSTREAM – Windstream Communications Inc
WIRELESSNET-ID-AP WIRELESSNET AS
WITCOM- Wiesbadener Informations – und Telekommunikations GmbH
WN-AS Private enterprise Gorbunov A.A.
WORLDBANK-AS – WORLD BANK
WORLDCALL-AS-LHR Worldcall Broadband Limited
WORLDNET-AS World Net & Services Co., Ltd.
WOW-INTERNET – WideOpenWest Finance LLC
WXC-AS-NZ WorldxChange Communications LTD
WYOMING – wyoming.com
XO-AS15 – XO Communications
XTRA-AS Telecom XTRA, Auckland, NZ
YAHOO-BANGALORE-AS-AP Yahoo Bangalore Network Monitoring Center
YAHOO-US – Yahoo
ZIGGO Ziggo – tv, internet, telefoon
ZIPNETBD-DKB-AS-AP Zipnet Limited DKB AS number
The following chart maps the location of more than 300 command and control networks that were used in these attacks. 299 of them were located in China.
I did SecurID for my masters, what was your source and do you read forno?
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Thanks you for the list, going forward it is clear that we need open reporting and alerting……… The scale of information leakage here indicated is beyond the capability of any existing organisation to analyse it will only be with open comment, blogs like Richard Forno’s Inforwarrior, and this one,,,,,,, tied to standards now under development that any semblance of preparedness for “next time” is available.
I would encourage those with an interest in reporting to follow the IETF Managed Incident Lightweight Exchange (mile)
Security Area Directors:
Security Area Advisor:
General Discussion: email@example.com
To Subscribe: http://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/mile
The Managed Incident Lightweight Exchange (MILE) working group will
develop standards and extensions for the purpose of improving incident
information sharing and handling capabilities based on the work
developed in the IETF Extended INCident Handling (INCH) working group.
The Incident Object Description Exchange Format (IODEF) in RFC5070 and
Real-time Inter-network Defense (RID) in RFC6045 were developed in the
INCH working group by international Computer Security Incident Response
Teams (CSIRTs) and industry to meet the needs of a global community
interested in sharing, handling, and exchanging incident information.
The extensions and guidance created by the MILE working group assists
with the daily operations of CSIRTs at an organization, service
provider, law enforcement, and at the country level. The application of
IODEF and RID to interdomain incident information cooperative exchange
and sharing has recently expanded and the need for extensions has become
more important. Efforts continue to deploy IODEF and RID, as well as to
extend them to support specific use cases covering reporting and
mitigation of current threats such as anti-phishing extensions.
An incident could be a benign configuration issue, IT incident, an
infraction to a service level agreement (SLA), a system compromise,
socially engineered phishing attack, or a denial-of-service (DoS)
attack, etc. When an incident is detected, the response may include
simply filing a report, notification to the source of the incident, a
request to a third party for resolution/mitigation, or a request to
locate the source. IODEF defines a data representation that provides a
standard format for sharing information commonly exchanged about
computer security incidents. RID enables the secure exchange of
incident related information in an IODEF format providing options for
security, privacy, and policy setting.
MILE leverages collaboration and sharing experiences with the work
developed in the INCH working group which includes the data model
detailed in the IODEF, existing extensions to the IODEF for
Anti-phishing (RFC5901), and RID (RFC6045, RFC6046) for the secure
exchange of information. MILE will also leverage the experience gained
in using IODEF and RID in operational contexts. Related work, drafted
outside of INCH will also be reviewed and includes RFC5941, Sharing
Transaction Fraud Data.
The MILE working group provides coordination for these various extension
efforts to improve the capabilities for exchanging incident information.
MILE has several objectives with the first being a description a
subset of IODEF focused on ease of deployment and applicability to
current information security data sharing use cases. MILE also
describes a generalization of RID for secure exchange of other
security-relevant XML formats. MILE produces additional guidance needed
for the successful exchange of incident information for new use cases
according to policy, security, and privacy requirements. Finally, MILE
produces a document template with guidance for defining IODEF extensions
to be followed when producing extensions to IODEF as appropriate, for:
* labeling incident reports with data protection, data retention, and
other policies, regulations, and
laws restricting the handling of those reports
* referencing structured security information from within incident
* reporting forensic data generated during an incident investigation
(computer or accounting)
Does anyone remember Aurora, the intrusion reported by Google a couple of years ago?
Does anyone realize that the victim count for that particular incident totaled over three thousand, according to several very credible sources?
Why is there such a reluctance to accept that the same attackers that got RSA also got over 760 other victims, most of them probably less sophisticated about information security than RSA?
I am not questioning the numbers. I am questioning posting data like that without any salient supporting details. I suspect the same is true of many of the posters who called out this article.
I’m questioning the speculations. 😉 (There are about 8 million bots around and some of them show up on networks with worlds highest traffic. Same as with criminals – bet most of the companies in the list have at least one employee with a criminal background?! oO let’s speculate about the impact… 8-))
Well if someone is still speculating about the impact, again from Brian’s article:
“A few caveats are in order here. First, many of the network owners listed are Internet service providers, and are likely included because some of their subscribers were hit. Second, it is not clear how many systems in each of these companies or networks were compromised, for how long those intrusions persisted, or whether the attackers successfully stole sensitive information from all of the victims. Finally, some of these organizations (there are several antivirus firms mentioned below) may be represented because they intentionally compromised internal systems in an effort to reverse engineer malware used in these attacks.”
Liked your ’employee with a criminal background’ statement!
I’m not sure this is as much a failure of hosting, hoteling or other types of boarded sites at the host level as much as that compartmentalization and egress filtering not being well thought out by these orgs.
An org which isn’t scanning and monitoring for traffic anomalies outbound from their resources is already behind the curve.
If there is a workstation or other resource deeper in the org that has been compromised it should be caught by the internal monitoring of traffic anomalies outbound.
Most security minded business managers know that its good business to have a gauntlet on on way in; but forget or override for business reasons and make a straight shot outbound.
Anyone who plays capture the flag know that the key strategy for that game is not a superior inbound defense but ensuring that the enemy’s inevitable return trip is going to be hell.
Brian- a lot of folks are not looking for the source to this list, but reasonably requesting a way to verify that your method is valid.
Is the list based on a specific type of network request that perhaps isn’t directly to the C2? Was exfiltrated data really observed here? It does not seem that way.
Until you clarify, the folks declaring “FUD” can’t be denied. But then, they may be right. Please clarify your method of data collection leading to this spectacular conclusion.
Interesting, I think some of the “alleged” beaconing is actual RSA customers who asked to have their tokens replaced.
So who provided the list and how did they arrive at the concolusion they were beaconing.
I know of several who should not be on the list if beaconing traffic is the sole criteria
To really understand this, we probably need the source of the list (even if it is ‘a congressional staffer sent it to me’) and the details of the “phone home” provided as a true C&C communication.
The other thing I don’t understand is that a number of these communications, if botnet C&C coordination, could be the result of infections independent of the RSA breach, even if it is the same C&C.
There is perhaps just one thing to understand…
If you’re not an ISP and your network is on the list contact your local CERT for more information and help:
Pssst… CERT is on the list:
“CERT – Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT) – Coordination Center”
BK isn’t required to give his his source. If you don’t think he’s on the up-and-up, then why do you read his blog? I suspect he gave us as much information as he could, under the circumstances.
It’s funny… really, some folks pointing some noobs to this article: “Hey, you are on the list!” …and those pencil pushers attack the messenger. *lmao* 🙂
Pssst… did you know… YOU’RE ON THE LIST!!!11elevenelves
The overall point of computer security blogs, such as this one, is to increase user and system managers awareness of current security issues and means of mitigating the dangers. Skepticism on the part of users is promoted particularly with respect to social engineering contacts directly and through web-surfing. There is nothing wrong with questioning information here when there is little backing proof, just as assertions presented anywhere should be questioned. Comments that verge on character attacks aren’t helpful but such are fairly common on public forums such as this.
…and this is why we need to put the chains to China. Letting them pull these government sponsored attacks is absolutely unacceptable.
From who the list’s from ?
What are the captures and analysis (think we’ll never see them)…
It seems that the preponderance of the attacks concerns telecommunications companies. Has anyone done any further analysis as to the intent? (Perhaps to be able to monitor and trace call and internet flow?)
David: This is misleading–it’s just that many of the victims have IP registrations through their telecom providers. See my other comment on this article.
There is an easy way to prevent many of these APT attacks through whitelisting the software which is allowed to run on users’ computer and not allowing any other. The problem is security is always weighed against usability, so most companies never adopt this approach. Until security is given as much priority as business strategies, the APT will always continue to happen, and no amount of congress legislation will change it.
I work in IT Security for one of the largest banks in the world and they cannot even tell who is logging onto their network.
The banks outsource their IT to India, China and Russia and then wonder why they are attacked.
My bank’s solution “we are going to hire Anonymous”
WTF – I moved my money into a tiny S&L that does no business out of state, much less overseas.
Be afraid — very afraid.
One day we will wake up to find one of our largest banks emptied of all their money….
This is NOT a victim list. It is a list of IP registration records associated with victim IPs–thus the prevalence of telecoms and hosting companies, many of which do not SWIP their IP registration records to specific customers, but instead use RWHOIS records.
It is extremely misleading to call this a list of victims.
“Enriching The ‘RSA Employee #15666’ Dump + Stats” (Aug. 18th, 2011)
This is a circus…
Let’s review what Brian ACTUALLY SAYS:
“Security experts have said that RSA wasn’t the only corporation victimized in the attack, and that dozens of other multinational companies were infiltrated using many of the same tools and Internet infrastructure.”
OK. What part of “dozens” doesn’t anyone here get?
If any of you have a complaint with that, take it up with the “security experts”, not Brian.
“But so far, no one has been willing to talk publicly about which other companies may have been hit. ”
What part of “may” doesn’t anyone here get?
“Today’s post features a never-before-published list of those victim organizations. The information suggests that more than 760 other organizations had networks that were compromised with some of the same resources used to hit RSA. Almost 20 percent of the current Fortune 100 companies are on this list.”
Again, note the words “suggests” and “some”.
“The information below was shared with congressional staff.”
Irrelevant to the basic point. This originated either from said congressional staff OR from said “security experts”. If you have a beef about the methodology, take it up with them.
Oh, wait, Brian has already told you he can’t reveal his source. So it’s time to stop asking for it. Take the information as revealed for what it’s worth to YOU.
“Below is a list of companies whose networks were shown to have been phoning home to some of the same control infrastructure that was used in the attack on RSA.”
That’s ALL it says. A machine “phoned home”, i.e., presumably connected from its IP to the IP of a C&C machine.
Where does Brian claim that every single one of those machines 1) was controlled by said C&C, 2) necessarily was actually “phoning home” as opposed to some other relatively rare event like being a honeypot or whatever, and 3) had a full compromise with extracted proprietary data?
“A few caveats are in order here.”
Read this list. It covers most of the complaints here.
“First, many of the network owners listed are Internet service providers, and are likely included because some of their subscribers were hit.”
“Second, it is not clear how many systems in each of these companies or networks were compromised, for how long those intrusions persisted, or whether the attackers successfully stole sensitive information from all of the victims.”
“Finally, some of these organizations (there are several antivirus firms mentioned below) may be represented because they intentionally compromised internal systems in an effort to reverse engineer malware used in these attacks.”
All of which makes perfect sense and does not detract from the overall point that some, most or (less likely) all of the listed companies may have a security issue.
As I’ve been posting over at Bruce Schneier’s blog (until I got banned for a “bad attitude” 🙂 ), my meme is: “There is no security. Suck it up.” The more extended version is: “You can haz better security. You can haz worse security. But you cannot haz ‘security’ (in any absolute sense).”
The bottom line is, as has been demonstrated at company after company in the last few years, if someone wants to get in and has the patience, time, and resources to do so, they WILL get in. And even at some allegedly “well protected” companies, it has proven amazing EASY for them to get in.
So anyone who works at any of the companies on this list who thinks the list can be ignored because they 1) don’t have details about the source IP, 2) the methodology of recording the “phone home”, or 3) whether the systems have been actually compromised, is being foolish.
If a box in your network is communicating in any way with a C&C malicious server, you have a problem. Period.
The odds are really good that you have been compromised in some way by some one – if not the Chinese state. Or if you haven’t, that you will be.
So the smart thing to do is to take this list as a “heads up”.
And if you already know you’ve been compromised in the past, then assume you still are.
It’s like debugging. If you’re not intent on PROVING you HAVE bugs, you won’t find bugs.
In security, you have to ASSUME you have been compromised AT ALL TIMES. You can never say “we’re secure”. Ever. Just keep looking and be thankful for every day you didn’t find it. And don’t be surprised when you do find it. And you’d better have a response plan to deal with it.
Because sooner or later you will find a compromise. At the very least you will find endless ways you can be compromised. Because “there is no security.”
Well Richard – you don’t seem to have a bad attitude to me! Thanks for posting!
That’s why this whole article is speculative. “May”, “should” or “security experts” and hiding behind journalistic immunity to not disclose sources makes it more a best hollywood novel and not written by someone who knows anything about computers.
Brian Job well Done Bro , if Brian has the goods to write about RSA breach well trust him I do . Say all you want bitch all you want ask all you want to reveal the info well he has to give you “NOTHING” . You all got to quit PHISHING for the source (FISHING) for all you don’t understand . As Paul Harvey used to say the next page ok everyone. I’m waiting to see what he writes next as a follow up . 🙂
Only issue my org is on the list and the only thing we did was ask RSA to replace the tokens.
I don’t blame Brian, he used the information he was provided, which was FUD and FUD hurts progress.
But it does generate media attention. If it’s on the internet it must be true.
Just hope Congress gets the facts before jumping off into the deep end of the pool and hammering folks trying to do their jobs in the “do more with less” budget environment.
Thanks for the list!. I agree with JS that if workstations or other resources deeper in the company that have been compromised it should be caught by the internal monitoring of traffic anomalies outbound.
I work for a security software company, EZMCOM. We are currently conducting an online survey to find out business security threats, such as identity theft, white collar crimes etc. Participants will be enrolled to a lucky draw in which there are iPod shuffles to be won. I would greatly appreciate if you can just take 2-4minutes from your time to complete the survey by following this link http://www.surveymonkey.com/s/2HCM8TJ.
I know of a specific case, but cannot reveal lots of details, where ONE PC on a corporate network was compromised, and the end result was the corporation lost over $ 1 million in bank accounts, that it never recovered.
This was caused by a combination of behaviors which could have been avoided with better badware education in the work place, so that people would be better able to recognize what is suspicious.
I also remember incident, where ONE TOP MANAGER lack of security introduced virus to SEVERAL company PCs, then everyone was told NOT to use specific PCs until tech support completed fixing them all.
ANOTHER person had trouble with her PC printer, so she made the rounds of printers attached to different offices PCs until she got her stuff printed satisfactorily. In the process, she visited PCs with the virus not yet fixed, and unknowingly redistributed to many co-worker PCs, including many that tech support had just spent several days fixing.
This was an issue of badware literacy in the workplace, and lack of IT having authority over what the PC users are doing.
Thanks you for the list. As always, you provide dynamite information on the dimensions of security threats and risks.
There have been many attacks, where we do not know which were helped by others.
We try to protect ourselves from badware, hackers, phishing, a spectrum of attack paths, but the idea that our providers of internet services, hardware, software, been penetrated, that is a scary notion of what implications.
RSA attack both reduced effectiveness of RSA’s widely-used SecureID tokens, but the breach also gave attackers info they needed to launch potential attacks against companies using RSA SecurID tokens for two-factor authentication.
Hackers stole from Google – source code for Gaia, a password management program – and tried to steal its signing certificates.
I work for a large federal government agency, and a couple of months ago several people in my office received emails directing them to change their passwords, although no reason was provided. I contacted all of them and they all used the departments RSA Secure token. I spoke with the head of IT security for my division, and he wasn’t aware of oany compromise of the department’s tokens. The next day, I spoke with the director of IT security for the entire department, andwhen I asked him if we had been affected by the RSA breach, he refered to some obscure report and claimed that we hadn’t. Oddly enough, our depatrment is not on the list provided on this blog.
Two weeks later, a mass mailer indicated that our RSA tokens had been compromised. By the way, the head of IT security for our department came from another federal agency that made headlines when their data was compromised.