Posts Tagged: скиммер


7
Dec 11

Pro Grade (3D Printer-Made?) ATM Skimmer

In July 2011, a customer at a Chase Bank branch in West Hills, Calif. noticed something odd about the ATM he was using and reported it to police. Authorities who responded to the incident discovered a sophisticated, professional-grade ATM skimmer that they believe was made with the help of a 3D printer.

Below is a front view image of the device. It is an all-in-one skimmer designed to fit over the card acceptance slot and to record the data from the magnetic stripe of any card dipped into the reader. The fraud device is shown sideways in this picture; attached to an actual ATM, it would appear rotated 90 degrees to the right, so that the word “CHASE” is pointing down.

On the bottom of the fake card acceptance slot is a tiny hole for a built-in spy camera that is connected to a battery. The spy camera turns on when a card is dipped into the skimmer’s card acceptance slot, and is angled to record customer PINs.

The bottom of the skimmer device is designed to overlay the controls on the cash machine for vision impaired ATM users. On the underside of that space is a data port to allow manual downloading of information from the skimmer.

Looking at the backside of the device shows shows the true geek factor of this ATM skimmer. The fraudster who built it appears to have cannibalized parts from a video camera or perhaps a smartphone (possibly to enable the transmission of  PIN entry video and stolen card data to the fraudster wirelessly via SMS or Bluetooth). It’s too bad so much of the skimmer is obscured by yellow plastic. I’d welcome any feedback from readers who can easily identify these parts based on the limited information here. Continue reading →


20
Sep 11

Gang Used 3D Printers for ATM Skimmers

An ATM skimmer gang stole more than $400,000 using skimming devices built with the help of high-tech 3D printers, federal prosecutors say.

Before I get to the gang, let me explain briefly how ATM skimmers work, and why 3D printing is a noteworthy development in this type of fraud. Many of the ATM skimmers profiled in my skimmer series are carefully hand-made and crafted to blend in with the targeted cash machine in both form and paint color. Some skimmer makers even ask customers for a photo of the targeted cash machine before beginning their work.

The skimmer components typically include a card skimmer that fits over the card acceptance slot and steals the data stored on the card’s magnetic stripe, and a pinhole camera built into a false panel that thieves can fit above or beside the PIN pad. If these components don’t match just-so, they’re more likely to be discovered and removed by customers or bank personnel, leaving the thieves without their stolen card data.

Enter the 3D printer. This fascinating technology, explained succinctly in the video below from 3D printing company i.materialise, takes two dimensional computer images and builds them into three dimensional models by laying down successive layers of powder that are heated, shaped and hardened.

3D printing in action from i.materialise on Vimeo.

Apparently, word is spreading in the cybercrime underworld that 3D printers produce flawless skimmer devices with exacting precision. Last year, i-materialise blogged about receiving a client’s order for building a card skimmer. The company said it denied the request when it became clear the ordered product was a fraud device.

3D printer firm i.materialise received and promptly declined orders for this skimmer device - a card acceptance slot overlay

In June, a federal court indicted four men from South Texas (PDF) whom authorities say had reinvested the profits from skimming scams to purchase a 3D printer. According to statements by the U.S. Secret Service, the gang’s leader, Jason Lall of Houston, was sent to prison for ATM fraud in 2009. Lall was instrumental in obtaining skimming devices, and the gang soon found themselves needing to procure their own skimmers. The trouble is, skimmer kits aren’t cheap: They range from $2,000 to more than $10,000 per kit.

Secret Service agents said in court records that on May 4, 2011, their undercover informer engaged in a secretly taped discussion with the ring’s members about a strategy for obtaining new skimmers. John Paz of Houston, one of the defendants, was allegedly the techie who built the skimming devices using a 3-D printer that the suspects purchased together. The Secret Service allege they have Paz on tape explaining the purchase of the expensive printer.

“When [Lall was] put in jail, we asked, ‘What are we going to do?’ and we had to figure it out and that’s when we came up with this unit,” Paz allegedly told the undercover officer.

Continue reading →


18
May 11

Point-of-Sale Skimmers: Robbed at the Register

Michaels Stores said this month that it had replaced more than 7,200 credit card terminals from store registers nationwide, after discovering that thieves had somehow modified or replaced machines to include point of sale (POS) technology capable of siphoning customer payment card data and PINs. The specific device used by the criminal intruders has not been made public. But many devices and services are sold on the criminal underground to facilitate the surprisingly common fraud.

POS skimmer component. Bogus PIN pad connector is at left.

POS skimmers typically are marketed and sold in one of three ways: Pre-compromised POS terminals that can be installed at the cash register; Fake POS devices that do not process transactions but are designed to record data from swiped cards and PIN entries; or Do-it-yourself kits that include all parts, wiring and instructions needed to modify an existing POS terminal.

I spoke at length to a POS skimmer seller who has been peddling POS modification devices on an exclusive underground fraud forum for more than a year. From the feedback left on his profile it is clear he had many satisfied customers. Buyers specify the make and model of the POS equipment they want to compromise (this guy specializes in hacking VeriFone devices, but he also advertises kits for devices manufactured by POS makers Ingenico, Xyrun, TechTrex).

The seller’s Bluetooth board (bottom) connected to the PIN pad interface.

His skimmer kit includes a PIN pad skimmer and two small circuit boards; One is a programmable board with specialized software designed to interact with the real card reader and to store purloined data; The other is a Bluetooth-enabled board that allows the thief to wirelessly download the stolen card data from the hacked device using a laptop or smartphone.

The PIN pad skimmer is an ultra-thin membrane that is inserted underneath the original silicon PIN pad. It records every button pressed with a date and time stamp. The thief must also solder the two boards to the existing PIN pad device to hijack the machine’s power and data processing stream.

Continue reading →


10
Apr 11

ATM Skimmers: Hacking the Cash Machine

Most of the ATM skimmers I’ve profiled in this blog are comprised of parts designed to mimic and to fit on top of existing cash machine components, such as card acceptance slots or PIN pads. But sometimes, skimmer thieves find success by swapping out ATM parts with compromised look-alikes.

ATM Card skimmer, using modified ATM component

ATM Card skimmer, using modified ATM component

On May 16, 2009, a company representative from ATM maker Diebold was servicing an ATM at a Bank of America branch in Sun Valley, Calif., when he discovered a skimming device and a camera that were attached to the machine. The technician took pictures of the camera and card skimmer (click picture at right for larger image), and then went into the branch to contact his supervisor.

But when the Diebold employee returned, the camera had been removed from the ATM, suggesting that the skimmer scammer was lurking somewhere nearby and had swooped in to salvage his remaining equipment. This is similar to what happened when an ATM technician discovered a compromised ATM a year ago.

Investigators of the present scam learned that the thief had somehow pried off the plastic cover of the ATM’s card acceptance slot and replaced it with an identical, compromised version that included a modified magnetic stripe reader and a flash storage device. The new card slot came with its own clear plastic face that was situated in front of the plastic one that was already attached to the ATM’s internal card reader (see picture below). The entire fraudulent device was glued onto the ATM with silicon.

Real card reader and skimmer overlayBelow are a few close-ups of the silicon-based magnetic stripe reader attached to the compromised card acceptance slot overlay.

A close-up of an ATM card skimmer

A close-up of an ATM card reader

Here’s a closer look at the electronics inside this handmade reader:

A close-up of an ATM card skimmer Continue reading →


16
Feb 11

Having a Ball with ATM Skimmers

On February 8, 2009, a customer at an ATM at a Bank of America branch in Sun Valley, Calif., spotted something that didn’t look quite right about the machine: A silver, plexiglass device had been attached to the ATM’s card acceptance slot, in a bid to steal card data from unsuspecting ATM users.

But the customer and the bank’s employees initially overlooked a secondary fraud device that the unknown thief had left at the scene: A sophisticated, battery operated and motion activated camera designed to record victims entering their personal identification numbers at the ATM.

The camera was discovered more than a day later by a maintenance worker who was servicing the ATM. The device, pictured below with the boxy housing in which it was discovered, was designed to fit into the corner of the ATM framework and painted to match.

The self-contained camera and box attached to the Bank of America ATM

The ATM pictured on the right below is shown with the card skimmer and video camera attached (click the image for a slightly larger look).

California police say the video camera and skimmer were installed by the person pictured below. The entire scam ran only for about three hours, and was reported about 11 AM. Police recovered both the skimmer and video camera, so no customer or bank losses ensued as a result of the attack. Meanwhile, the crook responsible remains at large.

The image below shows some of the manufacturer’s specs on the “Camball-2” camera that was used in this attack, which retails for around $200 and runs for about 48 hours on motion detection mode.

Here’s a closer look at the relatively crude device attached to the mouth of the card insert slot, designed to steal data recorded on the magnetic stripe on the back of all bank cards. Criminals can then encode the information onto counterfeit cards, and — armed with the victim’s PIN — withdraw money from the victim’s account from ATMs around the world.

The authorities I’ve been interviewing about skimmer scams say the devices are most commonly installed on weekends, when many banks are closed or have limited hours. It’s difficult — once you know about the existence of these fraud devices — not to pull on parts of ATMs to make sure they aren’t compromised. If something comes off of the machine when you yank on it, and the bank is closed or the ATM isn’t attached to a financial institution, it’s probably best just to leave the device at the scene and not try to make off with it. Otherwise, consider the difficulty in explaining your actions should you be confronted by police after walking away. What’s more, in many skimmer cases, the fraudster who placed it there is monitoring the scene from somewhere within viewing distance of the compromised ATM.

It’s easy to be frightened by ATM skimmers, but try not to let these fraud devices spook you away entirely: Stick to machines in well-lit areas, places where you feel relatively safe physically. On top of that, cover your hand when entering your PIN, as many skimmers rely on hidden cameras and can’t steal your account credentials without recording those digits. Also, remember that any losses you may incur from skimmers should be fully reimbursable by your bank (at least in the United States). While the temporary loss of funds may not cover the cost of any checks that bounce because of the incident, these also are losses that your financial institution should cover if they were incurred because of a skimmer incident.

[EPSB]

Have you seen:

Green Skimmers Skimming Green…To combat an increase in ATM fraud from skimmer devices, cash machine makers have been outfitting ATMs with a variety of anti-skimming technologies. In many cases, these anti-skimming tools take the shape of green or blue semi-transparent plastic casings that protrude from the card acceptance slot to prevent would-be thieves from easily attaching skimmers. But in a surprising number of incidents, skimmer scammers have simply crafted their creations to look exactly like the anti-skimming devices.

[/EPSB]


31
Jan 11

ATM Skimmers That Never Touch the ATM

Media attention to crimes involving ATM skimmers may make consumers more likely to identify compromised cash machines, which involve cleverly disguised theft devices that sometimes appear off-color or out-of-place. Yet, many of today’s skimmer scams can swipe your card details and personal identification number while leaving the ATM itself completely untouched, making them far more difficult to spot.

The most common of these off-ATM skimmers can be found near cash machines that are located in the antechamber of a bank or building lobby, where access is controlled by a key card lock that is activated when the customer swipes his or her ATM card. In these scams, the thieves remove the card swipe device attached to the outside door, add a skimmer, and then reattach the device to the door. The attackers then place a hidden camera just above or beside the ATM, so that the camera is angled to record unsuspecting customers entering their PINs.

The crooks usually return later in the evening to remove the theft devices. Armed with skimmed card data and victim PINs, skimmer thieves are able to encode the information onto counterfeit cards and withdraw money from compromised accounts at ATMs across the country.

On July 24, 2009, California police officers responded to a report that a customer had uncovered a camera hidden behind a mirror that was stuck to the wall above an ATM at a bank in Sherman Oaks, Calif. There were two ATMs in the lobby where the camera was found, and officers discovered that the thieves had placed an “Out of Order” sign on the ATM that did not have the camera pointed at its PIN pad. The sign was a simple ruse designed to trick all customers into using the cash machine that was compromised.

Bank security cameras at the scene of the crime show the fake mirror installed over the ATM on the right.

Here’s a front view of the hidden camera, which probably would appear to most ATM users as nothing more than a parabolic mirror designed to give customers a view of anyone standing behind them.

Behind the glass, however, was a battery-operated hidden camera. A tiny hole was cut out of the bottom of the mirror housing to enable the camera to record PIN entries.

Below are several images showing the key card door lock that was compromised in this attack. The top left image shows the device as it would appear attached to the door securing access to the ATM lobby. The other two pictures show the skimmer device with the electronic components added by the thieves.

Continue reading →