Gang Used 3D Printers for ATM Skimmers

September 20, 2011
87 Comments

An ATM skimmer gang stole more than $400,000 using skimming devices built with the help of high-tech 3D printers, federal prosecutors say.

Before I get to the gang, let me explain briefly how ATM skimmers work, and why 3D printing is a noteworthy development in this type of fraud. Many of the ATM skimmers profiled in my skimmer series are carefully hand-made and crafted to blend in with the targeted cash machine in both form and paint color. Some skimmer makers even ask customers for a photo of the targeted cash machine before beginning their work.

The skimmer components typically include a card skimmer that fits over the card acceptance slot and steals the data stored on the card’s magnetic stripe, and a pinhole camera built into a false panel that thieves can fit above or beside the PIN pad. If these components don’t match just-so, they’re more likely to be discovered and removed by customers or bank personnel, leaving the thieves without their stolen card data.

Enter the 3D printer. This fascinating technology, explained succinctly in the video below from 3D printing company i.materialise, takes two dimensional computer images and builds them into three dimensional models by laying down successive layers of powder that are heated, shaped and hardened.

3D printing in action from i.materialise on Vimeo.

Apparently, word is spreading in the cybercrime underworld that 3D printers produce flawless skimmer devices with exacting precision. Last year, i-materialise blogged about receiving a client’s order for building a card skimmer. The company said it denied the request when it became clear the ordered product was a fraud device.

3D printer firm i.materialise received and promptly declined orders for this skimmer device - a card acceptance slot overlay

In June, a federal court indicted four men from South Texas (PDF) whom authorities say had reinvested the profits from skimming scams to purchase a 3D printer. According to statements by the U.S. Secret Service, the gang’s leader, Jason Lall of Houston, was sent to prison for ATM fraud in 2009. Lall was instrumental in obtaining skimming devices, and the gang soon found themselves needing to procure their own skimmers. The trouble is, skimmer kits aren’t cheap: They range from $2,000 to more than $10,000 per kit.

Secret Service agents said in court records that on May 4, 2011, their undercover informer engaged in a secretly taped discussion with the ring’s members about a strategy for obtaining new skimmers. John Paz of Houston, one of the defendants, was allegedly the techie who built the skimming devices using a 3-D printer that the suspects purchased together. The Secret Service allege they have Paz on tape explaining the purchase of the expensive printer.

“When [Lall was] put in jail, we asked, ‘What are we going to do?’ and we had to figure it out and that’s when we came up with this unit,” Paz allegedly told the undercover officer.

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Cultural CAPTCHAs

September 19, 2011
32 Comments

CAPTCHAs, those squiggly and frustrating puzzles that many Web sites require users to solve before registering or leaving comments, are designed to block automated activity and deter spammers. But for some Russian-language forums that cater to spammers and other miscreants, CAPTCHAs may also be part of a vetting process designed to frustrate foreigners and outsiders.

I'm still slogging through Disc 2 of this lengthy Soviet-era spy series.

“Verified,” one of the longest-running Russian-language forums dedicated to Internet scammers of all stripes, uses various methods to check that users aren’t just casual lurkers or law enforcement. It recently began using CAPTCHAs that quiz users about random bits of Russian culture when they register or log in.

Consider this CAPTCHA, from Verified: “Введите пропущенное число ‘… мгнoвeний вeсны.'” That translates to, “Enter the missing number ‘__ moments of spring.'”

But it may not be so simple to decipher “мгнoвeний вeсны,” the “moments of spring” bit. One use of cultural CAPTCHA is to frustrate non-native speakers who are trying to browse forums using tools like Google translate. For example, Google translates мгнoвeний вeсны to the transliteration “mgnoveny vesny.” The answer to this CAPTCHA is “17,” as in Seventeen Moments of Spring, a 1973 Russian television mini-series that was enormously popular during the Soviet Union era, but which is probably unknown to most Westerners.

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Adobe, Windows Security Patches

September 13, 2011
30 Comments

If you use Windows or Adobe Reader/Acrobat, it’s patch time. Microsoft released five updates to fix at least 15 security vulnerabilities, and Adobe issued a quarterly update to eliminate 13 security flaws in its PDF Reader and Acrobat products.

The Microsoft patches, available via Windows Update and Automatic Update, address security holes in Excel, Office, Windows Server and SharePoint. None of the flaws earned Redmond’s most dire “critical” rating, but it’s a mistake to let too much time go by before installing these updates.

Adobe’s patches for Reader and Acrobat correct critical vulnerabilities in the programs that could be exploited by attackers just by convincing users to open a booby-trapped file. Updates are available for Adobe Reader X (10.1) and earlier versions for Windows, Macintosh, Adobe Reader 9.4.2 and earlier versions for UNIX, and Adobe Acrobat X (10.1) and earlier versions for Windows and Macintosh.

Acrobat users should check out the Adobe security advisory. Heads up for users of older versions of Reader and Acrobat: support for Adobe Reader 8.x and Acrobat 8.x for Windows and Macintosh will end on November 3, 2011.

As always, please leave a note in the comments section below if you experience any issues resulting from the installation of these updates.

Pharma Wars: Paying for Prosecution

September 12, 2011
23 Comments

In June 2011, Russian authorities arrested Pavel Vrublevsky, co-founder of ChronoPay, Russia’s largest processor of online payments, for allegedly hiring a hacker to attack his company’s rivals. New evidence suggests that Vrublevsky’s arrest was the product of a bribe paid by Igor Gusev, the other co-founder of ChronoPay and a man wanted by Russian police as a spam kingpin.

Igor Gusev, in an undated photo taken at a family birthday celebration.

Two years after forming ChronoPay in 2003, Gusev and Vrublevsky parted ways. Not long after that breakup, Gusev would launch Glavmed and its sister program SpamIt, affiliate operations that paid the world’s most notorious spammers millions of dollars to promote rogue Internet pharmacies. Not to be outdone, Vrublevsky started his own rogue pharmacy program, Rx-Promotion, in 2007, contracting with some of the same spammers who were working at Gusev’s businesses.

By 2009, the former partners were actively trying to scuttle each others’ businesses. Vrublevsky allegedly paid hackers to break into and leak the contact and earnings data from GlavMed/SpamIt. He also reportedly paid a man named Igor “Engel” Artimovich to launch a volley of distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks against SpamIt.

Gusev told me he long suspected Artimovich was involved in the attacks, and that he had information that Vrublevsky hired Artimovich to attack ChronoPay’s rivals while they were locked in a competition for a lucrative contract to process online payments for Aeroflot, Russia’s biggest airline.

Last month, hundreds of chat conversations apparently between Gusev and his right-hand man, Dmitry Stupin, were leaked online. They indicate that Gusev may have caused Vrublevsky’s arrest by paying Russian law enforcement investigators to go after Artimovich.

Over the past year, Gusev has insisted in numerous phone interviews that the increasingly public conflict between him and Vrublevsky was not a “war,” but more of a personal spat. But if the chat below is accurate, Gusev most certainly viewed the conflict as a war all along.

The following is from a leaked chat, allegedly between Gusev and Stupin, dated Sept. 26, 2010. The two men had already decided to close SpamIt, and were considering whether to do the same with GlavMed. “Red,” mentioned twice in the discussion below, is a reference to Vrublevsky, also known as “RedEye.”

Gusev: $2k from HzMedia to China – it’s mine. We also need to send additional money for salaries plus double bonus to Misha (Michael). I have already paid $50k for Engel’s case (20к – forensics, $30к – to speed up the starting of the criminal case)

Stupin: Why have you paid for Engel’s case ? I was even against paying for the Red’s case. Why pay for Engel’s?  What is the point?

Gusev: To my mind, you do not fully understand what’s been going on for the last year. Paul has a plan to either throw me into jail or end me. His intentions are totally clear. There are only two choices: 1 – do nothing, and pay nothing to nobody, and at the end either go to jail or keep hiding until all the resources are exhausted; 2 – do the same thing, as he is doing, with the same goal.

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Who’s Behind the TDSS Botnet?

September 7, 2011
60 Comments

Yesterday I wrote about the public storefront where anyone can rent access to computers infected with TDSS, widely considered one of the largest and most complex botnets on the planet. Today, I’ll take a closer look at a Russian individual who appears to have close ties to the TDSS operation.

Tuesday’s story got picked up by news-for-nerds site Slashdot, and one of the comments on the piece observed that the storefront for TDSS — awmproxy.net — has a Google Analytics code embedded in the homepage. That code, UA-3816538, is embedded in six other Web sites, including awmproxy.com (a clone of awmproxy.net), according to a lookup at ReverseInternet.com.

Using domaintools.com, I was able to find the historical Web site registration records for awmproxy.com (the historical data for awmproxy.net is hidden). Those records show that the domain was registered on Feb. 27, 2008 to an individual in Russia who used the email address fizot@mail.ru. Another Web site with that same Google Analytics code, pornxplayer.com (hostile site), also includes that email address in its historical records. Awmproxy began offering proxies on March 16, 2008.

WHOIS records also indicate fizot@mail.ru was used to register fizot.com, a site which is no longer active. The name given by the person who registered fizot.com was Galdziev Chingiz in St. Petersburg, Russia. That same name is on the registration records for fizot.org, but fizot.org lists a different contact email address: xtexgroup@gmail.com.

Googling for the fizot@mail.ru address turns up a LiveJournal blog by a user named Fizot who provides a contact email address of xtexcounter@bk.ru. Fizot isn’t the most prolific blogger, but he has 27 journal entries on his page, and discusses everything from life in St. Petersburg to earning millions of dollars.

In one entry, Fizot discusses having bought a sports car with a license plate number that includes the Number of the Beast: “666.” It turns out that there is a Youtube.com channel belonging to a user named Fizot who designates the domain name fizot.com as his personal Web site. Fizot has uploaded just four videos since the account was created in July 2007. Among the videos is a short movie uploaded on Oct. 5, 2007, showing a Porsche car with the license plate H666XK [N666HK in the Cyrillic alphabet] zooming away from the camera in a shopping mall parking lot, before turning around and heading back to the filmmaker. A license plate cover beneath the tags indicates the car’s owner is or was a member of the Moscow Porsche Club.

Fizot’s plates

Fizot may only be tangentially connected to those responsible for building and maintaining the TDSS botnet, but it is likely that he and some of his pals in the SPB and RU Auto clubs know the responsible parties.

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Rent-a-Bot Networks Tied to TDSS Botnet

September 6, 2011
42 Comments

Criminals who operate large groupings of hacked PCs tend to be a secretive lot, and jealously guard their assets against hijacking by other crooks. But one of the world’s largest and most sophisticated botnets is openly renting its infected PCs to any and all comers, and has even created a Firefox add-on to assist customers.

The TDSS botnet is the most sophisticated threat today, according to experts at Russian security firm Kaspersky Lab. First launched in 2008, TDSS is now in its fourth major version (also known as TDL-4). The malware uses a “rootkit” to install itself deep within infected PCs, ensuring that it loads before the Microsoft Windows operating system starts. TDSS also removes approximately 20 malicious programs from host PCs, preventing systems from communicating with other bot families.

In an exhaustive analysis of TDSS published in June, Kaspersky researchers Sergey Golovanov and Igor Soumenkov wrote that among the many components installed by TDSS is a file called “socks.dll,” which allows infected PCs to be used by others to surf the Web anonymously.

Researchers say this Firefox add-on helps customers use Internet connections of TDSS-infected PCs.

“Having control over such a large number of computers with this function, the cybercriminals have started offering anonymous Internet access as a service, at a cost of roughly $100 per month,” the researchers wrote. “For the sake of convenience, the cybercriminals have also developed a Firefox add-on that makes it easy to toggle between proxy servers within the browser.”

The storefront for this massive botnet is awmproxy.net, which advertises “the fastest anonymous proxies.” According to Golovanov, when socks.dll is installed on a TDSS-infected computer, it notifies awmproxy.net that a new proxy is available for rent. Soon after that notification is completed, the infected PC starts to accept approximately 10 proxy requests each minute, he said.

“For us it was enough to see that this additional proxy module for tdl4 was installed directly on encrypted partition and runs thru rootkit functionality,” Golovanov told KrebsOnSecurity. “So we believe that awmproxy has direct connection to tdl4 developer but how they are working together we don’t know.” The curators of AWMproxy did not respond to requests for comment.

AWMproxy.net, the storefront for renting access to TDSS-infected PCs

The service’s proxies are priced according to exclusivity and length of use. Regular browser proxies range from $3 per day to $25 monthly. Proxies that can be used to anonymize all of the Internet traffic on a customer’s PC cost between $65 and $500 a month. For $160 a week, customers can rent exclusive access to 100 TDSS-infected systems at once. Interestingly, AWMproxy says it accepts payment via PayPal, MasterCard, and Visa.

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Pharma Wars: Purchasing Protection

August 30, 2011
49 Comments

Leaked online chats between the co-owners of the world’s largest pharmacy spam operation reveal the extent to which illicit organizations in Russia purchase political protection, and bribe public officials into initiating or stalling law enforcement investigations.

Last month, there was a leak of more than four years of chat logs seized by Russian police who had arrested and interrogated Dmitry Stupin, allegedly the co-owner of GlavMed and the now-defunct SpamIt, organizations that paid spammers millions of dollars each month to promote fly-by-night online pharmacies.

In the the Jan. 9, 2010 chat between Stupin and Igor Gusev, the alleged other owner of GlavMed and SpamIt, Gusev has just learned that he and his operation are under investigation by Russian authorities (Gusev would be formally charged with illegal business activities in October 2010, forcing the closure of SpamIt). Gusev says he may be able to purchase shelter from the charges by funneling money to key Russian politicians who have influence over investigators.

Specifically, Gusev suggests purchasing a sponsorship of the Volleyball Federation of Russia. The price tag for this is an official sponsorship fee of 10 million rubles (about $350,000 USD), plus $150,000 in cash. The official head of the federation, Nikolai Patrushev, is a powerful man in Russian law enforcement. Patrushev was director of the Russian FSB, the successor organization to the KGB, from 1999 to 2008; he has been secretary of the Security Council of Russia since 2008.

Sources say it is typical for Russian sport leagues and charities to be used as vehicles for funneling money into the pockets of policymakers. One example comes from a book by Lennart Dahlgren, former head of the Russian division of Swedish furniture maker IKEA. In Despite Absurdity: How I Conquered Russia While It Conquered Me, Dahlgren writes of having to pay bribes of 30 million Rubles ($1 million USD) to Russian charities that helped funnel money to bureaucrats and top officials.

In this chat, translated from Russian into English, Gusev mentions that a close friend of his family is a director general of the Volleyball Federation;

Gusev: We have big problems. Register fake mailbox somewhere. I will send you something very important.

Gusev: Let’s move Jabber to a new server and encrypt it. We’ll have a trusted communication channel. Everything is very bad 🙁

Gusev: asdas12334@mail.ru / mgadjadtwa2009. check the e-mail.

Gusev: Are you reading?

Stupin: Yes. Do not know what to say.

Gusev: There is nothing to say. We have only two ways: find someone from law enforcement, pay up and be under protection [or] be placed in jail for 7-9 years and do self-analysis. I have one more way out, but I could not decide regarding it in December, because it was very expensive. It is about 10 million rubles officially and 150K under the table.

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Experienced Money Mule, Will Travel

August 29, 2011
18 Comments

I’ve written a great deal about “money mules,” people looking for part-time employment who unwittingly or willingly help organized cyber thieves launder stolen funds. The most common question I get about money mules is: “Do any of them ever get prosecuted?” The answer is generally “no” because it’s hard to prove that these mules weren’t scammed. But recently, I encountered a mule who made it abundantly clear that he understood exactly what he was doing.

A complicit mule negotiating a new deal.

In June 2011, I was investigating an online banking heist against a company called Jackson Properties. Thieves had broken into Jackson’s computers and stolen the firm’s online banking credentials. They added a half dozen money mules to the company’s payroll account, using mules they’d acquired from a gang I call the Back Office group. This mule gang uses multiple bogus corporate names, and the Back Office front company that supplied the mules in this attack was called AMR Company.

Reginald, a 45-year-0ld Texas resident, was among the mules hired by AMR Company. Reggie communicated with the mule recruiters by logging into a Web site set up by the fake company, and checking for new messages. A source who had figured out how to view the administrator’s account (and hence, all messages on the server) sent me some choice screenshots from several mule communications.

On June 7, the mule recruiters sent Reginald a transfer of $4,910, claiming that Jackson Properties was its client. Reginald was to withdraw the money in cash and wire it overseas, minus a small commission. The payment never landed in his account; it was blocked when Jackson detected the fraudulent transactions and worked with its bank to get them reversed.

But that apparently did not deter our Reginald, who told his recruiter and manager at AMR Company that he understood the whole thing was a scam, and that he had done this sort of thing before. He said he was ready and willing to open additional bank accounts to help with future fraud schemes.

On June 8, Reggie signed into his account at AMR Company and wrote the following to Sarah, his erstwhile boss:

“Let me say from the start. I knew what this was about. I’ve had success working with others like yourself in the past, especially comrades from Russia. I know this game well. If you want to have an ally in the US, I’m your guy. I have more accounts. I’d like us to try again, with another account…Listen Sarah, I am all for making some money. I couldn’t care less about our banking system, anything we can get out [sic] it. Lets [sic] do it. I cant do this without you. I can open up accounts in different names, that’s easy for me. But I have no way of funding them like you do. Think it over and see if there’s a way we can make some money. Even if we only succeed one time…we will still succeeded. I have another account ready to go. Respond to me and I will send you the name, routing, account num, etc.”

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Coordinated ATM Heist Nets Thieves $13M

August 26, 2011
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An international cybercrime gang stole $13 million from a Florida-based financial institution earlier this year, by executing a highly-coordinated heist in which thieves used ATMs around the globe to cash out stolen prepaid debit cards, KrebsOnSecurity has learned.

Jacksonville based Fidelity National Information Services Inc. (FIS) bills itself as the world’s largest processor of prepaid debit cards; FIS claims to process more than 775 million transactions annually. The company disclosed the breach in its first quarter earnings statement issued May 3, 2011. But details of the attack remained shrouded in secrecy as the FBI and forensic investigators probed one of the biggest and most complex banking heists of its kind.

FIS said it had incurred a loss of approximately $13 million related to unauthorized activities involving one client and 22 prepaid cards on its Sunrise, Fla. based eFunds Prepaid Solutions, formerly WildCard Systems Inc., which was acquired by FIS in 2007.

FIS stated: “The Company has identified that 7,170 prepaid accounts may have been at risk and that three individual cardholders’ non-public information may have been disclosed as a result of the unauthorized activities. FIS worked with the impacted clients to take appropriate action, including blocking and reissuing cards for the affected accounts. The Company has taken steps to further enhance security and continues to work with Federal law enforcement officials on this matter.” The disclosure was scarcely noted by news media.

KrebsOnSecurity recently discovered previously undisclosed details of the successful escapade. According to sources close to the investigation, cyber thieves broke into the FIS network and targeted the Sunrise platform’s “open-loop” prepaid debit cards. The balances on these prepaid cards aren’t stored on the cards themselves; rather, the card numbers correspond to records in a central database, where the balances are recorded. Some prepaid cards cannot be used once their balance has been exhausted, but the prepaid cards used in this attack can be replenished by adding funds. Prepaid cards usually limit the amounts that cardholders can withdraw from a cash machine within a 24 hour period.

Apparently, the crooks were able to drastically increase or eliminate the withdrawal limits for 22 prepaid cards that they had obtained. The fraudsters then cloned the prepaid cards, and distributed them to co-conspirators in several major cities across Europe, Russia and Ukraine.

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Hybrid Hydras and Green Stealing Machines

August 24, 2011
8 Comments

Hybrids seem to be all the rage in the automobile industry, so it’s unsurprising that hybrid threats are the new thing in another industry that reliably ships updated product lines: The computer crime world. The public release of the source code for the infamous ZeuS Trojan earlier this year is spawning novel attack tools. And just as hybrid cars hold the promise of greater fuel efficiency, these nascent threats show the potential of the ZeuS source code leak for morphing ordinary, run-of-the-mill malware into far more efficient data-stealing machines.

Researchers at Trusteer have unearthed evidence that portions of the leaked ZeuS source code have been fused with recent versions of Ramnit, a computer worm first spotted in January 2010. Amid thousands of other password-stealing, file-infecting worms  capable of spreading via networked drives, Ramnit is unremarkable except in one respect: It is hugely prolific. According to a report (PDF) from Symantec, Ramnit accounted for 17.3 percent of all malicious software that the company detected in July 2011.

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