Krebs on Security

How Was Your Credit Card Stolen?

January 19, 2015

Almost once a week, I receive an email from a reader who has suffered credit card fraud and is seeking help figuring out which hacked merchant was responsible. I generally reply that this is a fruitless pursuit, and instead encourage readers to keep a close eye on their card statements and report any fraud. But it occurred to me recently that I’ve never published a primer on the types of card fraud and the likelihood with each of the cardholder ever learning how their account was compromised. This post is an effort to remedy that.

The card associations (Visa, MasterCard, et. al) very often know which merchant was compromised before even the banks or the merchant itself does. But they rarely tell banks which merchant got hacked. Rather, in response to a breach, the card associations will send each affected bank a list of card numbers that were compromised.

The bank may be able to work backwards from that list to the breached merchant if the merchant in question is not one that a majority of their cardholders shop at in a given month anyway. However, in the cases where banks do know which merchant caused a card to be compromised and/or replaced, the banks rarely share that information with their customers.

Here’s a look at some of the most common forms of credit card fraud:

Hacked main street merchant, restaurant:
Most often powered by malicious software installed on point-of-sale devices remotely.

Distinguishing characteristic: Most common and costly source of card fraud. Losses are high because crooks can take the information and produce counterfeit cards that can be used in big box stores to buy gift cards and/or expensive goods that can be easily resold for cash.

Chances of consumer learning source of fraud: Low, depending on customer card usage.

Processor breach:
A network compromise at a company that processes transactions between credit card issuing banks and merchant banks.

Distinguishing characteristic: High volume of card accounts can be stolen in a very short time.

Chances of consumer learning source of fraud: Virtually nil. Processor breaches are rare compared to retail break-ins, but it’s also difficult for banks to trace back fraud on a card to a processor. Card associations/banks generally don’t tell consumers when they do know.

Hacked point-of-sale service company/vendor:

Distinguishing characteristic: Can be time-consuming for banks and card associations to determine vendor responsible. Fraud is generally localized to a specific town or geographic region served by vendor.

Chances of consumer learning source of fraud: Low, given that compromised point-of-sale service company or vendor does not have a direct relationship with the card holder or issuing bank.

Hacked E-commerce Merchant:
A database or Web site compromise at an online merchant.

Distinguishing characteristic: Results in online fraud. Consumer likely to learn about fraud from monthly statement, incorrectly attribute fraud to merchant where unauthorized transaction occurred. Bank customer service representatives are trained not to give out information about the breached online merchant, or address information associated with the fraudulent order.

Chances of consumer learning source of fraud: Nil to low. Continue reading →

Another Lizard Arrested, Lizard Lair Hacked

January 16, 2015

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Several media outlets are reporting that authorities in the United Kingdom early this morning arrested an 18-year-old in connection with the denial-of-service attacks on Sony Playstation and Microsoft Xbox systems over Christmas. The arrest is one of several tied to a joint U.K. and U.S. law enforcement investigation into a group calling itself the “Lizard Squad,” and comes as the group’s attack-for-hire online service was completely compromised and leaked to investigators.

A BBC story does not name the individual, saying only that the youth was arrested at an address in Southport, near Liverpool, and that he was accused of unauthorized access to computer material and knowingly providing false information to law enforcement agencies in the United States. The notice about the arrest on the Web site of the Southeast Regional Organized Crime Unit states that this individual has been actively involved in several “swatting” incidents — phoning in fake hostage situations or bomb threats to prompt a police raid at a targeted address.

U.K. police declined to publicly name the individual arrested. But according to the Daily Mail, the youth is one Jordan Lee-Bevan. Known online variously as “Jordie,” “EvilJordie” and “GDKJordie,” the young man frequently adopts the persona of an African American gang member from Chicago, as evidenced in this (extremely explicit) interview he and other Lizard Squad members gave late last year. Jordie’s Twitter account also speaks volumes, although it hasn’t been saying much for the past 13 hours.

Update: Added link to Daily Mail story identifying Jordie as Lee-Bevan.

Original post:

An individual using variations on the “Jordie” nickname was named in this FBI criminal complaint (PDF) from Sept. 2014 as one of three from the U.K. suspected in a string of swatting attacks and bomb threats to schools and universities across the United States in the past year. According to that affidavit, Jordie was a member of a group of males aged 16-18 who called themselves the “ISISGang.”

In one of their most appalling stunts from September 2014, Jordie and his ISIS pals allegedly phoned in a threat to Sandy Hook Elementary — the site of the 2012 school massacre in Newtown, Ct. in which 20 kids and 6 adults were gunned down. According to investigators, the group told the school they were coming to the building with an assault rifle to “kill all your asses.”

In an unrelated development, not long after this publication broke the news that the Lizard Squad’s attack infrastructure is built on a network of thousands of hacked home Internet routers, someone hacked LizardStresser[dot]su, the Web site the group uses to coordinate attacks and sell subscriptions to its attacks-for-hire service. As I noted in a previous story, the attacks on Microsoft and Sony were merely meant to be commercials for this very “stresser” (a.k.a. “booter”) service, which allows paying customers to knock any Web site or individual offline for a small fee.

A copy of the LizardStresser customer database obtained by KrebsOnSecurity shows that it attracted more than 14,241 registered users, but only a few hundred appear to have funded accounts at the service. Interestingly, all registered usernames and passwords were stored in plain text. Also, the database indicates that customers of the service deposited more than USD $11,000 worth of bitcoins to pay for attacks on thousands of Internet addresses and Web sites (including this one).

One page of hundreds of support ticket requests filed by LizardStresser users.

Continue reading →

Park ‘N Fly, OneStopParking Confirm Breaches

January 14, 2015

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Late last year, KrebsOnSecurity wrote that two huge swaths of credit card numbers put up for sale in the cybercrime underground had likely been stolen from Park ‘N Fly and from OneStopParking.com, competing airport parking services that lets customers reserve spots in advance of travel via Internet reservation systems. This week, both companies confirmed that they had indeed suffered a breach.

When contacted by this author on Dec. 15, Atlanta-based Park ‘N Fly said while it had recently engaged multiple security firms to investigate breach claims, it had not found any proof of an intrusion. In a statement released Tuesday, however, the company acknowledged that its site was hacked and leaking credit card data, but stopped short of saying how long the breach persisted or how many customers may have been affected. A portion of their statement reads:

“Park ‘N Fly (“PNF”) has become aware of a security compromise involving payment card data processed through its e-commerce website. PNF has been working continuously to understand the nature and scope of the incident, and has engaged third-party data forensics experts to assist with its investigation. The data compromise has been contained. While the investigation is ongoing, it has been determined that the security of some data from certain payment cards that were used to make reservations through PNF’s e-commerce website is at risk. The data potentially at risk includes the card number, cardholder’s name and billing address, card expiration date, and CVV code. Other loyalty customer data potentially at risk includes email addresses, Park ‘N Fly passwords, and telephone numbers.”

The Park ‘N Fly homepage now includes a conspicuous notice stating that the Web site is temporarily unable to process transactions and directs customers to a 1-800 for reservations.

Reading the Park ‘N Fly disclosure made me wonder if anything had changed over at OneStopParking.com, a Florence, Ky.-based competitor that KrebsOnSecurity reported Dec. 30, 2014 as the likely source of another e-commerce breach. Reached via phone this morning, the site’s manager Amer Ghanem said the company recently determined that hackers had broken in to its systems via a vulnerability in Joomla for which patches were made available in Sept. 2014. Unfortunately for OneStopParking.com and its customers, the company put off applying that Joomla update because it broke portions of the site. Continue reading →

Adobe, Microsoft Push Critical Security Fixes

January 14, 2015

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Microsoft on Tuesday posted eight security updates to fix serious security vulnerabilities in computers powered by its Windows operating system. Separately, Adobe pushed out a patch to plug at least nine holes in its Flash Player software.

Leading the batch of Microsoft patches for 2015 is a drama-laden update to fix a vulnerability in Windows 8.1 that Google researchers disclosed just two days ago. Google has a relatively new policy of publicly disclosing flaws 90 days after they are reported to the responsible software vendor — whether or not that vendor has fixed the bug yet. That 90-day period elapsed over the weekend, causing Google to spill the beans and potentially help attackers develop an exploit in advance of Patch Tuesday.

For its part, Microsoft issued a strongly-worded blog post chiding Google for what it called a “gotcha” policy that leaves Microsoft users in the lurch. Somehow I doubt this is the last time we’ll see this tension between these two software giants. But then again, who said patching had to be boring? For a full rundown of updates fixed in today’s release, see this link. Continue reading →

Toward Better Privacy, Data Breach Laws

January 13, 2015

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President Obama on Monday outlined a proposal that would require companies to inform their customers of a data breach within 30 days of discovering their information has been hacked. But depending on what is put in and left out of any implementing legislation, the effort could well lead to more voluminous but less useful disclosure. Here are a few thoughts about how a federal breach law could produce fewer yet more meaningful notice that may actually help prevent future breaches.

The plan is intended to unify nearly four dozen disparate state data breach disclosure laws into a single, federal standard. But as experts quoted in this story from The New York Times rightly note, much rides on whether or not any federal breach disclosure law is a baseline law that allows states to pass stronger standards.

For example, right now seven states already have so-called “shot-clock” disclosure laws, some more stringent; Connecticut requires insurance firms to notify no more than five days after discovering a breach; California has similar requirements for health providers. Also, at least 14 states and the District of Columbia have laws that permit affected consumers to sue a company for damages in the wake of a breach. What’s more, many states define “personal information” differently and hence have different triggers for what requires a company to disclose. For an excellent breakdown on the various data breach disclosure laws, see this analysis by BakerHostetler (PDF).

Leaving aside the weighty question of federal preemption, I’d like to see a discussion here and elsewhere about a requirement which mandates that companies disclose how they got breached. Naturally, we wouldn’t expect companies to disclose the specific technologies they’re using in a public breach document. Additionally, forensics firms called in to investigate aren’t always able to precisely pinpoint the cause or source of the breach.

But this information could be publicly shared in a timely way when it’s available, and appropriately anonymized. It’s unfortunate that while we’ve heard time and again about credit card breaches at retail establishments, we know very little about how those organizations were breached in the first place. A requirement to share the “how” of the hack when it’s known and anonymized by industry would be helpful. Continue reading →

KrebsOnSecurity Wins Ntl’ Journalism Award

January 12, 2015

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I put this out on Twitter last Friday but wanted to note it here in the blog as well: The National Press Foundation graciously announced last week that it plans to award me its Chairman’s Citation, which “confers recognition on individuals whose accomplishments fall outside the traditional categories of excellence.”

I’m truly honored by this award, and more than a little humbled by the pedigree of its previous winners. The NPF’s Chairman’s Citation was last awarded in 2012 to the late, great New York Times reporter Anthony Shadid, who died in Syria that same year. Shadid, a two-time Pulitzer Prize winner, was also a former Washington Post reporter. Likewise, the award was presented in 2010 to Colbert King, a Pulitzer Prize-winning columnist at The Post.

This honor also gives me another opportunity and platform for proselytizing to media colleagues about the merits and rewards of being an independent journalist. Some of my reporter friends probably get sick of hearing it from me, but there has never been a more important time for reporters who are passionate about creating original, impactful content to consider going it alone. A diversity of authoritative (and accountable) voices on important topics keeps the mainstream media honest and on its toes. More crucially, it helps inspire and cultivate the next generation of the Fourth Estate.

A hearty “THANK YOU” to the NPF for this recognition, and to the faithful readers here who make this all worthwhile!

Lizard Stresser Runs on Hacked Home Routers

January 9, 2015

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The online attack service launched late last year by the same criminals who knocked Sony and Microsoft’s gaming networks offline over the holidays is powered mostly by thousands of hacked home Internet routers, KrebsOnSecurity.com has discovered.

Just days after the attacks on Sony and Microsoft, a group of young hoodlums calling themselves the Lizard Squad took responsibility for the attack and announced the whole thing was merely an elaborate commercial for their new “booter” or “stresser” site — a service designed to help paying customers knock virtually any site or person offline for hours or days at a time. As it turns out, that service draws on Internet bandwidth from hacked home Internet routers around the globe that are protected by little more than factory-default usernames and passwords.

The Lizard Stresser’s add-on plans. Despite this site’s claims, it is *not* sponsored by this author.

In the first few days of 2015, KrebsOnSecurity was taken offline by a series of large and sustained denial-of-service attacks apparently orchestrated by the Lizard Squad. As I noted in a previous story, the booter service — lizardstresser[dot]su — is hosted at an Internet provider in Bosnia that is home to a large number of malicious and hostile sites.

That provider happens to be on the same “bulletproof” hosting network advertised by “sp3c1alist,” the administrator of the cybercrime forum Darkode. Until a few days ago, Darkode and LizardStresser shared the same Internet address. Interestingly, one of the core members of the Lizard Squad is an individual who goes by the nickname “Sp3c.”

On Jan. 4, KrebsOnSecurity discovered the location of the malware that powers the botnet. Hard-coded inside of that malware was the location of the LizardStresser botnet controller, which happens to be situated in the same small swath Internet address space occupied by the LizardStresser Web site (217.71.50.x)

The malicious code that converts vulnerable systems into stresser bots is a variation on a piece of rather crude malware first documented in November by Russian security firm Dr. Web, but the malware itself appears to date back to early 2014 (Google’s Chrome browser should auto-translate that page; for others, a Google-translated copy of the Dr. Web writeup is here).

As we can see in that writeup, in addition to turning the infected host into attack zombies, the malicious code uses the infected system to scan the Internet for additional devices that also allow access via factory default credentials, such as “admin/admin,” or “root/12345”. In this way, each infected host is constantly trying to spread the infection to new home routers and other devices accepting incoming connections (via telnet) with default credentials.

The botnet is not made entirely of home routers; some of the infected hosts appear to be commercial routers at universities and companies, and there are undoubtedly other devices involved. The preponderance of routers represented in the botnet probably has to do with the way that the botnet spreads and scans for new potential hosts. But there is no reason the malware couldn’t spread to a wide range of devices powered by the Linux operating system, including desktop servers and Internet-connected cameras. Continue reading →

Thieves Jackpot ATMs With ‘Black Box’ Attack

January 6, 2015

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Previous stories on KrebsOnSecurity about ATM skimming attacks have focused on innovative fraud devices made to attach to the outside of compromised ATMs. Security experts are now warning about the emergence of a new class of skimming scams aimed at draining ATM cash deposits via a novel and complex attack.

The attackers responsible for this "black box" ATM attack relied on a mobile device and a USB-based circuit board.

The attackers responsible for this “black box” ATM hack relied on a mobile device and a USB-based circuit board.

At issue is a form of ATM fraud known as a “black box” attack. In a black box assault, the crooks gain physical access to the top of the cash machine. From there, the attackers are able to disconnect the ATM’s cash dispenser from the “core” (the computer and brains of the device), and then connect their own computer that can be used to issue commands forcing the dispenser to spit out cash.

In this particular attack, the thieves included an additional step: They plugged into the controller a USB-based circuit board that NCR believes was designed to fool the ATM’s core into thinking it was still connected to the cash dispenser.

“They didn’t have to do this [to get away with the money] but our guess is they thought this component would buy them some time,” before the ATM’s owners figured out something was wrong, said Charlie Harrow, solutions manager for global security at NCR.

NCR says the crooks then attached a smart phone (a virgin, out-of-the-box Samsung Galaxy 4), which they used as a conduit through which to send commands to the cash dispenser remotely. According to Harrow, the mobile phone was set up to relay commands through a dynamic IP service.

“Which meant that the real attacker sending the commands was somewhere remote from the ATM,” Harrow said.

Why would the ATM thieves set it up so that the dispense commands could only be issued remotely, when co-conspirators would still need to be present at the hacked cash machine to retrieve the money? Harrow believes it’s so that the boss running the crime operation can call the shots.

“There is no honor among thieves, and these guys will delegate responsibility,” Harrow observed. “That way, you have the Mr. Big back at the hideout who’s sending the commands, and the mules are the ones at the ATMs. So the mule who has the black box is unable to activate the attack unless he gets the command from the Mr. Big, and the mobile phone is the best way to do that.” Continue reading →

Who’s Attacking Whom? Realtime Attack Trackers

January 5, 2015

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It seems nearly every day we’re reading about Internet attacks aimed at knocking sites offline and breaking into networks, but it’s often difficult to visualize this type of activity. In this post, we’ll take a look at multiple ways of tracking online attacks and attackers around the globe and in real-time.

A couple of notes about these graphics. Much of the data that powers these live maps is drawn from a mix of actual targets and “honeypots,” decoy systems that security firms deploy to gather data about the sources, methods and frequency of online attacks. Also, the organizations referenced in some of these maps as “attackers” typically are compromised systems within those organizations that are being used to relay attacks launched from someplace else.

The Cyber Threat Map from FireEye recently became famous in a 60 Minutes story on cyberattacks against retailers and their credit card systems. This graphic reminds me of the ICBM monitors from NORAD, as featured in the 1984 movie War Games (I’m guessing that association is intentional). Not a lot of raw data included in this map, but it’s fun to watch.

FireEye’s “Cyber Threat Map”

My favorite — and perhaps the easiest way to lose track of half your workday (and bandwidth) comes from the folks at Norse Corp. Their map — IPViking — includes a wealth of data about each attack, such as the attacking organization name and Internet address, the target’s city and service being attacked, as well as the most popular target countries and origin countries.

Norse’s IPViking attack map is eye candy-addictive, but very resource-intensive.

Continue reading →

Lizard Kids: A Long Trail of Fail

December 31, 2014

81 Comments

The Lizard Squad, a band of young hooligans that recently became Internet famous for launching crippling distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks against the largest online gaming networks, is now advertising its own Lizard-branded DDoS-for-hire service. Read on for a decidedly different take on this offering than what’s being portrayed in the mainstream media.

Lizard Stresser login page taunts this author.

The new service, lizardstresser[dot]su, seems a natural evolution for a group of misguided youngsters that has sought to profit from its attention-seeking activities. The Lizard kids only ceased their attack against Sony’s Playstation and Microsoft’s Xbox Live networks last week after MegaUpload founder Kim Dotcom offered the group $300,000 worth of vouchers for his service in exchange for ending the assault. And in a development probably that shocks no one, the gang’s members cynically told Dailydot that both attacks were just elaborate commercials for and a run-up to this DDoS-for-hire offering.

The group is advertising the new “booter service” via its Twitter account, which has some 132,000+ followers. Subscriptions range from $5.99 per month for the ability to knock a target offline for 100 seconds at a time, to $129.99 monthly for DDoS attacks lasting more than eight hours.

In any case, I’m not terribly interested in turning this post into a commercial for the Lizard kids; rather, it’s a brain dump of related information I’ve gathered from various sources in the past 24 hours about the individuals and infrastructure that support the site.

In a show of just how little this group knows about actual hacking and coding, the source code for the service appears to have been lifted in its entirety from titaniumstresser, another, more established DDoS-for-hire booter service. In fact, these Lizard geniuses are so inexperienced at coding that they inadvertently exposed information about all of their 1,700+ registered users (more on this in a moment).

These two services, like most booters, are hidden behind CloudFlare, a content distribution service that lets sites obscure their true Internet address. In case anyone cares, Lizardstresser’s real Internet address currently is 217.71.50.57, at a hosting facility in Bosnia.

In any database of leaked forum or service usernames, it is usually safe to say that the usernames which show up first in the list are the administrators and/or creators of the site. The usernames exposed by the coding and authentication weaknesses in LizardStresser show that the first few registered users are “anti” and “antichrist.” As far as I can tell, these two users are the same guy: A ne’er-do-well who has previously sold access to his personal DDoS-for-hire service on Darkode — a notorious English-language cybercrime forum that I have profiled extensively on this blog.

As detailed in a recent, highly entertaining post on the blog Malwaretech, LizardSquad and Darkode are practically synonymous and indistinguishable now. Anyone curious about why the Lizard kids have picked on Yours Truly can probably find the answer in that Malwaretech story. As that post notes, the main online chat room for the Lizard kids (at lizardpatrol[dot]com) also is hidden behind CloudFlare, but careful research shows that it is actually hosted at the same Internet address as Darkode (5,38,89,132).

A suggested new banner for this blog from the jokers at black hat forum Darkode, which shares a server with the main chat forum for the Lizard kids.

In a show of just how desperate these kids are for attention, consider that the login page for LizardStresser currently says “Hosted somewhere on Brian Krebs’ forehead: Donate to the forehead reduction foundation, simply send money to krebsonsecurity@gmail.com on PayPal.” Many of you have done that in the past couple of days, although I doubt as a result of visiting the Lizard kids’ silly site. Anyway, for those generous donors, a hearty “thank you.” Continue reading →

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