Posts Tagged: FCC


25
Oct 16

Senator Prods Federal Agencies on IoT Mess

The co-founder of the newly launched Senate Cybersecurity Caucus is pushing federal agencies for possible solutions and responses to the security threat from insecure “Internet of Things” (IoT) devices, such as the network of hacked security cameras and digital video recorders that were reportedly used to help bring about last Friday’s major Internet outages.

In letters to the Federal Communications Commission (FCC), the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), Virginia Senator Mark Warner (D) called the proliferation of insecure IoT devices a threat to resiliency of the Internet.

“Manufacturers today are flooding the market with cheap, insecure devices, with few market incentives to design the products with security in mind, or to provide ongoing support,” Warner wrote to the agencies. “And buyers seem unable to make informed decisions between products based on their competing security features, in part because there are no clear metrics.”

The letter continues:

“Because the producers of these insecure IoT devices currently are insulated from any standards requirements, market feedback, or liability concerns, I am deeply concerned that we are witnessing a ‘tragedy of the commons’ threat to the continued functioning of the internet, as the security so vital to all internet users remains the responsibility of none. Further, buyers have little recourse when, despite their best efforts, security failures occur” [link added].

As Warner’s letter notes, last week’s attack on online infrastructure provider Dyn was launched at least in part by Mirai, a now open-source malware strain that scans the Internet for routers, cameras, digital video recorders and other Internet of Things “IoT” devices protected only by the factory-default passwords. Continue reading →


6
Nov 15

FCC Fines Cox $595K Over Lizard Squad Hack

In September 2014, I penned a column called “We Take Your Privacy and Security. Seriously.” It recounted my experience receiving notice from my former Internet service provider — Cox Communications — that a customer service employee had been tricked into giving away my personal information to hackers. This week, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) fined Cox $595,000 for the incident that affected me and 60 other customers.

coxletterI suspected, but couldn’t prove at the time, that the band of teenage cybercriminals known as the Lizard Squad was behind the attack. According to a press release issued Thursday by the FCC, the intrusion began after LizardSquad member “Evil Jordie” phoned up Cox support pretending to be from the company’s IT department, and convinced both a Cox customer service representative and Cox contractor to enter their account IDs and passwords into a fake, or “phishing,” website.

“With those credentials, the hacker gained unauthorized access to Cox customers’ personally identifiable information, which included names, addresses, email addresses, secret questions/answers, PIN, and in some cases partial Social Security and driver’s license numbers of Cox’s cable customers, as well as Customer Proprietary Network Information (CPNI) of the company’s telephone customers,” the FCC said. “The hacker then posted some customers’ information on social media sites, changed some customers’ account passwords, and shared the compromised account credentials with another alleged member of the Lizard Squad.”

My September 2014 column took Cox to task for not requiring two-step authentication for employees: Had the company done so, this phishing attack probably would have failed. As a condition of the settlement with the FCC, the commission said Cox has agreed to adopt a comprehensive compliance plan, which establishes an information security program that includes annual system audits, internal threat monitoring, penetration testing, and additional breach notification systems and processes to protect customers’ personal information, and the FCC will monitor Cox’s compliance with the consent decree for seven years. Continue reading →


17
Apr 13

SWATting Incidents Tied to ID Theft Sites?

Many readers have been asking for an update on the “SWATting” incident at my home last month, in which someone claiming to be me fraudulently reported a home invasion in progress at my address, prompting a heavily armed police response. There are two incremental developments on this story. The first is I’ve learned more about how the hoax was perpetrated. The second is that new clues suggest that the same individual(s) responsible also have been SWATting Hollywood celebrities and posting their personal information on site called exposed.re.

The day before my SWATting, I wrote a story about a site called exposed.su, which was posting the Social Security numbers, previous addresses, phone numbers and other sensitive information on a slew of high-profile individuals, from the director of the FBI to Kim Kardashian, Bill Gates and First Lady Michelle Obama. I wrote about the site by way of explaining that — as painful as it may be to admit — this information should no longer be considered private, because it is available quite cheaply via a number of shady services advertised in underground cybercrime forums.

After migrating the data from Exposed.su to Exposed.re, the curator added [Swatted] notations.


[Swatted] notations were added to celebrity names after Exposed.su became Exposed.re

To illustrate this reality, I pointed to one underground site in particular — the now-defunct ssndob.ru (it is now at another domain) — that could be used to pull all of this information on just about anyone, including all of those whose information was listed at the time on exposed.su. In a follow-up investigation I posted on Mar. 18, 2013, I cited sources who claimed that the DDoS against my site and the simultaneous SWATting attack on my home was in retaliation for my writing about ssndob.ru, which allegedly some of those involved in the attacks prized and did not wish to see shuttered.

Specifically, two different sources placed blame for the attacks on a young hacker named “Phobia,” who they said was part of a group of Xbox gaming enthusiasts who used ssndob.ru to look up Social Security numbers belonging to high-value Xbox account holders — particularly those belonging to Microsoft Xbox Live employees. Armed with that information, and some social engineering skills, the hackers could apparently trick Microsoft’s tech support folks into transferring control over the accounts to the hackers. “I heard he got pissed that you released the site he uses,” one of the sources told me, explaining why he thought Phobia was involved.

Incidentally, two days after my story ran, several news outlets reported that Microsoft had confirmed it is investigating the hacking of Xbox Live accounts belonging to some “high-profile” Microsoft employees, and that it is actively working with law enforcement on the matter.

A little digging suggested that Phobia was a 20-year-old Ryan Stevenson from in Milford, Ct. In that Mar. 18 story, I interviewed Phobia, who confessed to being the hacker who broke into and deleted the Apple iCloud account of wired.com reporter Mat Honan. In subsequent postings on Twitter, Honan expressed surprise that no one else had drawn the connections between Phobia and Stevenson earlier, based on the amount of open source information linking the two identities. In his own reporting on the attack that wiped his iCloud data, Honan had agreed not to name Phobia in return for an explanation of how the hack was carried out.

Geographic distribution of servers observed in Mar. 14, 2013 attack on KrebsOnSecurity. Source: Prolexic

Geographic distribution of servers observed in Mar. 14, 2013 attack on KrebsOnSecurity. Source: Prolexic

The week after my story ran, I heard from someone who lives in Stevenson’s neighborhood and who watched federal agents and police descend on Stevenson’s home on Mar. 20. I was later able to corroborate that information with a police officer in Connecticut, who confirmed that authorities had seized several boxes of items from the Stevenson residence that day.

If Stevenson was as involved as his erstwhile gaming buddies claim, I can’t say that I’m sad to learn that he got his own police raid. However, I do not believe he was the one responsible for sending the emergency response team to my home. I believe that the person or persons responsible is/are still at large, and that Stevenson was merely thrown under the bus as a convenient diversion. But more on that at another time.

At the end of March, exposed.su was shut down, and the content there was migrated over to a new domain — exposed.re. The curator(s) of this site has been adding more celebrities and public figures, but there is another, far more curious, notation on some of the listings at the new version of the site: Several of those named have the designation [Swatted] next to them, including P. Diddy, Justin Timberlake and Ryan Seacrest (see the collage above). It’s worth noting that not all of those listed on exposed.re who were SWATted recently are designated as such on the site.

Continue reading →


6
Oct 10

FCC May Confront ISPs on Bot, Malware Scourge

The Federal Communications Commissions (FCC) may soon kickstart a number of new initiatives to encourage Internet service providers to do a better job cleaning up bot-infected PCs and malicious Web sites on their networks, KrebsOnSecurity has learned.

Earlier this year, the commission requested public comment on its “Cybersecurity Roadmap,” an ambitious plan to identify dangerous vulnerabilities in the Internet infrastructure, as well as threats to consumers, businesses and governments. Twice over the past few weeks I had an opportunity to chat with Jeffery Goldthorp, associate bureau chief of the FCC’s Public Safety & Homeland Security Bureau, about some of the ideas the commission is considering for inclusion in the final roadmap, due to be released in January 2011.

Goldthorp said there are several things that the commission can do to create incentives for ISPs to act more vigorously to protect residential users from infections by bot programs.

“Along those lines would be something like an ISP ‘code of conduct’ and best practice-oriented approach that ISPs could opt-in to or not, basically a standard of behavior for ISPs to follow when they find that a user of theirs has been infected,” Goldthorp said. “The goal of that would be to clean up the consumer and residential networks. We’re also very interested in trying to figure out if there are rules we have on our books that stand in the way of ISPs being more proactive and creating a safer environment for consumers online.”

In addition, Goldthorp said the FCC is considering ways to encourage ISPs to be more proactive in dealing with malicious Web sites.

“At the server level, we’re looking at doing things that would allow us in an operational role to apply our jurisdiction with ISPs and try to reduce the time to remediation of things like malicious hosts and phishing or spam sites,” he said. “That’s really an area that [the FCC is] doing nothing in right now. We don’t get any information now about what those sites are and what we could do about them. So, we expect that there will be specific things we’d propose on all those areas of the roadmap.”

Prompted in part by the FCC’s request for comment, I wrote a column for CSO Online last month in which I called on the commission to begin measuring the responsiveness of ISPs in quashing malicious threats that take up residence on their networks. One of the ways I suggested the commission could do that is by publishing data about badness on these networks – data that is already being collected by a myriad of mostly volunteer-led groups that monitor this type of activity.

Continue reading →


2
Sep 10

Toward a Culture of Security Measurement

“Our dependence on all things cyber as a society is now inestimably irreversible and irreversibly inestimable.”

Yeah, I had to re-read that line a few times, too. Which is probably why I’ve put off posting a note here about the article from which the above quote was taken, a thought-provoking essay in the Harvard National Security Journal by Dan Geer, chief information security philosopher officer for In-Q-Tel, the not-for-profit venture capital arm of the Central Intelligence Agency.

The essay is well worth reading for anyone remotely interested in hard-to-solve security problems. Geer is better than most at tossing conversational hand grenades and then walking away, and this piece doesn’t disappoint. For example:

“Looking forward, without universal strong authentication, tomorrow’s cybercriminal will not need the fuss and bother of maintaining a botnet when, with a few hundred stolen credit cards, he will be able to buy all the virtual machines he needs from cloud computing operators. In short, my third conclusion is that if the tariff of security is paid, it will be paid in the coin of privacy.”

Geer’s prose can be long-winded and occasionally sesquipedalian (such as the phrase “Accretive sequestration of social policy”), but then he turns around and shows off his selective economy with words by crafting statements like:

“..demand for security expertise so outstrips supply that the charlatan fraction is rising.”

In the essay, Geer touches on a pet issue of mine: Accountability for insecurity. I recently wrote an editorial for CSO Online addressing a public request for advice by the Federal Communications Commission (FCC), which wants ideas on how to craft a “Cybersecurity Roadmap” as part of its $7 billion national broadband initiative.

In that column, I suggest that the FCC find a way to measure and publish data about the number and longevity of specific cyber security threats resident on domestic ISPs and hosting providers. I also suggest that the government could achieve this goal largely by collecting and analyzing data from the many mainly volunteer-led efforts that are already measuring this stuff.

Geer warns readers that “the demand for ‘safe pipes’ inexorably leads to deputizing those who own the most pipes.” But mine isn’t a “punish or regulate ISPs-for-having-lots-of-security-problems” approach. Instead, it’s more of a “publish a reputation score with the imprimatur of the federal government in the hopes that the ISPs will be shamed into more proactively addressing abuse issues” idea.

Who knows if my idea would work, but it wouldn’t be terribly risky or expensive to try. After all, as Geer said, “security is a means and that game play cannot improve without a scorekeeping mechanism.”

“These are heady problems,” he concludes. “They go to the heart of sovereignty.  They go to the heart of culture.  They go to the heart of ‘Land of the Free and Home of the Brave’.  They will not be solved centrally, yet neither will they be solved without central assistance.  We have before us a set of bargains, bargains between the Devil and the Deep Blue Sea.  And not to decide is to decide.”

Cue the music.